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Abstract 
In the post-World War Two era, political decolonisation swept across Africa. In the 
wake of decolonisation a wide variety of political leadership outcomes have emerged. 
In many national contexts indigenous political stakeholders were required to wrest 
political control from colonial powers. This study will compare the progress of the 
post-colonial political leadership experiences in Kenya and Tanzania - in order to 
ascertain the nature of the unique pressures and constraints placed upon first 
generation post-colonial political leaders. This will be framed and informed through 
the lens of contemporary and historical theories of leadership. Developing a greater 
understanding of the leadership experiences of these first-generation post 
decolonisation leaders will provide greater insight into the nature of post 
decolonisation leadership in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Introduction  
‘Governments set up overnight, like everything in nature whose growth is 
forced, lack strong roots and ramifications. So they are destroyed in the first 
bad spell. This is inevitable unless those who have suddenly become princes are 
of such prowess that overnight they can learn how to preserve what fortune has 
suddenly tossed in their laps, and unless they can lay foundations such as other 
princes would have already been building on.’ – Niccolo Machiavelli1  
In the 1960s and 70’s, a new generation of ‘princes’ inherited Africa. They inherited 
their political kingdoms from a raft of spent and retiring colonial powers. The British, 
French, Belgians and Portuguese were the last to retreat from Africa; Germany and 
Italy’s retreat had been secured earlier. During the ‘Scramble for Africa’, commencing 
around a century before, the European powers laid claim to almost the entire 
continent. During the ‘scramble’, the various ‘halls of power’ in Western Europe saw 
the construction of crudely drawn maps of the continent, and the wholesale ‘carving 
up’ of one of the last frontiers of imperialism. Martin Meredith asserts that ‘by the 
time the Scramble for Africa was over, some 10,000 African polities had been 
amalgamated into forty European colonies and protectorates. Thus were born the 
modern states of Africa.’2  
As the age of imperialism drew to a close, the colonial-state was to be replaced by the 
self-determined African nation-state. At the apex of these new states were the 
‘princes’ referenced above. This thesis is a study not only of these ‘princes’, but the 
institutions and context that formed around them. It is a study of leadership; which is a 
dynamic relationship between the leader and their context. This is not a ‘systems 
analysis’ or a study of the unique institutional framework arising in Africa during the 
period of decolonisation – it is a study of the lead actors within the institutions. It also 
                                                          
1
 Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, 1513, in Jackson, R., and Rosberg, C., Personal Rule in Black Africa, 
Berkeley, 1982, p. v.  
2
 Meredith, Martin, The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence, London, 2006, p. 2 
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a study of the dynamic relationship between the actor’s leadership and the wider 
political context or environment within which they operated. This environment or 
milieu was distinctively and powerfully framed by the colonial experience. The cases 
employed in this thesis are the leadership experiences of Jomo Kenyatta and Julius 
Nyerere. Both leaders were East African, and both inherited their leadership from the 
proud and expansive British Empire. The British approach to colonial establishment 
and governance did much to frame the leadership environment in which the selected 
actors operated. This thesis is therefore titled ‘Political Leadership after the British: A 
Study of Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere.’  
Untrained musings on African independence leadership can often conjure up crude 
references to the emergence of one party-states; or dictatorship, corruption, tribalism, 
civil conflict and a general plunder of the state’s resources for enrichment of a few 
elites. In several cases there is a body of evidence that supports such accusations, 
however, to generalise on the state of all African political leadership, using these crude 
terms is inherently misguided and unhelpful. Joseph Mobutu can legitimately be 
referred to as ‘the great plunderer,’ in reference to his outrageous mismanagement of 
what is referred to today as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.3 The hubris of 
Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah also provides the untrained eye with evidence to support 
such generalisations; as could the bizarre and tyrannical leadership of Hastings Banda 
in Malawi.4 Whilst cases of significant political mismanagement were unfortunately 
recurrent among the cohort of independence leaders in Africa, this thesis finds no 
evidence to support any assertion that this was a continent-wide phenomenon.  This 
                                                          
3
 Meredith, pp. 293 - 308 
4
 Ibid, p. 165 
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thesis instead seeks to address the unique strengths and weaknesses of the leadership 
of the specific cases, within in their specific environments.  
The British Empire manifested itself in a variety of ways depending on the location of 
operation. Analysis of the impact of British colonial practice on independence 
leadership must be measured in a way that acknowledges the significant variance and 
contradictions that existed within the British imperial system. This thesis analyses the 
political leadership of Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, as impacted upon by their 
unique preceding British colonial systems. This analysis is done with a view to test the 
applicability of the political leadership theories advanced by James McGregor Burns 
and Frederick Greenstein. Both theorists have written extensively on political 
leadership at transitional moments in history, and advance different frameworks for 
the analysis of leadership behaviour. Both theorists place substantial emphasis on 
context, a bias that fits this thesis superbly well – as it is a study of leadership in 
context. Burns’ contextual approach focuses heavily on the orientation of what he calls 
‘the followership’- that is the citizenry, the recipients of leadership. Greenstein’s 
contextual analysis is broader. He calls for the researcher to assess the ‘stability’ of the 
entire environment that surrounds the leader. Greenstein also advises the researcher 
to look to the ‘strategic location’ of the actor as an important indicator of likely 
leadership outcomes. These ideas, and their relationship to British colonialism in 
Africa, will be developed much more thoroughly in the following chapter.  
As noted, the British Empire forms much of the backdrop for this study. 
Generalisations about the nature of the British Empire can be as equally misguided and 
unhelpful as the aforementioned and inaccurate musings about independence 
governance. The British Empire cannot be analysed as a single unit. The following 
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chapters dedicate considerable analysis to how the Empire manifested itself within 
different contexts; the forces that drove the differences, and how these manifestations 
subsequently framed the leadership equation. The body of literature available on the 
British Empire is of remarkable size, and within the large body there are a wide variety 
of perspectives that are often conflicting. A significant portion of the following chapter 
is therefore assigned to reviewing perspectives on the British Empire, so as to ensure it 
is represented accurately within the leadership equation that is projected to emerge 
from this thesis.  
Following the analysis of literature on empire and the theoretical discussion on 
leadership, this thesis will then turn in subsequent chapters to the cases of Jomo 
Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere. The leadership experiences of the two individuals will be 
exposed in as much detail as possible so as to further illuminate the theoretical 
discussion on political leadership after the British in Africa. The narrative of their own 
political development and leadership practice is overlaid with the narrative of the 
British colonial operations in their own unique contexts. This should provide the 
necessary discussion of the inputs and outputs that make up the leadership equation 
this thesis seeks to expose. This will enable conclusions to be drawn on the dynamic 
nature of political leadership after the British in Africa; conclusions arising from the 
experiences of Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere.  
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Chapter One - Literature Review  
The most effective method for conceptualising the raft of literature that feeds into this 
thesis is to envisage a ‘T-Intersection’ where the three major channels are; literature 
on the British Empire, applicable political leadership theory and literature on 
independence African political leadership.  
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – The intersection of relevant literature to this thesis 
Within these three major subject areas there are obviously a myriad of sub-groups of 
literature, for example specific biographies of subjects, studies of specific features of 
Empire, or different sub-strata of political leadership theory.  
This literature review will commence with a review of the literature relevant to the 
subject’s British Empire elements. This is the literature that focuses on British Imperial 
operations in Africa (with major reference to the subject countries). It covers 
everything from ideologies and theories of Empire to the plain statistics that articulate 
the story of British imperial activity. Useful starting points for this process are the 
general histories of Empire – such as Niall Ferguson’s ‘Empire – How Britain Made the 
Modern World,’ or John Darwin’s ‘The Empire Project – The Rise and Fall of the British 
World System, 1830 – 1970.’ Following the review of the generalist literature on the 
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subject, detailed accounts on British imperial operations in the subject countries will 
be reviewed. Special attention will be paid to literature that focuses on the 
intersection between empire and indigenous leadership.  
The subsequent phase of the review will be focused on the relevant political leadership 
theory. Frederick Greenstein’s thesis on leadership in environments of high levels of 
restructuring has been deemed directly applicable to this subject - so therefore will be 
an important piece of theoretical literature to be reviewed. James McGregor Burns’ 
analysis also provides a wealth of assistance to this thesis.  
Literature on the British Empire  
The precursor to global capitalism 
One of the most prolific writers on this subject in recent times is Niall Ferguson. His 
two major texts on the subject are Empire – The Rise and Demise of the British World 
Order and the Lessons for Global Power and Empire- How Britain Made the Modern 
World. Ferguson is an economic historian with a specific focus on the history of 
financial markets. This naturally frames a considerable portion of his work within the 
parameters of economic thought. Ferguson’s thesis rests on the principle that British 
Imperial success was in large part a result of the strength of the British Government’s 
financial institutions – inherited and developed from the Dutch Imperial model that 
preceded them.5 Expanding from this premise Ferguson makes continual assertion that 
the financial paradigms which governed British Imperial thinking - established the 
context for the subsequent ascendency of modern global capitalism.  
 
                                                          
5
 Ferguson, Niall, Empire – How Britain Made the Modern World, London 2004, pp. 1 - 29  
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Ferguson and the ‘night watchman’ state 
Ferguson also displays a considerable amount of sympathy for an idea that the 
Viceroy of India Lord Curzon,  articulated over one hundred years ago, that, ‘the British 
Empire was the greatest force for good the world had ever seen’6. Ferguson argues the 
British Empire was responsible for the dissemination of ideas of liberty, representative 
assemblies, the limited ‘night watchman’ state, Common Law and civilised forms of 
land tenure7 – among Britain’s vast array of dominions, colonies, protectorates and 
spheres of influence. Ferguson’s claims are buttressed by arguments around 
improvements in the health, education and infrastructural development in colonial 
society, when compared with pre-colonial times. This particular justification of Empire 
is naturally challenged by a multitude of authors. John Cartwright, author of Political 
Leadership in Africa, for example identifies the limited ‘night watchman’ state as one 
of the key contributing forces in the drift toward leadership problems that have been 
observed in the post-independence period.8 This theme has proven to be a major 
contributor to this thesis. Presumably because of Ferguson’s affiliation to the 
economic theories of natural markets, he seems to believe that the limited ‘night 
watchman’ state was a positive British contribution to the nations of the Empire. 
Cartwright, however, asserts; 
‘Not only did the small size… of the civil service restrict its ability to generate 
and process the information that a [post-independence] ruler would need in 
order to canvass effectively a range of policy options, but the sheer mass of day-
to-day demands meant that few leaders or their lieutenants had the time to 
take a long-range look at where they were going’.9 
                                                          
6
 Schama, Simon, A History of Britain – The Fate of Empire 1776 - 2000, Volume Three, London, 2002   
7
 Ferguson, p xxiii 
8
 Cartwright, John, Political Leadership in Africa, Kent, 1983, p 58 
9
 Ibid, p. 54 
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Essentially Cartwright advances an alternative view to Ferguson’s,  that British policy 
makers did not bequeath the inheritors of their Empire an economically efficient and 
limited state apparatus –rather they handed them geographic colonial units with high 
levels of institutional weakness and deficit, which could be considered a contributor in 
any drift toward leadership problems.  
An evolving empire 
A key contribution of Ferguson to scholarship on the British Empire, in the same vein 
as Simon Schama and other Empire historians, is the identifying of different phases of 
ideology that informed and governed British Imperial policy. An example of this is the 
contrast between ‘the Hanoverian’ approach of ‘grabbing power in Asia, land in 
America and slaves in Africa,’ and the subsequent Victorian ‘elevated aspirations.’10 
This is an essential consideration for this thesis as the ideology of the day in London 
went a long way to determining colonial practices in the subject cases. Ferguson does 
well to articulate the uniquely Victorian belief that British imperial conquest was not 
about ‘ruling the world, but redeeming it,’ that is ‘to bring to light what they called the 
Dark Continent.’11 Understanding the Victorian ideal of a global civilising mission is 
central to this topic as it was during the Victorian era that the British colonisation of 
Africa took place – and the subsequent establishment of the colonial state occurred.  
The Victorian mission – Maxim gun evangelism 
Historian Denis Judd shows a less idealistic side of Victorian era colonialism in Africa, 
by focusing on the activities of the multi-millionaire Cecil Rhodes. In 1877, Rhodes set 
about to establish a ‘secret society, the aim of which was the extension of British rule 
                                                          
10
 Ferguson, p. 113 
11
 Ibid.  
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throughout the world.’ 12 Judd writes that Rhodes envisioned ‘the establishment of a 
power so great as to hereafter render wars impossible and [therefore] promote the 
best interests of humanity.’ 13 Judd articulates the view, shared by historian Martin 
Meredith in Diamonds, Gold and War, that Cecil Rhodes had an insatiable appetite for 
British domination of Africa – which was well reflected throughout his career.14 
Ferguson weighs in on this idea also – by referencing Rhode’s statement of intent 
when establishing the Rhode’s Scholarship, ‘Jesuits if attainable, and insert English 
Empire for Roman Catholic Religion.’15 Considering that Rhodes was arguably one the 
most significant agents of empire in Africa during the colonisation period – one can 
observe a cleavage from the ‘missionary’ colonialism articulated above. These 
conflicting notions of Empire and its purpose are essential contributors to 
understanding the landscape of this subject. These philosophies inform the manner in 
which the British Government approached indigenous political leadership within the 
colonies – which is at fulcrum of this subject.  
Staunchly critical of British Imperial operations in Africa is historian Richard Gott. This 
author writes on the subject from a passionately anti-colonial perspective in Britain's 
Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt. Gott argues that the British Empire was 
essentially an institution of violence, murder and the subsequent excise of domination 
of vanquished colonial peoples – an argument directly counter to the thesis of the 
                                                          
12
 Judd, Dennis, Empire – The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present, Scotland, 1996, p. 
117 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Meredith, Martin Diamonds Gold and War – The Making of South Africa, London, 2007, p. 311 
15
 Ferguson, p. 221 
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more apologetic historians who focus on the ‘civilising mission’ features of British 
colonial management.16  
A chaotic conglomerate 
John Darwin, another pre-eminent author on the British Empire, makes the assertion 
that: 
‘Far from being  the ‘designer empire’ whose links and connections could be 
neatly traced from imperial centre to colonial periphery, it looked like a half-
finished ‘project of an Empire’ (in Adam Smith’s phrase) bound loosely together 
by a maze of wiring of uncertain age and untested strength. The questions that 
matter are why this was so, and how it was possible for this chaotic 
conglomerate to survive for so long into the age of global war after 1914?’17 
This inference by Darwin alludes to the idea the British Empire took very different 
forms in the multitude of contexts it was active. A significant moral disjunction that 
demonstrates this variance is that at the same time the Royal Navy was enforcing the 
abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, that same Navy was forcing open Chinese ports in 
order to further advance the interests of the Opium Trade. This study is therefore 
obliged to analyse the manner in which the British Empire manifested itself in the 
subject environments to gain a true understanding of how the Empire intersects with 
indigenous political leadership.  
In-built racism? 
Ambe J. Njoh delivers a sharpened focus, in Colonial Philosophies, Urban Space and 
Racial Segregation in British and French Colonial Africa. Njoh initiates his discussion by 
articulating the racial constructs prevalent in Britain and France in the late 19th 
century, referencing the British equation of contemporary scientific findings on race as 
‘gospel truth.’ Njoh argues that the British viewed themselves as Caucasians, therefore 
                                                          
16
 Drayton, Richard, ‘Review of Richard Gott – Britain’s Empire’ in The Guardian, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/dec/07/britains-empire-richard-gott-review (Accessed 4th July 
2012) 
17
 Darwin John, in Stockwell, Sarah, The British Empire – Themes and Perspectives, Massachusetts, 2008, 
p. 3 
16 
 
a ‘race superior to all other races’ – a premise which he asserts framed the colonial 
approach:  
‘It is important to note that Western racism and imperialism were heightened 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This period coincided with the 
heyday of the European colonial project in Africa. As I show in this discussion, 
this negative development in race relations had far-reaching implications.’18  
Shortly after making this assertion Njoh moves to his main argument in the area of 
‘Racial Spatial Segregation in French, then subsequently, British Colonial Africa.’ Njoh 
succinctly articulates that the British colonial operation of racial spatial segregation 
was inspired by the rationale of ‘protecting the health of Europeans.’19 Whether this 
was a delicate justification for institutional racism or not – the consequences of the 
pursuit of this policy were same – a racial pecking order emerged based on the way the 
British colonial authorities physically structured their communities. This literature is a 
crucial contributor this thesis – as this legacy feeds directly into the post-colonial 
leadership equation.  
Piers Brendon articulates the savage realities of British activity in The Decline and Fall 
of the British Empire – 1781 – 1997. Brendon notes a heightened level of racism in 
Rhodesia, which could easily be attributed to the unique attitudes of the ‘vociferous 
and powerful’ white settler minority. He articulates this through the following 
anecdote;  
‘…the Chief Native Commissioner got so furious at the sight of a “raw native” 
wearing boots that he had the man flogged. As Milner himself acknowledged, 
the usage of the blacks was a scandal and “cannot be defended”.’20 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Njoh, Ambe J., ‘Colonial Philosophies, Urban Space and Racial Segregation in British and French 
Colonial Africa, in Journal of Black Studies, Volume 38, 2007, p. 581 
19
 Njoh, p. 588 
20
 Brendon, Piers, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire – 1781 – 1997, London, 2007,  p. 569 
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Her Majesty’s Colonial Service in Africa 
For an even sharper focus on British Imperial operations relevant to this subject, one 
can investigate the individual histories of the case-study colonial/post-colonial states. 
A useful starting point is A. H. M. Kirk-Greene’s The Thin White Line: The Size of the 
British Colonial Service in Africa. This article quantitatively and qualitatively presents 
the historical realities of the British Colonial Service in Africa, with references to 
specific colonial states and regions. Kirk-Greene raises critically relevant points to this 
subject, such as the ‘crash-programmes for Africanising the administrative cadres [that 
were] introduced into nearly every territory between 1957 and 1962.’21 Kirk-Greene 
also effectively equips his readers to fully understand the role of ‘the District-
Commissioner’ within British Africa – something equally crucial to the subject of 
African political leadership during decolonisation.  
Imperial policy spheres 
In Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 
1895 – 1914, John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman analyse the historical processes that 
formed the colonial political economy in Kenya. They argue Kenya is a worthy case 
study as it was subject to London’s two major policy approaches to Africa; the ‘West 
Coast’ policy was based on the concept of a ‘peasant political economy,’ and a ‘South 
African’ policy with an emphasis on the settler political economy. Lonsdale and 
Berman make several conclusions in their paper. They assert that the political 
economy that was welded together in Kenya provided ‘the internal dynamic of 
economic growth and political conflict over the next half century [post 1914].’22 An 
                                                          
21
 Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., ‘The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa, in African 
Affairs, Volume 79. No. 314, 1980, p. 30  
22
 Lonsdale, John, and Berman, Bruce, ‘Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial 
State in Kenya, 1895-1914, in The Journal of African History, Volume 20, Number 4. 1979, p. 504  
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important distinction that this article makes is the importance of ‘the colonial state’ as 
a major feature of decolonised political leadership equation.  
Matthew Lange picks up this thread in British Colonial Legacies and Political 
Development. He asserts ‘while most works analyse the long term effects of 
colonialism on economic development, several others consider democratisation, 
health and education. Regardless of the outcome variable, however, nearly all these 
scholars acknowledge the colonial state was the primary extension of foreign 
domination and investigate how its form and persistence over time have shaped future 
development.’ 23 This is an acknowledgement that the colonial state is a fundamental 
unit of analysis when analysing the relationship between British imperial policy and 
independence political leadership outcomes. Building on this rationale, Lange 
identifies two broad categories of colonial state within the British Empire – Settlement 
colonies and extractive colonies. This distinction is important when analysing the 
impact of colonial policy.  
There is a discernible theme emerging from the above texts on the nature of Britain’s 
African policy during the colonial era.  Authors reference distinctive differences in the 
British approach to African colonies. Historian Martin Meredith notes in The State of 
Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence; ‘each of Britain’s fourteen African 
territories was governed separately… Britain’s West African Territories were the most 
advanced… In Britain’s colonies in east and central Africa, political activity revolved 
around the demands of white settlers.’24 
                                                          
23
 Lange, Matthew K, ‘British Colonial Legacies and Political Development, in World Development, 
Volume 32, Number 6, 2004, p. 905 
24
 Meredith, Martin, The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence, London, 2006  p. 11 
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It has already been noted that there was a distinction between a ‘West African’ and a 
‘Southern African’ colonial policy. Matthew Lange adds more policy distinction by 
articulating the differences in approach to settlement colonies and extractive colonies. 
It is therefore critically important to attempt to locate the subjects of this study within 
these categories.  
As noted earlier, the Kenya case straddles the policy categories. Lonsdale and Berman, 
assert that British imperial designs were, in fact, paralysed by the opposing demands 
of the ‘West Coast,’ and ‘Southern African’ policy in Kenya.25  This meant that the 
colonial state apparatus in Kenya was consistently drawn in opposite directions – one 
toward the primary focus on settler interests (mainly residing in the ‘White 
Highlands’), and the other toward a peasant political economy with high emphasis on 
extraction. It is important to note that these policy paradigms, while useful for 
understanding the British approach, are not definitive. As referenced earlier, the views 
and approach of autonomous and powerful ‘District Commissioners’ acting under the 
authority of even more powerful Governors had as much to do with colonial state 
management as the policy frameworks mentioned above. This idea is also consistent 
throughout the literature.   
‘For God’s sake don’t worry headquarters’ – the unique role of the Governor and 
District Commissioner 
Niall Ferguson tells us that in Tanzania, or Tanganyika as it was referred to during the 
colonial era, the roll of the ‘District Commissioner’ or ‘District Officer’ was of amplified 
importance.26 The Tanganyikan colonial state is interesting in that the imperial policies 
of two different empires fed into its creation and construction. During the ‘Scramble 
                                                          
25
 Lonsdale and Berman, p. 487 
26
 Ferguson, Niall, p. 210 
20 
 
for Africa’ in the late 19th century, Tanganyika was claimed by Germany, and held as a 
Germany colony until the First World War when Britain obtained a mandate to govern 
the East African state. This factor, coupled with the reality that Tanganyika offered it’s 
colonial rulers no high value resources to extract, could be reasonably argued to have 
generated the ad-hoc nature in which Britain managed and developed this colony. 
Justin Willis argues in The Administration of Bonde, 1920 – 1960: A Study of the 
Implementation of Indirect Rule in Tanganyika that indirect rule was indeed the order 
of the day. 27 Indirect rule meant a considerable amount of indigenous participation in 
their colonial governance, which contrasts directly with the Kenyan experience.  
David Killingray argues that within the context of ‘indirect rule’ there were two basic 
pillars that colonial government in Africa rested upon. In The Maintenance of Law and 
Order in British Colonial Africa, Killingray argues that ‘effective colonial government’ 
relied upon; the maintenance of law and order to uphold the authority of the 
administration as one pillar, and the collection of adequate revenue with which to 
finance the running of the colony as the other.28 This creates a paradox for the 
Governors and District Commissioners, as on the one hand they were charged with 
operating in a minimalistic, ‘indirect’ manner, yet were also charged with preserving 
law and order and the collection of revenue. Killingray does, however, make the 
concession that conceptions of ‘law and order’ in the colonial context were somewhat 
different to that of the metropolitan milieu; ‘In all colonies a dual system of laws was 
established, an alien law based on the system then pertaining in England, and 
                                                          
27
 Willis, Justin, ‘The Administration of the Bonde – 1920 – 60: A Study of the Implementation of Indirect 
Rule in Tanganyika,’ in African Affairs, Volume 92, Number 366, 1993 
28
 Killingray, David, ‘The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa,’ in African Affairs, 
Volume 85, Number 340, 1986, p. 411 
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customary law.’29 Killingray also argues that ‘indirect rule was not concerned with the 
rule of law but with supporting the colonial structure.’ 30 The assertion that ‘law and 
order meant different things to different people at different times,’ is an important 
one as it highlights a much broader idea. The reality is that generalisations on the 
nature of British colonial rule in Africa are problematic. They are problematic because 
so much of British colonial activity was framed by the wildly variable interpretations 
the colonial agents had of British policy. This point does, however, serve to buttress 
the importance of the individual character of Governor or District Commissioner in 
understanding British colonial operations in Africa.  
A discernible theme is therefore the amplified importance of the District 
Commissioner, and the paradoxical nature of that office. Understanding this is 
important to cultivating an understanding of how the British model of colonial 
governance in Africa impacted upon political leadership during the decolonisation 
phase. Another is the precarious balance these colonial agents were obliged to 
maintain between appeasing various interests including; preserving the colonial power 
structure, maintaining quasi-law and order, ensuring a favourable distribution of 
resources to settlers, keeping indigenous populations at peace with the Crown, 
collecting revenue and constantly trying to achieve ‘more with less’ in terms of political 
resources. The extent to which this historical reality feeds into the post-colonial 
leadership equation will be developed further in this work. Meredith remarked; 
‘A veteran native commissioner in Southern Rhodesia remembered being told 
that his duties as a District Officer were to: Get to know your district, and your 
                                                          
29
 Killingray, p. 413 
30
 Ibid. 
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people. Keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for God’s sake, don’t 
worry headquarters.’31 
 
The ‘Winds of Change’ – the British withdrawal from Africa 
The simple fact is that British global hegemony saw nearly a quarter of the world’s 
population governed directly and indirectly by the political elites of Westminster. 
Ferguson notes in his introduction that the British Empire occupied roughly a similar 
proportion of the world’s land surface – and had complete ascendancy on nearly all 
oceans around the globe, ‘the British Empire was the biggest Empire ever, bar none.’32 
For this reason alone the raft of literature on the subject is overwhelming. To 
comprehensively analyse it all would significantly detract from the major theme of this 
this; which is leadership. This chapter therefore shifts focus to literature that focuses 
on the process of decolonisation in the subject environments – which established the 
context of leadership.  
Martin Meredith’s The State of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence 
delivers and effective survey of the process of decolonisation in the subject colonies. In 
Meredith’s ‘Winds of Change’ chapter, the historical narrative of this process in Africa 
is effectively laid out. Meredith notes the British desire for a ‘long apprenticeship’ for 
indigenous political leadership prior to the attainment of full self-rule; ‘to give the 
colonies their independence,’ said one senior Labour politician, Herbert Morrison, 
‘would be like giving a child a latch-key, a bank account and a shot gun.’33 
The implementation of this ‘long apprenticeship’ was, however, severely challenged. In 
the post-World War Two era, there was open international disdain for the surviving 
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 Meredith,  p. 6 
32
 Ferguson, p. xi  
33
 Meredith, p. 11 
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Empire’s and their trappings. This disdain communicated on the international 
diplomatic stage by representatives of the world’s two new super powers, the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The implementation of 
the ‘long apprenticeship’ for African self-government was further challenged by the 
‘game changing’ diplomatic defeat of Britain and France by Gamal Abdul Nasser in 
Egypt, regarding the Suez Canal in 1956. In Meredith’s chapter Revolt on the Nile, he 
references the substantial shift in the British policy for the African colonies, especially 
with regard to the process and timeline for African self-governance.34  
In Britain and Decolonisation, John Darwin asserts that because ‘Britain’s legendary 
financial resources were devastated by the costs of war and the ravages of 
depression… the subject peoples of empire became more recalcitrant and in some 
places their resistance was more effective.’35 In Meredith’s aforementioned The State 
of Africa – A History of Fifty Years of Independence, there is a catalogue of examples of 
the extent to which British ‘Imperial Fatigue’ dictated the timeline for independence – 
especially when local ‘recalcitrance’ was involved. A survey of the literature therefore 
allows the researcher to infer that despite the noble ambitions of ‘long 
apprenticeships’ for the self-government, the reality was that with a few notable 
exceptions, the British Empire was quick to retreat in the twin faces of nationalist 
movements and international pressure. The realities of how imperial fatigue dictated 
the decolonisation process in Africa are of critical importance to the subject of political 
leadership after the British in Africa.  
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It can therefore be contended that an important force in the process of decolonisation 
was how financially devastated Britain was, and the extent to which this framed policy 
and decision making regarding the African colonies. The substantial depletion of 
imperial resources, coupled with the humiliation of the Suez Affair in 1956, meant that 
Britain’s lust for any further African imperial development was gutted. The final nail in 
the coffin of British interests in Africa was arguably the ‘Mau Mau’ rebellion in Kenya.  
Britain, the Mau Mau, and decolonisation in Kenya 
‘No other revolt against British rule in Africa gained such notoriety as the Mau 
Mau rebellion in Kenya.’36 
Historian Piers Brendon argues that the seeds of the ‘Mau Mau’ rebellion had been 
sown during the decades before as a consequence of the British appropriation of land. 
Brendon asserts that to the Kikuyu people of Kenya ‘land was life.’37  The Kenyan 
discontent emerged from the radically disproportionate appropriation of land between 
the settlers, numbering around three thousand and over a million Kikuyu – the largest 
ethnic group in Kenya. As mentioned above, Kenya awkwardly straddles both major 
colonial policy approaches that the British had for Africa. The settler population was 
just big enough to exact demands on the colonial state, yet not so big that it could be 
self-sufficient in subjugating the indigenous peoples (as in Rhodesia or South Africa for 
example). This meant the colonial state was torn between appeasing two highly 
distinct and opposing sets of interests, as well as the need to maintain ‘law and order’ 
in the East African colony. The British attempted to mitigate this by pursuing ‘multi-
racialism’; 
 ‘…because of the presence of vociferous and powerful white minorities, a 
different timetable [for independence] was envisaged. Britain’s aim in post-war 
years was to develop what it called ‘multiracial’ societies’… a ‘partnership’ 
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between white and black albeit under white leadership.’ White leadership was 
regarded as indispensable for economic development.’38 
This dichotomy was unsustainable considering the shear numerical discrepancy 
between the races. 
With the speeding up of land appropriations from Kenya’s indigenous peoples to make 
way for British ex-servicemen from World War One, and the subsequent expulsions of 
‘African squatters’ from ‘White’ land – tensions soon began to boil over into physical 
confrontation and conflict. The drift toward this conflict, Brendon argues, was 
amplified by the settlers ‘visceral determination to control the “raw savages” who 
could turn Kenya into a “second Liberia”.’39 This settler activity, and the permission of 
it by the colonial authorities, was a key contextual force in the subsequent 
independence leadership environment. Brendon notes that this exercise in control and 
subjugation was achieved through the establishment of ‘district councils’ – which were 
soon stacked with settlers, or seconded administrators sympathetic to the settler 
cause.  This meant that ‘the Nairobi government, which had previously maintained a 
façade of impartiality, became much more closely identified with the interests of the 
settlers.’40 This established the pretext for civil conflict, as Kenyan nationalists became 
aware that they were not going to achieve ‘uhuru’ (freedom) through Kenya’s civic 
institutions. Brendon’s account then moves swiftly into articulating his historical 
assessment of the drift to uprising – and the eventual Mau Mau uprising itself.  
This literature is fundamental to this study as it grows an understanding of the 
environmental dynamics that surrounded the first of the leadership cases on which 
this study will focus. The historical forces that Brendon articulates above are what 
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framed Jomo Kenyatta’s political milieu.  D. George Boyce is another imperial historian 
who assists the researcher in conceptualising how British activity worked to create the 
political world in Kenya – of which Kenyatta would soon rise to the apex. In 
Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775 – 1997 D. George Boyce approaches 
decolonisation and the ‘Mau Mau’ from a more holistic perspective. He focuses on an 
awkward disjunction that colonial policy makers had to deal with during the civil unrest 
of 1950’s Kenya. Boyce writes that while colonial authorities were obliged to try and 
restore some semblance of law and order in Kenya, they were incredibly careful not to 
alienate the ‘black political elites.’ This was because, Boyce argues, the British 
Government still maintained a policy of gradual enfranchisement then eventual hand-
over of political affairs to the African majority, despite the differing goals of the 
settlers.41  
In Search of Ujaama – The British retreat from Tanganyika/Tanzania 
Scholarship on the nature of British operations in Tanzania, or Tanganyika as it was 
formerly known, is more limited than that focusing on Kenya. The colony of Tanganyika 
was only acquired by Britain as a League of Nations ‘Mandate,’ post-World War One. 
After a period of ‘caretaker governance,’ one can discern from the writings of John 
Darwin, that British policy makers envisioned that the colony of Tanganyika would be 
amalgamated into a ‘federal East Africa.’42 Darwin interestingly notes; 
‘settler influence in Kenya predominated, and Kenya was still a ‘white-man’s 
country.’ Uganda on the other hand, had only a handful of European permanent 
residents… [and] was plainly a ‘black man’s country.’ Tanganyika, formally a 
trusteeship territory, stood halfway between the two.’43 
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For British policy makers, this generated the disjunction that is referenced above - 
between pursuing the settler policy approach, or the alternative, peasant based ‘West 
African approach’ in Tanganyika. Darwin argues that the British pursuit of a federal 
scheme for East Africa – therefore including Tanganyika, could solve some of the 
political management problems London policy makers were facing. The establishment 
of a federation, it was hoped, would create a political environment where settlers and 
the indigenous population would work more cooperatively. Establishing such a 
federation was also in line with the general British approach referenced above, of 
‘indirect rule.’ Darwin notes that the federalist intentions of the British had an unseen 
side-effect of fermenting Tanganyikan nationalism.44  Out of this nationalist movement 
springs this thesis’ second leadership subject, Julius Nyerere.  
Conclusions on literature relevant to British imperial operations in the subject 
colonies.  
There are several discernible themes from the literature reviewed above – on the 
nature of British imperial operations in the subject colonies. One of the most 
important to this study is that of ‘indirect rule’ and the British policy culture of 
minimalistic governance. This extent to which this approach framed the independence 
political experience remains to be exposed throughout this thesis. John Cartwright 
argues in Political Leadership in Africa, that ‘a wide range of political, social and 
economic forces encouraged the new rulers to eliminate rivals and to close off 
channels for direct challenges to their position’ – thus augmenting the drift toward 
some of the more spectacular leadership failures in modern history. A major force in 
Cartwright’s ‘wide range’ was the British appetite for a minimalistic government 
apparatus. This is a recurring theme in all of the literature surveyed above. Within this 
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minimalistic apparatus, the role of the District Commissioner was so empowered that 
they were essentially given absolute power – within their dominions. This essentially 
meant the ‘colonial state’ was in practice a collection of miniature fiefdoms led by the 
District Commissioner, under the loose over-lordship of a governor, who was subject 
to an even more loose over-lordship from London. This subsequently meant, as 
referenced above, that the manifestations of Empire in the subject colonies vary as 
widely as the personalities of the District Commissioners and Governors.  
Literature on Political Leadership Theory 
Having surveyed literature that explains the nature of the British contribution to the 
political leadership equation that this project seeks to expose, if not solve, the next 
critical input to the equation is theories that seek to explain the behaviour of the 
actors themselves. This leads this scholar to focus on applicable theories for actor 
behaviour in relation to the interplay between the leader and leadership context. 
Frederick Greenstein’s theoretical approach to the situational relationship and the 
action dispensability delivers quality insight into the context of this thesis.  James 
McGregor Burns’ prism for analysing leadership is also a significant contributor to this 
study. 
James McGregor Burns and the transformational leader 
James McGregor Burns’ approach to political leadership rests on the theoretical pillar 
that a great leader is transformational in their interactions and relationships with 
followers. Burns asserts ‘transforming leadership, while more complex, is more 
potent.’45 Burns’ conceptions of transformational leadership centre on an assertion 
that successful leadership occurs when a leader raises the moral deportment of the 
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followership – through the mobilisation of shared ideas, values and myths. Burns’ 
argues that the study of leadership has been hampered by a ‘bifurcation between the 
literature on leadership and the literature on followership,’ and therefore seeks to 
bring the two literary traditions together, seeing the roles of leader and follower 
‘united conceptually.’46 As a consequence of this conceptual unification – Burns arrives 
at the position that ‘transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual stimulation 
and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral 
agents.’47  
Burns raises a clarion warning to interested scholars that an analysis of political power 
remains perennially unbalanced until that analysis acknowledges the forces that limit 
power – and thus force leadership to take place as a dynamic interaction. This warning 
is vital to this thesis, as in many of the cases studied leaders appear to be endowed 
with absolute power. Heeding this warning – this thesis looks to engage with the 
leadership-followership interaction as it took place in Kenya, and Tanzania.  
Continuing this theoretical trajectory, Burns makes clear distinctions between leaders 
and ‘power wielders.’48 ‘To control things – tools, mineral resources, money, energy – 
is an act of power, not leadership, for things have no motives. Power wielders may 
treat people as things. Leaders may not.’49 This demonstrates how Burns’ thesis is 
grounded in the idea that ‘true leadership’ is a relationship based interaction. ‘I define 
leadership as leaders inducing followers to act for certain goals that represent the 
values and the motivations – the wants and needs, the aspirations and expectations of 
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both leaders and followers.’50 The application of these relationship based conceptions 
of leadership to the case studies of this thesis will be a challenging and complex 
process. Understanding the unique tapestry of inter-relationships, however, in the 
post-colonial African contexts will yield critical elements of the leadership equation.  
Burns’ asserts that ‘the essential strategy of leadership in mobilising power is to 
recognise the array of motives and goals in potential followers, to appeal to those 
motives by words and action, and to strengthen those motives and goals in order to 
increase the power of leadership, thereby changing the environment within which 
both followers and leaders act.’ 51 A leader then subsequently undertakes the 
‘fundamental act’ of raising the followership’s awareness of what they are feeling – to 
the extent that they meaningfully define their values and ‘can be moved in purposeful 
action.’52   
Burns uses different classifications of ‘followers,’ varying from the totally activated and 
engaged to the ‘apathetics, the anomics, the alienated and excluded… latent followers, 
unrealised, dormant.’53 Burns’ emphasis on classifying followers or followership will be 
implemented in this thesis. The unique nature of the ‘followership,’ in each of the 
given contexts, is a critical force in conceptualising post-colonial political leadership in 
Africa. Burns acknowledges that followers must be ‘activated’ by leaders – thus 
beginning the leadership interaction.54 ‘The activated followers are generally even 
more diverse than the activators (leaders); indeed, it is the contrary assumption – that 
one follower is necessarily like another… that has led to so much attempted activation 
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that finds either no response or unanticipated responses.’55 Burns’ method for the 
classification of followers uses analysis of their ‘psychological, social and political 
settings.’56 He refers to a ‘five nation study’ 57undertaken by Norman Nie, Bingham 
Powell and Kenneth Prewitt, in which five attitude sets were identified as relevant to 
the classification of followership. These were; a sense of citizen duty, basic information 
about politics, a perceived stake in political outcomes, a sense of political efficacy and 
attentiveness to political matters.58  
Burns’ theoretical approach to leadership as a relationship, whereby leader and 
follower dynamically interplay by either transformation or transaction - requires some 
assumptions to be accepted. Burns’ identifies that one of the most critical of these is 
the existence of universal and uniform human ‘needs.’59 This is to say that across 
culture, gender, ethnicity, resource endowment, physiological disposition, and myriad 
more divides, there are common motivations and purposes. These common 
motivations and purposes are fundamental to the theory as they provide grounding for 
understanding followership, as Burns defines it:  
‘If we define leadership as not merely a property or activity of leaders but as a 
relationship between leaders and a multitude of followers of many types, if we 
see leaders as interacting with followers in a great merging of motivations and 
purposes of both, and if in turn we find that many of these motivations and 
purposes are common to vast numbers of human kind in many cultures , then 
we could expect to identify patterns of leadership behaviour permitting 
plausible generalisations about the ways in which leaders generally behave.’60 
This thesis rests heavily on Burns’ consideration here. Without this justification, the 
research that supports this thesis would be obliged to extend to undertaking extensive 
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political-psychological surveys of surviving citizens (or followers) from Tanzania and 
Kenya. Burns asserts, that ‘[research] in the field of moral development [has] 
uncovered remarkable uniformities in hierarchies of moral reasoning across a number 
of cultures.’61 Burns however notes that ‘identification of leadership patterns does not 
depend of finding absolutely universal motives and values. Universal patterns simply 
assume strong probabilities that most leaders in interacting with followers will behave 
in similar ways most of the time.’62 To buttress this consideration, this thesis will also 
employ Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs – a theoretical framework which will be 
reviewed subsequently.  
On understanding the leader’s psychological predisposition, Burns’ makes another 
important warning to the interested scholar. Burns articulates concerns about the 
validity of ‘early life’ analysis of political leaders. ‘Memories of the early years are 
woefully, even perversely limited and distorted.’63 This is not to say analysis of early 
life is not important, only that it is the task of ‘the trained analyst to sift through [the] 
dross.’64 He nevertheless asserts that ‘psychobiography… can be an indispensable tool 
in analysing the shaping influences on leadership. Like all tools, it must be used 
cautiously, and adjusted to the task at hand.’65 This warning is also heeded by this 
thesis- with regard to the examination of the early lives of the chosen subjects. Burns 
engages in great depth, with the psychological processes involved with this analysis.  
Burns’ ultimate conception of a political leader is the ‘transformational’ leader who 
mobilises their political resources to engage with the morality of the followership in 
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such a way that it is elevated beyond basic human want and need – into the higher 
purposes. Burns also acknowledges the existence and importance of ‘transactional 
leadership.’ This style of leadership is less focused on raising the moral deportment of 
the followership through a relationship of mutual understanding, and rather gravitates 
around bargaining and exchange between leader and follower as the critical dynamic 
of the leadership interaction. The ‘transactional’ theory of leadership interaction holds 
that the relationship revolves around the exchanging of gratifications in the political 
marketplace. 66   The transactional approach holds that leader and follower are 
‘bargainers seeking to maximise their political and psychic profits.’67 Burns’ believes 
that this leadership approach must lead to ‘short lived relationships,’ because the 
participants in the exchange cannot continue to exchange identical items, ‘both must 
move on to new types and levels of gratifications.’68 If the researcher extrapolates this 
assertion onto the post-colonial African leadership context, a wealth of insight 
becomes available into possible the break down in leader-follower relations.  
Burns uses the example of Mao Zedong as one of his archetypical ‘transformational’ 
leaders. He argues that Mao had an ‘uncanny insight into the… motivations of the 
Chinese people.’69 Wielding this insight, Mao was able to tap into the motives of his 
followership – ‘he opened the floodgates to an outpouring of supressed resentments 
and grievances; he channelled the protest to serve his own ends and, to varying 
degrees, the ends of his followers.’70  Burns asserts that Mao’s leadership delivered 
such epic success as consequence of his ability to be ‘far more attuned’ to the needs of 
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China’s rural population – when compared with his rivals.71 Mao Zedong was also 
Burns’ keystone example of a ‘revolutionary leader’ – a sub-category of transformation 
leadership which he brands as ‘passionate, dedicated, single-minded, ruthless, self-
assured, courageous, tireless, usually humourless, often cruel.’72 Burns also asserts 
that it arises from a ‘chiliastic political theology’; however it remains flexible in regard 
to the practical application of this theology.73  Burns also argues it centres on conflict 
and is sourced from the leader’s ability to ignite the passions of the followership that 
arise from their wants and needs.74  
Contrasting with revolutionary leadership is reform leadership. Burns’ employs a H.M. 
Kallen quote to articulate this contrast: ‘‘the reformer seeks modifications harmonious 
with existing trends and consistent with prevailing principles and movements. The 
revolutionist seeks redirections, arrest or reversal of movements and mutation of 
principles… It is this insistent exclusive particularism which distinguished the reformer 
from the revolutionary as a psychological type.’75 Burns argues that the efforts of 
reform leadership can often be frustrated and compromised as a consequence of the 
leader accepting the social and political structures within which they act – and are 
therefore ‘inhibited by the tenacious inertia of the existing institutions.’76 There is 
considerable potential for the application of these considerations and classifications to 
the cases used in this thesis. Burns asserts revolutionary leadership ‘requires a prophet 
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but it needs institutional support and collective leadership to survive.’77 This idea lies 
at the heart of the Tanzanian case of Julius Nyerere.  
Burns also advances the idea of ‘heroic leadership’ as another brand of leadership 
under the transformational umbrella.78 He asserts ‘Heroic leadership plays a vital role 
in transitional or developing societies, where even the more idolatrous form of heroic 
leadership may meet the special needs of both leaders and followers.’79 This assertion 
and consideration is also crucial to this thesis. The sub-Saharan post-colonial political 
and social environment provided incredibly fertile ground for the emergence of Burns’ 
brand of heroic leadership.  ‘The idolatrous form of heroic leadership can serve, in 
Robert C. Tucker’s words, as “essentially a fulcrum of the transition from colonial-ruled 
traditional society to politically independent modern society”.’80  
Burns’ approach to political leadership is invaluable for developing an understanding of 
post-colonial political leadership in Tanzania and Kenya. Following Burns’ lead, this 
thesis will continuously seek to understand the needs and motives of the ‘followership’ 
in the given contexts. Burns’ makes absolutely clear – the necessity of understanding 
the leadership-followership interaction and its dynamics as the crucial element of any 
leadership equation. Especially noteworthy is Burns’ emphasis on understanding the 
level of ‘activation’ of the followership. For example Burns’ statement  ‘it is abundantly 
clear that the lower class cannot and does not feel as much sense of power in, and 
responsibility for the institutions of government and economy as does the middle 
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class’81 – is highly applicable to thesis for myriad reasons that will be articulated 
throughout this work.  
Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
Abraham Maslow’s psychological theory of a ‘Hierarchy of Needs’ – is critical to this 
thesis with respect to understanding the ‘followership,’ in the given contexts. 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is based on the preposition that ‘human needs arrange 
themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency… the appearance of one need usually rests 
on the prior satisfaction of another... no need or drive can be treated as if it were 
isolated or discrete; every drive is related to the state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
of other drives.’82 Maslow uses five strata of need to make up his hierarchy. The first 
and most basic level of needs are what Maslow classifies as ‘physiological needs’ – 
these are the basic survival needs of food, fluid, exercise, excretion, and the list of 
other essential requirements the human being physiologically needs to survive. 
Maslow asserts that these needs are ‘the most pre-potent of all needs.’83  
When these needs are satisfied, the individual is subject to the next level of needs in 
Maslow’s hierarchy of pre-potency - the ‘safety needs.’84 ‘If the physiological needs are 
relatively well gratified, there then emerged a new set of needs, which we categorise 
roughly as safety needs.’85 In the same way as the physiological needs, safety needs 
can serve as the ‘exclusive organisers’ of the behaviour of an individual.86 According to 
Maslow, an individual’s safety needs are, broadly speaking, satisfied when for 
example, they are ‘safe enough from wild animals, extremes of temperature, criminals, 
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assault and murder, [or] tyranny... therefore in a very real sense he no longer has any 
safety needs as active motivators.’ 87  With the physiological and safety needs 
accounted for, the individual can then be subject to Maslow’s next tier of needs – the 
needs of love, affection and belonging.88 These needs are fairly self-explanatory – and 
not hugely relevant to this thesis. Essentially, these broadly refer to a hunger for the 
gratification and affection that comes from familial and other forms of human 
relationships.  
As the physiological, safety, and love/affection needs are all satisfied, Maslow asserts 
that the individual is then subject to the needs of ‘esteem.’ These needs arise out of an 
individual’s desire for ‘a firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-
respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others.’89 Maslow asserts that when the 
esteem needs are satisfied, the individual experiences feelings of confidence, worth, 
strength and adequacy. Maslow also notes that when an individual’s esteem needs are 
thwarted, it can lead to feelings of ‘inferiority, weakness and helplessness.’ 90 
Nevertheless, supposing an individual’s needs for esteem are met, Maslow asserts that 
the individual is then subject to what he classifies as the highest form of need – self-
actualisation. Self-actualisation refers to the fulfilment of potential and/or purpose: 
‘This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, 
to become everything that one is capable of becoming.’91 
Maslow makes the important assertion that one could assume from his theoretical 
discussion that an individual moves in a ‘step-wise’ fashion through the needs listed 
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above.92 He asserts that this is not the case and that there are ‘degrees of relative 
satisfaction’93; “If one need is satisfied then the other emerges”. This statement might 
give the false impression that a need must be satisfied 100 per cent before the next 
need emerges.’94 Maslow clarifies that most normal members of developed society live 
partially satisfied in all of their needs and partially unsatisfied in all of their needs.95  
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a very useful companion to Burns’ theoretical approach 
covered above. Maslow’s hierarchy fits very neatly into the leadership equation that 
frames this thesis. This is because the hierarchy enables the scholar to better 
understand the dynamics of the followership in context – their responses to leadership 
and vice-versa. Maslow notes that when an individual’s prior satisfaction of a need is 
threatened – an emergency response is triggered by the individual, or a defence 
mechanism that exists for the protection of that particular need’s satisfaction. This 
acknowledgement helps to hypothesise about some of the ‘follower/citizenry’ 
responses to the new post-colonial political leadership in Africa, especially by the 
indigenous elites who had fared well under British administration. As asserted by 
Burns, and noted above, understanding the dynamic motivations of followership is a 
crucial ingredient to developing an effective comprehension of political leadership in 
any context. Maslow’s hierarchy buttresses Burns’ claim that similar ‘motivations and 
purposes are common to vast numbers of human kind in many cultures’ and therefore 
enables the scholar to ‘identify patterns of leadership behaviour permitting plausible 
generalisations about the ways in which leaders generally behave.’96 
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Frederick Greenstein on Personality and Politics 
Burns and Maslow make a substantial theoretical contribution to this thesis - they 
create a framework for understanding the leader-follower interaction and thus a 
crucial dimension the leadership equation. Frederick Greenstein’s analysis, in contrast 
focuses on the personality of the leader – and how this personality interplays with the 
leadership context or milieu (of which the followership makes up a significant though 
not exclusive part). In searching for a definition of personality, Greenstein asserts that 
it ‘accounts for the regularities in an individual’s behaviour as he responds to diverse 
stimuli.’97 On behaviour, Greenstein asserts that it ‘is a function of the actor’s 
psychological predispositions and the environmental influences that impinge upon 
him.’98 Even applying these definitions alone, to the African post-colonial political 
leadership context, important insights emerge. Questions such as how the various 
leaders were psychologically predisposed to deal with the very unique and intense 
external stimuli which framed their leadership situations – are at the centre of this 
inquiry. On external stimuli or situational stimuli, Greenstein notes that the actor’s 
perception of the environment is an equally important variable as the environment or 
external stimuli itself.99  
Greenstein also proposes that actions of political leaders should be envisaged on a 
continuum – ‘ranging from those that are indispensable for outcomes that concern us 
through to those that are utterly dispensable.’100 He asserts that where actions are 
located along this continuum can often be explained and justified by ‘(1) the degree to 
which the actions take place in an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the 
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location of the actor in the environment, and (3) the actors peculiar strengths and 
weaknesses.’101 To illustrate these points, Greenstein employs an analogy from the 
pool room: 
‘In the game of pocket billiards, the aim of the player is to clear as many balls as 
possible from the table. The initial distribution of balls parallels my first 
observation about the manipulability of the environment. With some arrays a 
good many shots are possible; perhaps the table can even be cleared. With 
other arrays no successful shots are likely. The analogy to point two – the 
strategic location of the actor – is, of course, the location of the cue ball. As a 
final point, we may note the political actor’s peculiar strengths and weaknesses. 
In the poolroom, these are paralleled by the player’s skill or lack of skill. Skill is 
of the upmost importance, since the greater the actor’s skill, the less his initial 
need for a favourable position or manipulable environment, and the greater the 
likelihood that he himself will contribute to making his subsequent position 
favourable and his environment manipulable. By the same token, a singularly 
inept politician may reduce the manipulability of his environment.’102  
This method of analysis proposed by Greenstein is of substantial relevance to this 
thesis. This is because the situational ‘array’ of Greenstein’s billiard balls in the context 
of African decolonisation was so unique, and provided a remarkable challenge to the 
first leaders ‘peculiar strengths and weaknesses.’ When this approach is synthesised 
with the Burns and Maslow approaches covered above, the researcher really begins to 
understand the incredible dynamics of the post-colonial political leadership equation 
in ex-British Africa. The synthesis of this theoretical literature creates a series of 
questions about the post-colonial leadership experience which this thesis intends to 
answer. They are;  
1. How strategically well placed were Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere to affect 
meaningful political change in their selected environments? (Greenstein) 
2. How and to what extent did the psychological predispositions of the 
‘followership’ in the selected cases (at different times and phases) enable or 
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disable the leader’s ability lead, and therefore affect historical outcomes? 
(Burns, Maslow)   
3. What were the other forces that made up the ‘situational array’ in the selected 
cases, and how stable or unstable were they? (Greenstein) 
4. Did the subject leaders possess the peculiar strengths required to engage the 
‘followership’ and direct them toward a meaningful goal and thus manipulate 
the situational array – or was the situational array too oppressive for even the 
most skilful political actor to manipulate? (Greenstein, Burns, Maslow) 
5. To what extent was the British method of colonial development and 
management responsible for the answers to the above questions?  
Some indicative yet rudimentary answers are provided by John Cartwright in Political 
Leadership in Africa.  
John Cartwright – Political Leadership in Africa 
On strategic placement Cartwright asserts that the independence leader’s location 
within the political context was paradoxical. He argues that the fluid nature of the 
transitional political systems in post-colonial Africa gave leaders scope to take their 
countries in a variety of directions.103  ‘Their fragile institutions and weak civic culture 
have paradoxically both limited what a leader can achieve while at the same time 
enhancing his power.’104 Cartwright asserts that a collection of the forces associated 
with this created an institutional or ‘situational array’ which generated what 
Cartwright calls – ‘pressures toward autocracy.’105 In Political Leadership in Africa he 
asserts that these forces had political, social and economic origins. In further reference 
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to strategic placement, Cartwright argues that the political systems that the British 
bequeathed the new independent states envisaged electoral competition, yet ‘also 
featured a concentration of power in the hands of a single executive,’ vested in a 
parliamentary Prime Minister.106 As ideological traditions were generally quite limited 
in these new states – the emergence of electoral competition between non-tribal 
based political parties was slow to emerge. When this factor was combined with a 
Westminster style executive endowed with considerable powers – a Prime-minister’s 
office emerged that was unduly powerful in its relationship to other countervailing 
power centres. This located the new leaders in a political position that was in some 
ways very powerful and poised to deeply affect historical outcomes.  
Cartwright argues that the inherited institutions also weakened the leaders’ strategic 
positioning within their political context – hence the paradox referenced earlier; ‘Not 
only did the small size (and often inexperience) of the civil service restrict its ability to 
generate and process the information a ruler would need in order to canvass 
effectively a range of policy options, but the sheer mass of day-to-day demands meant 
that few leaders or their lieutenants had the time to take a long range look at where 
they were going.’107 This problem with further exacerbated by the reality that ‘the 
structures necessary for implementing new policies  - a party to educate public opinion 
and an administration capable of working out the technical problems – scarcely 
existed.’108 These forces created a situation where in some areas leaders’ could act 
with unbridled power to profoundly affect the lives of their citizenry – yet in other 
areas the same leaders were mortally hamstrung to take their followers in any 
                                                          
106
 Cartwright, p. 54 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Ibid, p. 58 
43 
 
direction at all. Cartwright concludes on this point that the strategy choices that 
leaders could make were bounded by the following considerations;  
1. ‘Politically, most leaders had not fashioned reliable instruments for controlling 
or guiding their people.’ 
2. ‘Economically they were still in a circular trap of “underdevelopment”, which 
they had to escape in order to provide material payoffs needed to maintain 
their own support as well as to improve their peoples’ lives.’ 
3.  ‘Socially, they had to ensure an equitable distribution of such benefits as they 
could extract, to avoid the danger of their state being shattered by ethnic 
conflict.’109 
Cartwright illuminates important features of ‘psychological predispositions’ of the 
‘followership.’  He argues that one of the most harmful colonial legacies to the 
fortunes of the post-independence governance was a ‘legacy of deep suspicion and 
distrust of “the government”. ‘Despite the overlay of representative institutions which 
was attached to each colony during the period of decolonisation, the reality of 
government for most Africans was authoritarian power wielded in an unpredictable 
and capricious manner’ by the former colonial masters.110 This meant that any 
independence leader seeking to use the machinery of government to affect lasting 
change in their new country had to first overcome deep and widely held suspicion of 
central government itself from within the public domain.   
Conclusions on literature on the relevant political leadership theory  
A collection of theorists and authors have been used above to form the prism or 
equation through which the subsequent analysis of the case leaders will be 
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undertaken. James McGregor Burns’ contribution to this equation is the most 
prominent. Burns’ provides considerable grounding for the analysis in focusing on the 
dynamic interactions that occur between the political leaders and their followers. It is 
through analysing the cases with Burns’ theoretical guidance that the researcher can 
understand how the leadership-followership interaction framed so much of the 
fortunes of the subject leaders’ experience. Abraham Maslow’s contribution lies in the 
extent to which it buttresses Burns’ considerations regarding understanding the 
psychological pre-dispositions of the followership. Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ is 
especially useful for growing the understanding of the motives of the followership – 
these motives being a critically important contributor to the leader-follower 
relationship. Frederick Greenstein expands the terms of the interaction beyond the 
followership and considers the way the leader interacts with their institutional or 
situational surroundings – their milieu, as a further critical element of understanding 
the leadership equation. Greenstein also makes the contribution that the researcher 
must look to the leaders’ peculiar strengths and weaknesses, in terms of personality, 
as key inputs to the equation as well. Greenstein also directs the researcher to 
examine the extent to which the leadership environment is fluid or undergoing 
‘restructuring’ as an indicator of the likelihood of that leader having a significant or 
insignificant impact upon historical outcomes. With these factors considered, 
Greenstein also illuminates the leader’s strategic location within their historical 
context, or environment, as another indicator of the leader’s potential to affect a 
lasting impact.  
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Chapter Two - Jomo Kenyatta  
In 1973, African historian Guy Arnold wrote that Jomo Kenyatta was one of the 
outstanding African leaders of his generation. He asserts that because of the length of 
his tenure, Kenyatta was involved in almost every phase of political activity in the new 
and independent Kenya. Similarly to Arnold, historian Dennis Wepmen asserts that 
Kenyatta’s life and career had seen the British ‘in and out’ of Kenya, and that when he 
died on the 22nd of August 1978 Kenyan’s understood they had lost a leader who 
would leave an unmistakable imprint on their nations future.111   
Jomo Kenyatta was born into a political environment of ‘restructuring.’ As he passed 
through adolescence the restructuring intensified until the political environment was 
so fluid that radical transformation was inevitable (circa 1950s-60s). This coincided 
with the awakening of Kenyatta’s political consciousness and leadership ‘calling’ – as 
well as the political awakening and activation of many of his countrymen. This 
awakening created a dynamic and engaged ‘followership’ - an integral element of 
Burns’ theoretical approach referenced in the previous chapter. This generated a 
potent political leadership context – one that Kenyatta proved effective in 
manipulating, to the extent that he is remembered as one of the great African 
liberators.112  
When Kenyatta was on trial in 1952 for the suspected organisation of the Mau Mau 
colonial resistance movement, he stated, ‘I do not know when I was born – what date, 
what month, or what year – but I think I am over fifty. I was educated first in the 
Church of Scotland Mission and after that I educated myself. I am a Christian.’113 Whilst 
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his birthdate remains ambiguous – we do know that Kenyatta was born sometime 
between 1890 and 1895, in the Gatundu division of Kiambu – a province adjacent to 
Nairobi in central Kenya. At the time this was contained within what was called British 
East Africa or the East Africa Protectorate. Kenyatta’s name at birth was Kamau wa 
Ngengi (Kamau the son of Ngengi).114 He was born a member of agriculturalist Kikuyu 
tribe.  At age twelve he commenced five years of formative education at the local 
Church of Scotland Mission. As Kenyatta developed he began to take issue with the 
European education he was receiving. He believed it ‘never tried to understand the 
importance of a customary Kikuyu upbringing’; he argued it was ‘people-oriented 
unlike European education which [was] knowledge oriented.’115  At the outbreak of 
World War One, Kenyatta left his Church of Scotland education for Nairobi. Here he 
discovered a small and elite group of similar young Africans ‘who possessed a thin 
veneer of Western Christian education added to their tribal upbringing.’116  
According to Arnold, Nairobi at the time of Kenyatta’s arrival was more akin to an 
American frontier town than anything distinctly African. It was the heart of Kenya’s 
European settler economy and political system. For such a young town, only 
established in the early 20th century, Nairobi’s settler population were remarkably 
political. In the capacity of Colonial Under-Secretary, Winston Churchill observed that;  
Every white man in Nairobi is a politician; and most of them are leaders of 
parties. One would scarcely believe it possible, that a centre so new should be 
able to develop so many divergent and conflicting interests, or that a 
community so small should be able to give each such vigorous and even 
vehement expression. There are already in miniature all the elements of keen 
political and racial discord, all the materials for acrimonious debate.’117 
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Nairobi was also a town where African frustrations toward settlers and their 
administration were beginning to ferment. Kenyatta’s biographer Jeremy Murray-
Brown notes that acts of cruelty by settler landowners and businessmen towards the 
various tribes-people were openly shared and discussed by Africans at Nairobi’s 
markets - where ‘old men [would] shake their heads over their beer and the young 
men’s anger [would] rise.’118 These were the nascent issues that would eventually 
frame Kenyatta’s leader-follower relationship. At the time of Kenyatta’s arrival, the 
colonial centre of Nairobi was also exhibiting key elements of Frederick Greenstein’s 
political environment of potential restructuring – where an array of forces were 
beginning to arrange themselves consciously and subconsciously in preparation for an 
epic political confrontation for the future of the territory.   
The political forces that were mobilising around Nairobi to decide the future of the 
East African Protectorate were halted by the outbreak of World War One. With 
German colonies located throughout Africa, the British effort mostly revolved around 
their submission and acquisition. Murray-Brown notes that the war in East Africa 
‘turned out to be a watershed in Kenya’s history.’119 As World War One played itself 
out both locally in East Africa and internationally, a situational context evolved which 
further enhanced the environmental restructuring present (to use the Greenstein 
approach). This was one where key political actors – leaders and followers – were 
increasingly ‘activated’ (to employ Burns). From the perspective of the British settlers 
in East Africa, the First World War made it plainly obvious that as soon as the Suez 
Canal was closed – their pioneering agricultural operations in the Kenyan highlands 
were virtually cut-off, and their essential supplies had to be sourced from either South 
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Africa or India. ‘The concept of a viable, self-governing white state in the African 
highlands was shown to be an absurdity.’120 This subsequently motivated the settlers, 
possibly out of insecurity, to an endeavour to attain more control of the policy process 
in the territory from the beleaguered Colonial Administration in East Africa. Their 
efforts were successful in the context of war and the settlers achieved a measure of 
control over their own affairs. This ran counter to the official policy of the Colonial 
Office.121 The Colonial Office was instead trying to move toward ‘multiracialism’ for 
East Africa.122 This was also indicative of a theme in the previous chapter – that the 
British Empire was by no means homogenous in how it manifested itself.  
The war also saw a significant shift in the political orientation of the African majority. 
At the outbreak of the conflict the African population were told that King George’s 
enemies were threatening them. In light of this, many immediately offered their 
support and participation in the war effort.123All of the populous tribes in the 
protectorate were recruited from; the Kikuyu from around Nairobi, the Luo from near 
Kisumu and the Kamba and Swahili from around Mombasa. The extent of African 
participation was staggering – Murray-Brown estimates that from some areas around 
75% of the male population were involved in the war effort.124 This devastated village 
life those areas. ‘Few ridges of Kikuyuland escaped the impact of recruitment into 
what were little more than slave gangs.’125 These upheavals created an environment 
where traditional tribal life, certainly the tribal economy, was shattered. At the same 
time, groups of tribes-people who had been at war with each other only a generation 
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ago – were in the British columns together to fight a common enemy. This was a major 
reorganisation of African society in British East Africa. It would significantly change the 
political environment in the post-war era through its impact upon the psychological 
predispositions and motivations of the African population.  
One of the many ways that the war impacted on the indigenous populations of East 
Africa was it generated a labour shortage; making it easier for Africans not engaged in 
the conflict to find employment the urban areas of the territory. Educated young men 
like Jomo Kenyatta fared especially well. ‘Those with mission training had little 
difficulty finding jobs in offices or on deserted farms.’126 Kenyatta was first employed 
in a sisal company by the charismatic European, John Cook – who was already popular 
with young African’s from the mission schools. When analysing independence leaders 
it could be useful to look to the existence of any positive encounters with Europeans 
during their political development. This may deliver some insight into those who 
pursued conciliatory policies with the European settler and those who did not.  
Kenyatta could not stay with Cook for long as he had a serious bout of ill-health and 
was obliged to approach his close friend Charles Kasaja for medical assistance. This 
particular bout of ill-health enabled Kenyatta to avoid the increasingly desperate 
British conscription sweeps of the African community, as they searched for manpower 
to aid in the East African war.  Murray-Brown notes that as part of the British final 
effort to defeat the German armies in Africa – ‘all unemployed males were driven at 
the point of bayonets into service.’127 It was these British conscription ‘sweeps’ that 
drove many Kikuyu to seek salvation in the territory of the proud and nomadic Masai 
people – Kenyatta was one of them. ‘Among the Masai a man could lie low. The fire of 
                                                          
126
 Murray-Brown, p. 70 
127
 Ibid, p. 72 
50 
 
recruitment would not spread there, for the Masai were too dispersed for close 
administration and too fierce for casual interference.’128 The Kikuyu and the Masai 
were traditional enemies; this was yet another example of how the British East African 
policy during the war unintentionally broke historical tribal animosity – and to an 
extent made Britain the ‘common oppressor.’ To employ Burns, this amalgamation of 
motivations within the followership would later provide the independence leader with 
a vital avenue to deliver ‘activating’ leadership through tapping into common 
motivations and experiences. 
At the conclusion of the African campaign – culminating in the British acquisition of 
‘The German East,’ or what was known as Tanganyika, Kenyatta moved back to 
Nairobi. Murray-Brown notes that Nairobi had a magnetic effect on Kenyatta when he 
was in his twenties.129 Kenyatta had already proven how readily he could adjust to the 
new urban life of Nairobi. As a young, relatively educated African he was able to earn 
good money and master the new and emerging economic conditions in his fatherland. 
Twenty years earlier Kenyatta was carried around by his mother in a goatskin, deeply 
immersed in the traditional Kikuyu world – by 1918 he was, along with many of his 
kinsmen, in a completely different universe. British East Africa was changing rapidly, 
and Kenyatta was of the right age and constitution to take advantage.  
Nationalist Agitator  
As Kenyatta was enhancing his social and economic mobility, as part of the emerging 
African elite, political activity became more common among the indigenous population 
in the East Africa Protectorate (or Colony of Kenya as it was renamed in 1920). A series 
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of actions undertaken by the British Administration fermented his generations’ 
political consciousness For example, the 1920 Registration Act introduced the kipande 
or identity-certificate system for all African males of sixteen or over. It obliged them to 
carry registration cards on which their finger prints had been impressed. This was so 
that they could be more easily controlled.130 Arnold argues that the ‘kipande system,’ 
and the system of ‘Hut Taxes’ (Africans were taxed on the number of huts they owned) 
– were two of the main issues taken up by the new generation of politically interested 
Africans.131  
A post-war economic slump in the region further augmented established African 
frustrations. In response to the slump, the settlers demanded the local administration 
significantly reduce the wages that Africans were paid. This was naturally resented by 
the African population. These resentments were also exacerbated by African’s non-
representation in the government.132 The discontent had reached sufficient pressure 
for an outlet to be necessary and on June 11, 1921, a young Kikuyu, Harry Thuku, 
proposed the creation of the Young Kikuyu Association. It was created to advocate 
against any offensive government policy toward the Kikuyu people. 133  Other 
associations had emerged around the same time, and though they had significant 
differences, they were united by the same sense of grievance over a number of issues. 
Arnold articulated these issues included; ‘forced labour, or its near equivalent, the fact 
that those who had served in the war had been told that they would be rewarded 
afterwards and instead found themselves with increased taxes and the kipande 
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system; and, finally the proposed reduction in wages.’134 The colonial authorities 
entertained Thuku for a time, however in 1922 when he had achieved noticeable 
agitation – he was arrested and exiled. His organisation had to reform itself and was 
renamed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). 
In 1924 Jomo Kenyatta joined the organisation. His involvement in the KCA escalated 
when the Association launched its own paper, ‘Muigwithania’ or ‘the Reconciler.’135 
The paper needed a kikuyu editor with a strong command of the English language. 
Kenyatta was the obvious choice. Muigwithania was the first newspaper written for 
African’s living in the East Africa Protectorate and it was widely read across the 
territory.136 Arnold notes that Muigwithania had dual effects; it united the progressive 
elements among the African community, whilst it also served a tribal nationalist 
purpose. Muigwithania employed riddles, proverbs and stories that were intended to 
foster pride in being both Kikuyu and African.137 It was at Muigwithania that Kenyatta 
began to develop his ability to tap into the existing, and nascent, political forces among 
the African population. At Muigwithania Kenyatta became recognised as a voice of 
African discontent. This conforms to Burns’ and Greenstein’s prisms for the analysis of 
leadership. Kenyatta was located in an environment where he could represent and 
articulate the concerns of African’s in a way that achieved mutual stimulation. The 
maturing of this leadership skill was, however, decades away.  
At the end of the 1920’s a major political crisis emerged in the East African Territory. It 
would be the first to genuinely activate Kenyatta’s leadership capabilities. The Kikuyu 
practice of female circumcision had long been regarded by Europeans, and especially 
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the missions, as both pagan and abhorrent.138 The Church of Scotland Mission, where 
Kenyatta had received his education, led the demands for the ending of the custom. 
Kenyatta led the opposition and sought to preserve tribal autonomy.139 Arnold argues 
that this would be a situation typical of the anti-colonial struggle, where ‘the mission 
educated boy later [used] his education and knowledge to attack the position of the 
mission.’140 Kenyatta proved effective in this role – organising an articulate and 
assertive resistance. He naturally lost favour with his former mission and was expelled 
from the Church.  
London 
Kenyatta had proven his ability as a political representative and organiser. He had also 
demonstrated his loyalty and affiliation to the cause of African (more specifically 
Kikuyu) nationalism. As a consequence he was sponsored by the KCA to go to Britain 
and represent Kikuyu grievances on their behalf. Murray-Brown notes that ‘nothing 
that an African might see in the silent movie houses of Nairobi or the pages of English 
magazines could have prepared Kenyatta for the reality of Europe’s largest city.’141  
As mentioned in the previous chapter there was a distinction between Britain’s West 
African, and the Eastern and Southern colonies. This distinction was highlighted when 
Kenyatta reached London. As Martin Meredith noted, ‘Britain’s West African 
Territories were the most advanced… In Britain’s colonies in East and Central Africa, 
political activity revolved around the demands of white settlers.’142 Kenyatta was to 
become intimately involved with a group of West Africans who demonstrated much 
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higher levels of political development in ideas and demands for self-government. 
Murray-Brown mused that ‘for someone coming straight from the settler-dominated 
territories of East and Central Africa, such views were revalational. Only white men 
talked about self-government there; it was not a KCA objective.’143 For the first time in 
Kenyatta’s life he was exposed to Africans of a higher intellectual attainment than his 
own. Some of his West African companions in London were fully qualified barristers 
and accomplished writers. Murray-Brown notes that Kenyatta was insecure in their 
company. ‘They had no common experience except their black skins and no common 
language [aside from English] which he spoke slowly, whereas they had picked up the 
latest idiom of debate.’144  Kenyatta was initially intimidated by the task before him as 
an advocate at Whitehall. It was obvious to him that he was not being taken seriously 
by the British administrators, or even his West-African contemporaries. The 
employment of Greenstein’s approach here holds that as a potential leader, Kenyatta’s 
strategic location within such an entrenched and oppressive political context limited 
his ability to advocate for his people. Murray-Brown reflects that despite this (and the 
London weather) Kenyatta’s spirit was not dampened, he ‘had the money raised by the 
KCA and ample self-confidence in his destiny. He was ready to embark upon a new 
phase of his life.’145  
With meagre support from the West African’s, Kenyatta turned to some influential and 
sympathetic members of the British Labour Party to advance his cause. W. McGregor 
Ross and Norman Leys formed what Murray-Brown refers to as ‘the nucleus of a 
growing body of influential opinion in the British Labour Party.’146 On behalf of 
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Kenyatta, these men organised him a meeting with the Governor of the Kenya Colony, 
Edward Grigg. As the Governor was removed from Nairobi, and its political 
atmosphere, he agreed to meet with Kenyatta and hear out the KCA’s grievances. 
From this meeting at the offices of the Rhodes Trust, Kenyatta was successful in 
securing the release of Harry Thuku (though on a non-committal time frame). Kenyatta 
was, however, unsuccessful in getting the Governor to move on the issue of land – 
more specifically on the Governor’s ‘Native Lands Trust Bill,’ which provided for the 
creation of tribal reserves rather than allowing Africans individual title and deeds.147 
Governor Grigg asserted that the Kikuyu ‘must learn to patiently argue their views out 
through local councils.’148 Grigg added, that was going on at the same time in 
Britain.149 Unbeknown to Kenyatta, these talks were non-binding as the Governor was 
not acting in his official capacity as he was out of the colony. This scuttled Kenyatta’s 
hopes of securing meaningful concessions from the Colonial Administration. 150 
Kenyatta was once again alienated from any strategic location to achieve historical 
impact – to further employ Greenstein.  
This was the most tenuous phase in Kenyatta’s leadership career. At the same time as 
his failure to achieve meaningful advocacy became apparent, news was spread of 
Kenyatta being ‘out of his depth,’ and engaging with prostitutes in his spare time.151 
Some contemporary observers of Kenyatta believed that they had seen the end of him 
when he disappeared, without explanation, on a trip to Moscow.   This trip to Moscow 
was, however, not the end of the young Kikuyu. In 1929 Moscow was the capital of a 
recently united and communist Russia under Stalin. It was also a hotbed of radical 
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Marxist thought which informed a fairly savage critique of imperialism – and therefore 
the British Empire’s African extensions. On his first encounter with this environment, 
Kenyatta picked up the rhetoric. His first article published after he got back from 
Moscow, in ‘The Daily Worker,’ included soaring ‘language of abuse.’152 Kenyatta 
wrote, ‘The present situation means that once again the natives of the colony are 
showing their determination not to submit to the outrageous tyranny which has been 
their lot since the British robbers stole their land.’153 These were words far stronger 
than anything ever heard from Kenyatta, or the KCA. He went on to assert ‘discontent 
has always been rife among the natives, and will be so until they govern 
themselves.’154 These ideas would form the substantial basis of Kenyatta’s political 
message for the next thirty years.155 Despite the scandals around his consumption of 
prostitutes, or talk of his incapability to represent Africans, Kenyatta’s political career 
gained momentum. He was endowed with a message that began to achieve resonance 
in interested circles in Britain – as well as back in East Africa. Here the researcher can 
observe James McGregor Burns’ leadership theory in play. Kenyatta had discovered a 
message that had the potential to engage with the followership through tapping into 
nascent issues, and thus triggering their political consciousness. Kenyatta began to 
broadcast an idea that had the potential to ignite the interests and passions of a 
followership that could become responsive to his leadership. To synthesise this further 
with Greenstein’s approach – when Kenyatta came back from Russia and introduced 
the rhetoric of self-government, the ‘billiard balls’ began to move.  
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In an effort to try and keep Kenyatta from falling into a state of permanent hostility 
towards the British establishment, the Labour politicians organised a meeting with the 
Under-Secretary of State of the Colonies, Drummond Shiels. Shiels and Kenyatta 
agreed that the education of the African population in the Kenya Colony was 
fundamental to the advancement of African interests. At the meeting he told Kenyatta 
he was glad ‘to see the stress that you lay on education. Unless you have an educated 
people to deal with, you may have the misfortune to put into force influences that you 
cannot control, and grave disaster to all your hopes may result.’156 Shiels’ parting 
advice to Kenyatta was in line with the Labour politicians – they encouraged him to go 
back to Kenya and advocate for ‘ordered constitutional advance,’ rather than 
extremism or revolution.157 This concept of ordered constitutional advance was almost 
immediately undermined by Governor Grigg’s announcement to an assembly of Kikuyu 
elders that he intended to ban the collection of funds by Africans for the operation of 
political associations. This would effectively choke off the funds supporting Kenyatta’s 
advocacy in London. Murray-Brown asserted that Grigg also investigated the possibility 
of supressing ‘vernacular newspapers, while also making moves to limit the rights of 
African’s to hold political meetings and make speeches.’ 158  The Governor also 
established an elaborate intelligence system for the further subjugation of indigenous 
political activity.159  This demonstrates a cleavage that existed between a more 
enlightened and long term vision emanating from the Colonial Office in London, and 
the somewhat reactionary colonial administration on the ground.  
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Governor Grigg was exercising his rights and powers as the governor of the colony, 
though he was not conforming to the overall British policy for the region – which was 
for the gradual increase in African participation in civic process. This aligns with a 
theme from literature analysed in the previous chapter. The Governor, while still a 
British civil-servant, was endowed with substantial and far-reaching autonomy in the 
colonial context, mandating him to take actions and pursue courses with limited 
accountability to the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London. Tensions between the 
Governor and the Colonial Office in London were exacerbated in the summer of 1929 
when the new Labour Government under Ramsey MacDonald sought to pursue a 
significantly more progressive policy toward the East African colonies. The progressive 
approach of the Labour Government starkly contrasted its Conservative predecessor.  
Despite progressive ideas emanating from London, Murray-Brown asked the question; 
‘could democratic theory ever be reconciled with colonial practice? To give British 
imperial policy a new and radical direction was an exciting aim… But the colonial 
structure was in its very nature authoritarian and its civil servants were by training and 
background conservative.’160 This meant that any progressive intentions with regard to 
the colonies were likely to be hamstrung by the inertia that existed within the imperial 
system. Historian Caroline Elkins supports this claim about the colonial operators in 
contrast to any London progressives. Colonial officials ‘were [often] handpicked… in 
targeted recruitment campaigns that openly sought future colonial rulers with 
backgrounds common to the dominant ruling class in Britain.’161This disjunction was 
further complicated by the devolution of the power structure – empowering the 
colonial governors and district commissioners to ‘interpret’ colonial policy in a way 
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which suited their own governing predispositions. This meant that while the Labour 
politicians were endeavouring to convince Kenyatta to take a constitutional path 
toward the political empowerment of Africans, the actions of Governor Grigg and his 
administration forced Kenyatta in an opposing, more radicalised, direction. This 
supports Burns’ claim in the previous chapter regarding the tenacious inertia of 
institutions –and the extent to which they can frustrate reforming leadership.  
At the behest of the Labour politician McGregor Ross, Kenyatta wrote (or allowed Ross 
to publish in his name) a letter to the editor of the Manchester Guardian outlining his 
hopes for Kenya. The letter was deeply constitutionalist in that it sought a redress 
Kikuyu grievances from within the British governing framework.162 Murray-Brown 
argues that Kenyatta’s decision to moderate himself and pursue the constitutionalist 
path was in part motivated by a desire not to return to Kenya and suffer the same fate 
of his KCA predecessor Harry Thuku, in exile163. The letter did, however, include an 
ominous warning to all interested parties: ‘The repression of native views, on subjects 
of such vital interest to my people, by means of legislative measures, can only be 
described as a short-sighted tightening up of the safety valve of free speech, which 
must inevitably result in a dangerous explosion – the one thing all sane men wish to 
avoid.’164 Unfortunately for the constitutionalist reformers this ‘explosion’ prophesy 
was to manifest itself in the Mau Mau emergency.  
In the autumn of 1930 Kenyatta took the risk of returning to Kenya, which coincided 
with the conclusion of Governor Grigg’s tenure. He received a hero’s welcome at the 
port city of Mombasa. In his absence the organisation he was representing, the KCA, 
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had flourished. 165  The Association had even opened branches as far south as 
Tanganyika (Tanzania). 166  It was clear that Kenyatta’s message, broadcast from 
London, had activated a Burns style ‘followership.’ Kenyatta had tapped into a 
common sentiment among Kikuyu and now other ethnic groups within Kenya. This 
empowered the activist core that the KCA needed to obtain traction in their struggle 
for greater political representation and authority in Kenya. One can also trace some of 
Maslow’s theory here. The ‘esteem needs’ of the non-settler ethnic groups of Kenya 
were motivating them to articulate their increasingly vociferous demands for change. 
Kenyatta was to become increasingly successful in being the voice of such demands.  
The KCA chose to return Kenyatta to England in 1931. The purpose of this 
representative mission was for Kenyatta to ‘present evidence at the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa.’167 Guy Arnold asserts that the KCA 
was deeply opposed to such a Union as they legitimately feared it would establish a 
South African style settler government in East Africa. Unfortunately for the KCA and 
Kenyatta, the Committee had concluded its hearing of witnesses by the time of his 
arrival, though it unofficially allowed Kenyatta to deliver the Committee the KCA 
document of evidence.168 With his official business in London concluded, Kenyatta 
proceeded to remain in the capital of the British Empire for a subsequent sixteen 
years. Jeremy Murray-Brown notes that this was in large part because ‘in London he 
was a free man, in Nairobi the subject of a totalitarian state.’169 Writing retrospectively 
in Suffering Without Bitterness Kenyatta asserted that he chose to remain in London 
for the fulfilment of two objectives; to broaden his experience by becoming a student 
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of anthropology and economics, and to be continuous representative of his people 
through attacking colonialism and ‘the colonial attitudes at the centre of the British 
Empire.’170  
On Kenyatta’s return to London he enrolled in the London School of Economics to 
further his education, whilst still receiving material support from the Labour politician 
McGregor Ross. Kenyatta’s academic career reached its zenith with his 1938 
publication of Facing Mount Kenya; an anthropological study of the Kikuyu people. 
Murray-Brown asserts that Facing Mount Kenya was unprecedented in that ‘no other 
African had made such an uncompromising stand for tribal integrity.’171 The Ghanaian 
historian A.B. Assensoh notes that during this phase of Kenyatta’s development he 
established close ties with African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny, J B Danquah and Ladipo Solanke.172  Assensoh and Murray-Brown 
both acknowledge that throughout this student-academic phase, Kenyatta ‘learned the 
rudiments of colonial politics as well as Pan-Africanist organisation.’173  
The outbreak of World War II generated a familiar hostility of the colonial authorities 
toward dissenting political organisations such as the KCA. On the 30th of May, 1940 the 
Colonial government in Kenya ‘proscribed the KCA, alleging that it had established a 
treasonable relationship with Italian agents.’174 This did not culminate in Kenyatta’s 
arrest in London, though much of the KCA leadership back in Kenya were 
‘restricted.’175 The proscription did result in the freezing of the KCA funds that 
supported Kenyatta in London – his response was to take Englishwoman Grace Clark as 
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his second wife (he was also married to Grace Wahu back in Kenya), and to move to 
the countryside and work as a farm labourer.176 Arnold notes that life in rural England 
suited Kenyatta; he became popular with the locals and was a regular customer at the 
village pub.  
Toward the conclusion of the war Kenyatta began to reactivate his political career. 
With the KCA still a banned organisation in Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta used the avenue of 
the Pan-Africanist movement to attain political traction. In 1945 Kenyatta was elected 
the President of the 5th Pan-African Congress, commencing his sharp rise to political 
prominence in the post-war era. In the performance of this role, Arnold notes that he 
was described contemporaries as ‘sane, humorous and intelligent.’177  Kenyatta’s 
involvement in the congress framed his conclusion that the reformist and 
constitutional path, as advocated by his Labour Party associates, no longer made 
sense. He wrote in his autobiography that it was at this time he decided that ‘the 
paramount design must be to unite all the people of Kenya, and that the purpose must 
be nothing short of independence.’178 This shift in Kenyatta’s approach conforms 
remarkably well to Burns’ leadership thesis, demonstrating the frustrations of 
reforming leadership, and how Kenyatta was now sufficiently radicalised to pursue a 
more revolutionary path. Burns mused that ‘the reformer seeks modifications 
harmonious with existing trends and consistent with prevailing principles and 
movements. The revolutionist seeks redirections, arrest or reversal of movements and 
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mutation of principles.’179 Kenyatta was now on a revolutionary path, and with no 
warning in 1946 Kenyatta returned to Kenya.  
The Mau Mau  
In 1948 a District Commissioner from Nakuru, in the Rift Valley, made the first mention 
of what he believed was a ‘sinister secret society.’180 In his annual report he gave this 
organisation the name Mau Mau. Meredith asserts, ‘it was a name which in the Kikuyu 
language was meaningless. Its origin was lost in the Kikuyu passion for riddles.’181 
Martin Meredith notes that the colonial officials thought they were dealing with a 
secretive minority, when in reality they were facing ‘an incipient revolt among the 
Kikuyu for which Mau Mau became, by common usage, the fearsome expression.’182 
The discontent that drove the Mau Mau into existence had been brewing for decades. 
Meredith notes that such discontent was increased the Colonial Administration’s 
requirement for the indigenous population, especially the Kikuyu, to vacate Kenya’s 
most fertile lands in the White Highlands, to make way for white immigrants. ‘Facing 
the loss of land and grazing rights and the destruction of their communities, the 
squatters embarked on a resistance campaign, binding themselves together with 
secret oaths.’183 Settler pressure on indigenous communities was further exacerbated 
with the arrival of some 8,000 European migrants, escaping post-war austerity. Many 
of them were ex-World War II servicemen. The indigenous political milieu was one on 
the verge of rebellion. To employ Greenstein’s theoretical approach; Kenyatta landed 
in a political environment where there was powerful potential for restructuring. 
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Furthermore, Burns’ thesis explains the leadership context in that when Kenyatta 
returned to Kenya he was immediately exposed to a dynamic and engaged 
followership, a followership whose political consciousness had been activated by 
rhetoric against the colonial government, and against the settlers.  
Kenyatta rapidly immersed himself in grass-roots politics. He assumed the leadership 
of the pre-established Kenya African Union (KAU) – a pan-tribal organisation 
established two years before his return, for the purpose of campaigning for African 
rights. The organisation represented the reality that political consciousness in Kenya 
had morphed away from sectional tribal interests, into a nationwide struggle for 
change.  As leader of the KAU Kenyatta was soon captivating the crowds that flocked 
to listen to him with his ‘forceful personality, his powers of oratory and his flamboyant 
manner.’184 He became the focus of political intrigue in Kenya, his rhetoric about 
Britain and the future of Kenya was captivating to the multitude of Kenyans with 
whom his message resonated.185 Once again, Burns’ theory can be observed, Kenyatta 
was raising the political consciousness of the followership through the mobilisation of 
shared ideas, values, and more importantly, grievances. In 1964 in Mau Mau Detainee, 
J. M. Kariuki wrote, ‘he was mixing Kikuyu and Swahili words in a wonderful way.’186 
Kenyatta was also successful in arresting the concerns of many Africans that he had 
become too immersed in the London world and had lost touch with the life of the 
Kikuyu. Karuiki noted that this success was a result of his overlaying of his political 
message with traditional Kikuyu phrases, ‘the doubters found that he knew more old 
Kikuyu phrases than they had ever heard.’187 To employ Burns’ method of analysis, this 
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allowed Kenyatta a deeper moral engagement with the followership – and this 
increased the potency of his leadership.  
The Colonial Administration, and the settlers on whose behalf it mainly acted, was 
alarmed at the resonance of Kenyatta’s call for African unity. The demands he was 
making on behalf of his people were unpalatable to the Administration and therefore 
they set out to destabilise Kenyatta’s authority and standing.188 Guy Arnold writes that 
‘white Kenya… made determined efforts to destroy his charisma,’189 this was often 
done through references to his ‘eloping’ to Russia during his time in London. The 
narrative the authorities were attempting to build around Kenyatta had little sticking 
power with consideration to the mood of the indigenous population. According to 
former Colonial Officer F.D. Corfield, it was at this time in Kenyatta’s leadership 
development that he became, ‘to officials and non-officials… the dominant personality 
in the African scene.’190 Consideration here is given to Kenyatta’s enhanced strategic 
location due to the high levels of environmental restructuring present.  
Kenyatta was, however, unsuccessful in employing his rising personal prestige to 
control an emerging militancy among Kikiuyu. Their frustrations at the actions of the 
Administration radicalised them well beyond where Kenyatta was prepared to lead 
them. Meredith writes that Kenyatta ‘was outflanked by militant activists prepared to 
use violence.’191 These activists successfully acquired enough influence in the KAU to 
increase the frequency of violent attacks and sabotage against the Administration and 
the settlers. This shift toward the violence, Meredith argues, ‘split the Kikuyu 
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people’192 Historian Caroline Elkins asserts that the split within the Kikuyu people was 
between a ‘rich but tiny chiefly minority and the majority, who had endured not just 
exploitation but loss of land and status under British rule.’193 This situation was a 
typical result of British colonial practice. The minority of chiefs had been made 
exceptionally wealthy by the Colonial Administration in exchange for their continued 
collaboration and support for the regime. British policy choices intended to manage 
Kikuyu agricultural practices in their designated reserves had enflamed the Kikuyu 
populous beyond the control of their chiefs, and also of Kenyatta infleunce. British 
action had made the milieu so volatile that not even the emergent leadership of 
Kenyatta could steer the ‘environmental restructuring’ present, or play an effective 
shot on Greenstein’s billiard table.  
To add insult to injury, Kikuyu World War II veterans, who had served in the Middle 
Eastern and India/Burma theatres of war, found that their British counterparts were 
receiving ‘demobilisation support from the Colonial Administration, in the form of 
land, low interest loans, and job creation programmes.’194 The Kikuyu veterans were 
dismayed to discover that while the British veterans enjoyed these benefits, their own 
fortunes (and those of their tribes-people) were in steady decline.195  The squatter 
clearances of the White Highlands forced thousands of squatters off European farms 
and created ‘an agitated group of homeless and property-less people in a land they 
considered to be their own.’196 These sources of popular discontent combined with 
overcrowding and unemployment in Nairobi and other urban centres, generated the 
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elements of the ‘dangerous explosion’ which Kenyatta had prophesied over for some 
time.  
Elkins notes that it was not Kenyatta or the KAU leadership that initiated the 
mobilisation of the Kikuyu masses to open rebellion against colonial rule, rather the 
catalyst was a group of several thousand evicted squatters that had settled in area 
called Olenguruone. It was this group that instigated the widely practised 'oathing’ that 
would become synonymous with the ‘Mau Mau Emergency.’ Elkins asserts ‘Kikuyu 
men had taken an oath to forge solidarity during times of war or internal crises; the 
oath would morally bind men together in the face of great challenges.’197 Murray-
Brown notes that ‘oathing added secrecy to a political situation that was already 
fluid.’198 The secrecy of the system fuelled the paranoia of the Colonial Administration 
and the settlers; paranoia further exacerbated by the increase in violent resistance by 
men who had taken the oath. In 1950 the Kenya Colony African Affairs Department 
noted that ‘secret meetings were being held in which an illegal oath, accompanied by 
appropriately horrid ritual, was administered to initiates binding them to treat all 
Government servants as enemies, to disobey Government orders and eventually to 
evict all Europeans from the country.’199  
Martin Meredith asserts that Kenyatta tried to ‘ride out the turbulence, seeking to 
defuse the crisis rather than stir it up.’200 This was done in part, as Murray Brown 
notes, through seeking to moderate the militant faction of KAU leaders that had taken 
control of the organisations direction. 201  Historian David Anderson asserts that; 
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‘though few Europeans believed it at the time, Kenyatta’s protestations that he had 
done all he could to thwart the militants were true.’202 Unfortunately for Kenyatta, the 
militant factions were using Kenyatta’s name and personal prestige to justify their 
actions. Murray-Brown notes that the militant factions of the KAU and the now 
emergent Mau Mau leadership ‘used Kenyatta’s name freely in their propaganda.’203 
This further limited Kenyatta’s ability to control the events on the eve of the Mau Mau 
uprising. Colonial Authorities and the radical factions within the KAU treated Kenyatta 
with equal suspicion. Kenyatta’s grip on the hearts and minds of the Kikuyu people was 
never compromised, despite that behind the scenes the young militant faction, rather 
than his own moderate faction, was shaping the direction of Kikuyu, and indeed 
African politics in Kenya.204  The political environment, or situational milieu had 
become so fluid, and undergoing such intense restructuring, that Kenyatta’s leadership 
was rendered relatively impotent.  
By 1952 Kenyatta was asked by the Colonial Government to denounce the violence 
and intimidation of the Mau Mau, a request he duly accepted. Kenyatta’s denunciation 
of the Mau Mau naturally affected a hostile response from those in control of the KAU; 
fellow nationalist Fred Kubai recalled, ‘If Kenyatta had continued to denounce Mau 
Mau, we would have denounced him. He would have lost his life. It was too dangerous 
and he knew it. He was a bit shaken by the way we looked at him. He was not happy. 
We weren’t the old men he was used to dealing with. We were young and we were 
serious.’205 Kenyatta’s political leadership was dangerously located between a militant 
controlled KAU and an increasingly intimidated and hostile Colonial Administration. To 
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apply Greenstein’s leadership framework here, the situational array was incredibly 
oppressive for Kenyatta, and despite the universal adoration he was receiving from his 
followers (Burns framework also applicable), he did not have the unique blend of skills 
to navigate this milieu. As referenced above, Greenstein theorised about a leader’s 
historical impact being amplified by a political environment of high restructuring. This 
case moves beyond that assertion, indicating that an environment can be restructuring 
itself at too fast a rate for a leader to shape direction and therefore make any 
significant historical impact. The thesis of Abraham Maslow can assist in this analysis. 
The highland squatter clearances directly threatened the satisfaction of the basic 
human needs of safety, shelter and food of many Kikuyu, thus triggering Maslow’s 
‘emergency response.’ This could well explain one of the major radicalising forces 
among the followership – one that took them beyond the direct leadership of 
Kenyatta.  
This was not, however, the conclusion of Kenyatta’s political life, rather a moment 
where he was obliged to relatively helplessly watch the events unfold in his homeland. 
The new Governor of Kenya, Sir Evelyn Baring, heeded advice of his officials and 
declared a state of emergency; ordering the arrest of the entire KAU leadership as a 
means of ending the violence. Meredith writes that this move was taken by the Mau 
Mau activists as ‘tantamount to a declaration of war.’206 This caused the white farmers 
of the Rift Valley to panic, and subsequently expel a further 100,000 squatters – a 
move that swelled the Mau Mau’s recruitment base.207 Baring’s actions had only 
served to exacerbate the rebellion which soon escalated into open violence with the 
deaths of thousands of loyalist (to Britain) Africans, and subsequently tens of 
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thousands of rebels and their supporters (actual figures remain heavily contested).208 
The white community escaped the rebellion without such a shocking loss of life; with 
32 Mau Mau related deaths.209 By October 1952 six Battalions of the British Armed 
Forces were called into Kenya to end the rebellion.210  
Governor Baring was bent on pinning the rebellion on Kenyatta. This was likely to 
appease settler anxiety. Generating a conviction of Kenyatta was a complex process as 
for one; Kenyatta was not a Mau Mau leader, nor were there many willing witnesses or 
sources of evidence to corroborate such a claim. This led Baring to offer rewards for 
anyone willing to testify against Kenyatta; the eventual prosecuting witness received 
two years university education in Britain, all expenses paid, and a government job 
upon his return to Kenya.211 Despite having nine defence witnesses testify against the 
accusation, Kenyatta was convicted of being the ‘mastermind behind the Mau Mau 
who had used his influence over the Kikuyu to persuade them in secret to murder, to 
burn, to commit evil atrocities, with the aim of driving all the Europeans out of 
Kenya.’212 Meredith includes Magistrate Ransley Thacker’s concluding remarks; ‘you 
have let loose upon this land a flood of misery and unhappiness affecting the daily lives 
of the races in it, including your own people.’213 Kenyatta was convicted and sentenced 
to an isolated imprisonment in the inhospitable northern desert. The authorities then 
set about to try and erase public memory of Kenyatta through the destruction of his 
home and publically asserting that Kenyatta would never be able to return to Kikuyu 
land. These endeavours were unsuccessful.  
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Historian David Anderson notes that the events of the Mau Mau were an increasing 
embarrassment to even Winston Churchill’s Conservative Government (elected in 
1951).214 The Indian Prime-minister Jawaharlal Nehru sternly criticised the British 
handling of the Mau Mau on the international stage, bringing further pressure on the 
administration.215 Churchill was obliged to resign in 1955 due to ill health and was 
replaced by his ambitious lieutenant Anthony Eden. Eden oversaw entire battalions of 
the British Armed Services withdrawn from Kenya and also made surrender and 
amnesty offers to Mau Mau rebels and supporters.216 The remaining British forces 
were removed from the forests where they had pursued the Mau Mau fighters and in 
1955 the Government lifted the ban on African political organisations.217 By 1959 
Anthony Eden had lost office and was followed by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 
who was to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire. In one of his first acts as 
Prime Minister, Macmillan undertook a cabinet reshuffle, and replaced the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies with Iain McLeod. Iain McLeod was easily one of the most 
progressive members of his cabinet, and his approach to colonial affairs attracted 
significant criticism from the right wing elements of British politics. Shortly after 
McLeod’s appointment Kenya was declared no longer in a state of Emergency.218 Iain 
McLeod, however, had grander plans than just the cessation of hostilities. ‘In 1960 
while his Prime Minister was in Africa, McLeod called the various groups interested in 
Kenya’s future to a conference at Lancaster House in London. There he made it plain 
that Britain intended to give African’s majority rule in Kenya as soon as possible.’219  
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Michael Blundell was another key character in the search for the conclusion of racial 
hostilities in Kenya. Blundell had farmed in Kenya since the mid 1920’s and was elected 
to Kenya’s legislative council in 1948. He had been appointed to Minister of Agriculture 
in 1955 at the height of the Mau Mau Emergency. Blundell quickly saw that land was 
the key to resolving the Kikuyu grievances that were fuelling the violence. He therefore 
‘set in train a plan to demarcate and grant title to land and to develop cash crops. As 
the 87,000 [Mau Mau] detainees were released many went straight back to a stable 
farming life.’220 In 1956 the Colonial Administration had allowed limited African 
representation on Kenya’s Legislative Council; Blundell formed healthy relationships 
with these men and he subsequently formed the multi-racial ‘New Kenya Party.’221 His 
obituary notes that he ‘showed the European and Asian communities that they could 
live as Kenyans under African majority rule’.222 This provides more evidence of the 
recurring theme of the British Empire manifesting itself in myriad different ways in 
unique environments, and the difference in these manifestations often depending on 
the personalities involved.  
The Colonial Administration clung tenaciously to power, despite the reality that the era 
of their dominance was clearly coming to an end. It was not just for the British 
retreating; the French were retreating (or being forced out) of their African and Asian 
possessions, and the Belgians out of their central African fiefdoms. The Portuguese 
would be obliged to give up their ‘oversees provinces’ of Angola and Mozambique.  In 
this new era of decolonisation it became increasingly difficult for the British to justify 
absolute authoritarian rule in their African colonies. Colonial operatives still wedded to 
the ideas of paternalist white dominance had to attempt different tactics slow the 
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process of decolonisation in line with the policy of the ‘long apprenticeship’. In practice 
this meant colonial administrations attempted approaches such as the generic ‘divide 
and rule’ tactic.223 This was undertaken by allowing Africans representation only at the 
district level, and usually only ‘loyalists’ (those who had assisted the British during the 
Mau Mau) were allowed to participate. Arnold notes that the British sought to splinter 
a prospectively independent Kenya on a regional basis ‘to leave behind a weak political 
structure, more easily manipulable from outside’.224  
Kenyatta was finally released in on the 15th of August, 1961, under the KAU threat of a 
renewal of violence. Arnold notes that the incumbent Governor of Kenya, Sir Patrick 
Renison, ‘was to handle the Kenyatta question in such a way that he himself became 
symbolic of an almost desperate backward looking colonialism.’225 Right up until the 
transfer of power, Governor Renison was not capable of convincing himself to come to 
terms with the man who was clearly central to the future of Kenya. For as long as 
possible, the colonial authorities deferred the transfer of power to a majority of 
Kenyan voters. Arnold asserts that this was in part because of a need to safeguard 
British interests in East Africa, but also ‘a question of psychology: it was not possible to 
be both an effective colonial administrator and at the same time come to terms with 
African independence, since one was in negation of the other.’226 Meredith notes that 
using the ‘old Colonial Office criteria for self-government, British officials estimated 
that a minimum period of between ten and fifteen years of intensive training was 
needed to prepare reasonable efficient and stable modern administrations.’227 It has 
been noted previously that the British institutions of colonialism were subject to 
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considerable inertia, and despite the inspiring rhetoric of Harold MacMillan’s ‘Winds of 
Chance Speech’, colonial officials in Kenya were slow to uptake this new mood of 
decolonisation. In that ground shifting piece of oratory MacMillan asserted;  
'The wind of change is blowing through this continent and whether we like it or 
not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept 
it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.'228 
 
Unfortunately for the progress of indigenous leadership the settler population of 
Kenya was not willing to accept the growth of a Kenyan national consciousness as a 
political fact, and accordingly petitioned the Colonial Administration to maintain 
control.  
Upon his release much of Kenyatta’s activity had to be invested in dispelling white 
settler fears of the coming majority rule. He also had to allay their fears of him 
personally. To achieve this he made clear his disdain for the Mau Mau; hardly 
surprising considering it was the Mau Mau leadership’s liberal use of his name to 
justify their actions which contributed to his near decade long imprisonment.  
Meredith includes a 1962 quote of Kenyatta’s, aimed at the settlers. He stated; ‘we are 
determined to have independence in peace, and we shall not allow hooligans to rule 
Kenya… we must have no hatred towards one another. Mau Mau was a disease which 
has been eradicated, and must never be remembered again.’229 In 1963, at a meeting 
with 300 white farmers, Kenyatta assured them;  
“We want you to stay and farm well in this country. We want you to stay and 
co-operate with us…We must try to trust each other. We cannot go on looking 
backwards. We must look forward to the future. I suffered a prison and 
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detention term, but that is out of the past, and I am not going to remember it. 
So let us adopt one policy of give and take’.230 
Kenyatta pressed this message of forgiveness to the settlers and even went to the 
lengths of seeking their support for the new nationalist political organisation, the 
Kenyan African National Union (KANU). Arnold notes that reconciliation was also a 
strategic priority for Kenyatta, as he was positioning himself for independence 
leadership. Settlers were leaving Kenya at a rate of 700 per month,231 and with them 
they were taking the skills and expertise necessary for building a self-sustaining non-
colonial economy in Kenya. Arnold notes that ‘in 1962 80% of Kenya’s exports – worth 
£38 million – were produced by the settlers, and they disbursed a total of £10 million 
in wages.’232 Kenyatta acknowledged that in order to arrest the departure of the 
settlers, he needed to convince them that they had an African protector in the new 
Kenya. He achieved this reputation through actions such as insisting on the state 
paying full compensation to European farmers for any farms that were taken over in 
the White Highlands. Arnold writes that the settlers who remained ‘never had it so 
good as in the years following independence.’ 233  Kenyatta’s early push for 
reconciliation with the settlers is perhaps evidence of his growing awareness of the 
‘situational array’ to use Greenstein’s analysis. In what was clearly an environment of 
significant restricting, Kenyatta’s growing ability to see and understand the forces that 
were going to frame his future leadership – enabled him to more effectively navigate 
his milieu. Kenyatta understood that the settlers were critical to the economic viability 
of an independent Kenya, and thus located himself accordingly. Kenyatta did, however 
take a calculated risk here. If Burn’s thesis is applied, then Kenyatta was moving 
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against the mood of his general followership – the Kikuyu. This is where 
‘transformational leadership’ was required to take place, in that Kenyatta was obliged 
to convince his African kin that the future of Kenya rested in reconciliation and 
cooperation, not further conflict and bloodshed. This accords with of Burn’s theory 
with regard to the raising of the moral deportment of the followership beyond their 
basic interests, passions and grievances.  
While Kenyatta was still imprisoned, two of his fellow nationalists, Tom Mboya and 
Oginga Odinga, had worked to set up the Kenyan African National Union Party 
(KANU).234 Shortly after creating the organisation, Mboya and Odinga elected Kenyatta 
their president ‘in abstentia.’235 In October 1961, following Kenyatta’s release he 
assumed the full presidency of KANU. This was followed by his acquisition of a native 
seat in Kenya’s Legislative Council, and his joining of the coalition government. It was 
at this time that the radical shift in British colonial policy was beginning to manifest 
itself on the ground.  
Following Harold McMillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ speech, Meredith notes that the British 
change in course was abrupt, and that the philosophical view was grounded in the 
belief that if African political progress was continually held up by the interests of white 
settler minorities then Britain would only face more bloodshed.236 This meant that 
KANU rapidly attracted the attention of all those interested in the future governance 
of Kenya. Murray-Brown notes that as President of KANU, Kenyatta demonstrated a 
lack of effectiveness as either a party leader or as a government minister.237 It was 
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argued by some of his contemporaries that the long periods he had spent isolated 
from African politics, both in Europe and in prison, had exhausted his powers of 
leadership. They asserted that this coupled with his supposed drinking habits had 
brought him to near senility.238 KANU’s strength however was not generated solely by 
the leadership of Kenyatta. Tom Mboya brought to the organisation a wealth of 
organisational ability, cultivated from decades working as a trade union organiser and 
Oginga Odinga brought unswerving loyalty. This was coupled with Kenyatta’s natural 
strength at attracting huge crowds to outdoor meetings ‘reminiscent of the old tribal 
barazas where he used his proverbs, tribal lore, and spell-binding words.’239 Murray-
Brown notes that Kenyatta deployed these skills to full and great effect in the lead up 
to the election of 1961.240  
It was these strengths which enabled KANU to sweep the polls in Kenya’s first election 
where the majority were enfranchised. Murray-Brown notes that the unique strengths 
of the KANU leadership enabled them to effectively navigate the highly complex 
electoral arrangements bequeathed upon them by the British, especially the 
devolution and regionalism that the architects of the constitution had employed to 
weaken the independence leadership.241 On the 28th of May 1963, Kenyatta was 
invited to form a government by the last Governor of Kenya, Malcolm MacDonald, 
having just joined his younger colleagues in a traditional victory dance on the streets of 
Nairobi. On the 1st of June he became the first Prime Minister of a self-governing 
Kenya. Full independence was set for the following year. Murray-Brown notes that it 
was at this time that Kenyatta gave his country a new rallying cry; ‘Harambee!, an old 
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work chant meaning pull together.’242 On attaining independence Kenyatta gave what 
Meredith calls one of the most poignant speeches of the rush to decolonisation in 
Africa. In that speech Kenyatta asserted, ‘we do not forget the assistance and guidance 
we have received through the years from the people of British stock: administrators, 
businessmen, farmers, missionaries, and many others. Our law, our system of 
government and many other aspects of our daily lives are founded on British principles 
and justice.’243 Kenya was the thirty-fourth state in Africa to achieve independence. ‘All 
over the world the Union Jack was coming down and Auld Lang Syne being sung, but 
nowhere was the scene played out with greater poignancy than in Nairobi.’244  
The President 
As early as 1964 the emergence of a ‘one party state’ was noticeable in Kenya. 
Opposition members of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) had begun to 
cross the floor of Kenya’s legislative assembly to join Kenyatta’s government. Whilst 
this enabled Kenyatta to claim true representation of all Kenyans (rather than just his 
affiliated Kikuyu and Luo tribes), it also set a dangerous precedent for the future of 
Kenya’s democracy. Arnold notes that international observers were not alarmed by the 
drift toward a one-party state, instead commending Kenyatta for creating an 
atmosphere of reconciliation, buoyancy and unity within the independent Kenya.245 
Arnold writes that Kenyatta was in many ways a political conservative, and placed 
significant emphasis on the preservation of law and order in the new Kenya. Especially 
noteworthy was his determination to uphold laws around private property.246 Kenyatta 
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also sought prosperity through welcoming foreign investment in Kenya. His Foreign 
Investments (Protection) Bill sought to legislate in favour of the flow of foreign capital 
into the Kenyan economy.247  
Kenyatta’s decision to break with other African independence leaders, favouring the 
capitalist path over the ‘African socialism’ that proved popular in the decolonisation 
era – would be a trade mark of Kenyatta’s leadership. Murray-Brown argues that 
Kenyatta’s leadership was relatively free of ideology, compared with many of his 
contemporary independence leaders across Africa. Kenyatta had sought power purely 
on a belief in self-government, not an ideological predisposition emanating from the 
west or east. This pragmatism was well accommodated within in the one-party 
governing structure that rapidly evolved in independent Kenya. Murray-Brown asserts 
‘from the moment he became Prime Minister… Kenyatta began to assert his own will 
in the way Kenya was run. The achievement of personal power unstopped reserves of 
self-confidence and authority which many had previously doubted he possessed.’248   
Kenyatta was quick to recognise the value of some of the colonial institutions 
bequeathed upon his new country, and therefore ensured the preservation of the 
most useful elements of the British governing structure. Institutions like the police and 
army were taken over completely intact, despite their previous employment against 
the independence movement. Kenyatta even went as far as to retain the services of 
European officers such as Ian Henderson – the inspector who had prepared the case 
against him years earlier. Murray-Brown notes, ‘in the same way the judiciary, civil 
service and Parliament continued to function according to their British models and 
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with white men still in senior posts’.249 Kenyatta also sought to strongly rebuke 
members of the nationalist core who spoke of revenge against the institutions of the 
colonial era. Members of the rebel columns in the forests refusing to join in the new 
era of reconciliation, and accept Kenyatta’s resettlement schemes were quickly 
brought to heel by Kenyatta’s new state.  
Murray-Brown notes that white families who only several months before had treated 
Kenyatta and KANU with the highest suspicion now took the attitude of ‘everything will 
be all right so long as the old man is there.’250 Settler families were now taking up 
Kenyan citizenship – demonstrating a willingness to participate and contribute to 
Kenyatta’s new Kenya. Kenyatta was strategically positioning himself, as Greenstein’s 
theory would observe, as a reconciler and unifier within the dynamic context. This 
would see him located to have great historical impact. Kenyatta’s acknowledgement of 
the setter economy’s critical importance to the overall welfare of his government 
demonstrated remarkable discernment which some of his contemporary African 
leaders lacked. Kenyatta’s valuing and preservation of some of the colonial era 
institutions enabled his new state to capitalise on the accumulated expertise of the old 
regime’s civil service. Meredith notes that this expertise was in short supply within the 
African community. ‘The speed of change meant that colonies in East and Central 
Africa advanced toward independence with a minimum of trained local man power. 
[For example] Kenya’s first African lawyer did not begin to practise his profession until 
1956.’251 Nevertheless this was still an accommodation of the colonial system. As 
Kenyatta settled into the presidency, he increasingly did not conform to Burns’ model 
of transformational leadership   
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Kenyatta may have taken his accommodation of the old order too far when he 
scrapped the regionalised independence constitution and reverted to a centralised 
administrative system. This system was synonymous with that which existed under the 
old colonial governors.252 This represented the drift toward a one-party state. Historian 
John Cartwright’s theory holds that this may have seemed ‘obvious’ to Kenyatta as; ‘a 
wide range of political, social and economic forces encouraged the new rulers to 
eliminate rivals and to close off channels to direct challenges to their position.’253 
Cartwright asserts that this was in part because of the ambiguities of the political 
values instilled by colonial system. These ambiguities ‘facilitated leaders justifying 
increasingly authoritarian practices as being for the good of their people.’254 Such 
ambiguities are almost certainly references to colonial paternalism, and paternalistic 
justifications for the authoritarian nature of colonial governance. The paternalistic 
mould suited Kenyatta’s leadership style remarkably well. In 1964, Kenya became a 
Republic within the Commonwealth, with Kenyatta assuming the role as President. 
Murray-Brown asserts that Kenyatta was ‘stepping into a role in which he had watched 
many a plummed-hatted governor fill in the past.’255 Kenyatta began to enjoy a 
massive level of authority which would frame much of his presidency. Cartwright 
asserts this was a typical situation in the context of African independence leadership, 
where the new leaders soon found themselves defending the authoritarian regimes 
which they had fought so earnestly against during their independence struggles.  
Despite the continuity of authoritarian paternalism of Kenyatta’s political orientation, 
elements of liberal ideology can be tracked from very early on his leadership. Kenyatta 
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was vigorous in his promotion of grass-roots ‘self-help’ organisations that were 
responsible for the construction of educational, health services and water provision. 
Meredith articulates Kenyatta’s theoretical justification for this through a phrase he 
frequently broadcast to his audiences, ‘God… helps those who help themselves.’256 
Guy Arnold buttresses this claim, asserting that Kenyatta invited those with the power 
‘to use it for their own advancement… [and showed contempt] for anyone not 
concerned to better himself.’ 257  Perhaps this dualism in Kenyatta’s leadership, 
between authoritarian paternalism and a belief in encouraging the industriousness of 
the individual can be traced back to his Scottish missionary education – as this dualism 
was well observable in the culture of the protestant missionaries he was educated by. 
Here the scholar may be able to observe a distinctive impact of the British methods of 
colonial development on the nature of an independence leadership case. The 
paternalism was also potentially attributable to traditional forms of Kikuyu leadership, 
though the synthesis with forms of western liberalism was unusual in the African 
context.  
Kenyatta’s gradualism and desire to retain the good faith of the settler population was 
well demonstrated with his early land distribution policies. Using British funds, 
Kenyatta’s government oversaw the diffusion of the land hunger that had fuelled the 
Mau Mau through gradually buying out sections of the former White Highlands. ‘White 
farmers were bought out both by smallholders and by other African owners.’258 This 
gradualism starkly contrasts (and is vindicated when compared with) the transfer of 
land that occurred in Zimbabwe decades later. According to Meredith this was 
followed by a remarkable increase in agricultural incomes; ‘between 1958 and 1968 
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the gross farm revenues of small-holders grew by 435%.’259 By the 1970s Kenya was 
enjoying a growth rate in the agricultural sector of 5.4%.260 Kenyatta’s reconciliatory 
approach and his gradualism worked to great effect. Within the context of the 
sustainable economic growth, buttressed by Kenyatta’s steering Kenya away from the 
redistributive socialism that was to flourish elsewhere in Africa, the international 
community was willing to turn a blind eye to the autocracy and dominance that 
Kenyatta increasingly exercised.  The model racial reconciliation that was occurring 
between settler and African further justified this approach. As far as the theory is 
concerned, Greenstein’s analysis explains Kenyatta’s success. In the environment of 
restructuring, he managed the pace and direction of the restructure in such a way that 
he attained a strategic location at the apex of the new political structures. Kenyatta 
also began to conform to Burns’ mould of transactional leadership – whereby the 
relationship between him and his followers was based not so much on mutual 
stimulation, but on the exchange of wealth for power between the emergent new 
elites and Kenyatta.  
The post-independence security that Kenyatta was offering was also attracting flocks 
of foreign tourists to Kenya’s spectacular wildlife parks and coastal resorts. These 
tourists further supported Kenya’s impressive post-independence economic boom. 
Nairobi’s skyline was transformed into that which resembled many western capitals; 
containing sky-scraping hotels and office blocks. This prosperity translated into an 
average increase of 6% in gross domestic product each year in the 1960s, and 6.5% in 
the 1970s.261 Coupled with the improvements in the economic performance of Kenya, 
the population boomed. In 1962 it stood at around 8 million, by 1978 it had almost 
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doubled to 15 million. Kenyatta’s gradualist and capitalist strategy was being 
vindicated as far as outside observers were concerned.  
Kenyatta’s capitalist strategy was also generating significant disparities within the 
African population; disparities that were disguised by the symbols of a roaring 
economy. While African elites grew richer and more powerful as a consequence of 
land transfers and the attainment of senior government appointments, progress was 
slower, if not backward, for the millions of Kenyans who did not enjoy land-title or 
government connections. Eventually political pressures began to build up as more 
Kenyan’s wanted a share of the substantial economic gains the top tier of the 
population were enjoying. In Kenyatta and the Organisation of KANU, Kenneth Good 
notes that the radicals within the governing KANU party who took up the cause of the 
masses who were not enjoying the independence miracle, were rapidly isolated and 
excluded by Kenyatta’s inner circle.262  
In 1965 Kenyatta radically reduced the power of ‘backbench’ Members of the National 
Assembly. Earlier in June 1964 some KANU backbenchers broke the government policy 
of silence on the idea of an East African Federation and demanded that Kenyatta take 
steps to federate with bordering states. Kenyatta reacted fiercely to this dissent and 
decreed that all MP’s ‘must obtain a licence from the Administration before they could 
speak at a public gathering, even in their own constituencies.’263 The President’s grip 
on the party and the politics of Kenya was now vice-like in character. In 1965 Mwai 
Kibaki,264 warned of an emerging African elite around Kenyatta and his family, He went 
to assert that if Kenyan society continued without change, then in five years there 
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would be a new social class governing Kenya with the same vested interests in control 
as the previous colonial administration.265  
A former Mau Mau leader and prison companion of Kenyatta, Bildad Kaggia publically 
challenged Kenyatta’s land policies only to suffer a savage and public rebuke. Kaggia 
criticised the government for allowing land to pass into large individual titles for 
privileged Africans, allowing them to amass substantial holdings. ‘He warned of the 
dangers of letting a new class of African landholders replace the white settlers while 
landless Africans were struggling to survive.’266 Kenyatta’s response was to publically 
humiliate Kaggia, while they were speaking from the same platform at an event.267 
Kenyatta denigrated Kaggia for his distinctive lack of achievement in the new Kenya. 
This became typical of Kenyatta, Meredith writes that ‘he was ruthless in dealing with 
any challenge to his authority.’268  
Oginga Odinga, the prominent Luo who had earned himself the chiefly title of Ker 
which is loosely synonymous with being a king, provided the first real threat to 
Kenyatta’s dominance of Kenyan politics. Kenyatta had appointing Odinga as his Vice-
President after independence, a gesture symbolising the Kikuyu-Luo partnership at the 
head of the KANU party. In 1966 he split from the governing party to form his own 
minority party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). Odinga advocated for a free 
distribution of white-owned land and a programme of nationalisation of foreign owned 
enterprises in Kenya. In regard to foreign policy, Odinga wanted a shift from western 
allegiances to new ties with the Eastern bloc.269 By 1968 the relationship between the 
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government and the KPU was bitter. Kenyatta had already centralised control of the 
civil service on the Office of the President. The forty-one District Commissioners 
(another colonial hangover preserved in the post-independence era), reported directly 
to the President rather than the Parliament. Supporters of Kenyatta’s regime asked 
why not simply outlaw the KPU and officialise Kenya as a one-party state.270 Kenyatta 
opted to accuse Odinga of communist affiliations, asserting ‘some people try 
deliberately to exploit the colonial hangover for their own interest, to serve some 
external force… to us, communism is as bad as imperialism.’271 Meredith writes that 
Kenyatta also sought to brand his opponents as subversive and tribalistic.272 By 1969 
his patience with opposition ran out. He had his former nationalist comrade arrested 
and his party outlawed. This move all but formalised Kenya as a one-party state, with 
Kenyatta and his inner circle holding complete dominance of the policy process.  
According to James McGregor Burns, leadership is a dynamic relationship between 
leader and follower. Burns asserts that the naked wielding of power is not leadership, 
and that the leader and the tyrant are polar opposites. The application of Greenstein’s 
theory holds that Kenyatta had located himself in such a position within the political 
milieu that he could act with near autonomy. From a strictly western liberal 
perspective the researcher could discern that Kenyatta was on a direct path to 
dictatorship, which is not leadership according to Burns. The keystone here, however, 
is Abraham Maslow’s theoretical contribution, as detailed in the previous chapter.  
Historians such as Murray-Brown, Meredith and Arnold all agree that the trademarks 
of Kenyatta’s leadership were law, order and stability. The pursuit of these created the 
pre-conditions for remarkable economic growth. Within this environment, enough of 
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the followership – that is the Kenyan citizenry, enjoyed unprecedented satisfaction of 
Maslow’s needs; that is their physiological needs were by and large well satisfied, life 
in Kenya was safe, and a significant proportion of the population were enjoying the 
satisfaction of their esteem and self-actualisation needs within a prosperous Kenya. 
‘With government assistance, an expanding African middle class grasped opportunities 
in the civil service, agriculture, commerce and industry.’273 
With the Cold War dominating international relations during Kenyatta’s tenure, his 
decision to pursue a western-capitalist road attracted significant endorsements from 
the west, and foreign direct investment (FDI). In a 2005 report on investment in Kenya 
the United Nations Development Program notes that ‘FDI grew steadily throughout the 
1970s as Kenya was the prime choice for foreign investors seeking to establish a 
presence in Eastern and Southern Africa.’274 The report holds that ‘the relatively high 
level of development, good infrastructure, market size, growth and openness to FDI at 
a time when other countries in the region had relatively closed regimes all contributed 
to [overseas investors] choosing Kenya as their regional hub.’275 Interestingly, this 
report notes the post-Kenyatta decline in all of the above was a consequence of the 
failings of the following regimes. Kenyatta’s leadership, though authoritarian and 
paternalistic, created an environment where enough aspirational Kenyans could share 
in the prosperity. A consensus emerged among the followership that ‘old mzee’ 
provided stability and security, whilst attracting prosperity and opportunity. This made 
up a large body of the political currency on which Kenyatta traded with the 
followership. This does not conform to Burns’ theory of the transformational leader. 
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The Kenyatta experience displayed some elements of transformational leadership – 
such as zeal for reconciliation with the landowning settlers, though by and large 
Kenyatta was not a transformational leader. He instead opted for a ‘particular brand of 
quiet stability’ that Arnold writes was the hallmark of Kenyatta’s reign.276 This was a 
political exchange with the followership and thus conforms to the transactional model. 
In the early 1970’s Kenyatta’s leadership experienced a legitimate and populist political 
threat from his former private secretary Josiah Mwangi Kariuki. The stability and 
prosperity that Kenyatta used to legitimise his centralist rule was not being enjoyed by 
all Kenyans. The numbers of Kenyan’s not capitalising on the post-independence 
prosperity were swelling by the mid-1970s. J.M. Kariuki emerged as a champion of 
Kenya’s poor and landless. He openly set his goal of becoming Kenyatta’s successor. 
Considering his Kikuyu and Mau Mau background, coupled with his populist rhetoric 
against the new African elite – his goal seemed achievable. Meredith includes one of 
his more famous populist rallying calls; that ‘a stable social order cannot be built on 
the poverty of millions. Frustrations born of poverty breed turmoil and violence.’277 
Meredith writes that he possessed an ‘unerring popular touch and he skilfully 
exploited the groundswell of discontent that was building up over the greed and 
corruption clearly evident at the top of Kenyan society.’278 It was true that senior 
government officials and members of Kenyatta’s family and inner circle were doing a 
little too well out of the good economic times – in proportion to the majority of 
Kenyans. Whilst the system was stable, rot was beginning to set in at the top of the 
regime.  
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Kariuki never dared directly criticise Kenyatta himself. This was because Kenyatta was 
more or less untouchable in the eyes of the Kenyan populous. Kariuki and his allies 
instead levelled their critique of the government upon members of Kenyatta’s inner 
circle, who were mostly Kenyatta’s family members and were thus referred to as ‘the 
royal family.’279 This group aroused significant resentment as they publically enjoyed 
the presidential life-style yet held not even remotely the same level of dignity, prestige 
and respect that Jomo had earned from the Kenyan people. Kariuki therefore focused 
his attention on two members of the ‘royal family’ who were easy examples of the 
indulgence going on at the top. Kenyatta’s young wife, Ngina and his daughter 
Margaret, the Mayor of Nairobi were easy targets as they operated their business 
empires ruthlessly and used their close links with the President for substantial personal 
gain.280 By this time Jomo’s age was becoming evident, and as Meredith writes, he was 
showing less and less interest in the business of government.281 This enabled members 
of the ‘royal family’ to operate relatively unchecked by old mzee. Ngina Kenyatta 
became one of the richest individuals in Kenya with interests in agriculture, tourism 
and property. Meredith also notes that both family members were involved in the 
Ivory trade, and that the high level corruption that suited their operations cost Kenya 
half of its elephant population; with the deaths of at least 70,000 elephants.282 Kariuki 
was always careful to never mention names when he levelled his critique of the 
existing state of affairs, though Meredith notes it was clear who he was referring to. 
Quotes such as ‘we do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars, or 
‘we are being carried away by selfishness and greed’ were perceived as a direct threat 
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by members of the Kenyatta inner circle.283  In March 1975 Karuiki’s mutilated body 
was discovered, dumped in the hills outside Nairobi. ‘Subsequent investigations 
implicated members of Kenyatta’s inner circle.’284 
The ‘inner circle’ was not held to account for the death of Kariuki, and as Kenyatta’s 
political, and biological life waned they essentially took the reins. He spent the last 
three years of his life governing through what almost resembled a feudal court of loyal 
ministers and officials. He spent his time lecturing any visitors on the finer points of 
Christian theology and recounting stories about the ‘dour Scottish missionaries who so 
influenced his childhood.’285 His gentle decline consisted of pottering around his two 
farms and spending his evenings watching tribal dancers. On the 23rd of August 1978, 
Kenyatta’s presidency concluded with his death by natural causes ensuing from old 
age.  This was followed by a state funeral, a period of national mourning and the 
enduring presidency of Daniel arap Moi. 
Theoretical Questions of Kenyatta’s Leadership 
1.  How strategically well placed was Jomo Kenyatta to affect meaningful political 
change in Kenya? (Greenstein) 
Through a series of evolutions in the practice of his leadership, Jomo Kenyatta became 
relatively adept in locating himself in a position within his political context to 
significantly impact upon the progress of history in Kenya. The account of Kenyatta’s 
political career above does, however, demonstrate that Kenyatta’s strategic location 
within the environment was mostly dominated by forces beyond his control. An 
example of this was Kenyatta’s Scottish missionary education, and how it enabled him 
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to join an emergent and politicised urban African elite. The KCA’s favouring of Kenyatta 
as their representative in London also proved to be a critical force in establishing 
Kenyatta’s location within the subsequent political context. As noted earlier, Kenyatta 
also demonstrated ineptitude with regard to his strategic location during the Mau Mau 
Emergency – and spent nearly a decade in prison because of it. On this matter there is 
a school of thought that holds Kenyatta’s strategic location was enhanced because of 
his prison time, as several popular independence leaders had undergone a ‘prison 
internship’ before leadership, though Kenyatta’s nine years in a northern desert during 
one of the most significant upheavals in Kenyan history hardly constitutes an 
internship.  
Once in power, however, Kenyatta’s management of his strategic placement was 
legendary. He presented himself to the outside world as a stable and secure leader – 
not affiliated to radical causes of African socialism (despite his Moscow training), and 
encouraged his settler population to remain in Kenya, and consequently more foreign 
investment to flow in. This created the economic growth and prosperity that he could 
use to justify his increasingly authoritarian governing practices. These practices further 
entrenched his strategic location at the pinnacle of Kenyan politics. This saw him well 
placed to affect meaningful political change and significantly impact upon historical 
outcomes, right up until the decline in his health during the 1970s.  
2. How and to what extent did the psychological predispositions of the 
‘followership’ in Kenya (at different times and phases) enable or disable the 
Kenyatta’s ability lead, and therefore affect historical outcomes? (Burns, 
Maslow)   
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Kenyatta was remarkably successful in riding a groundswell of popular discontent to 
significant leadership success. In terms of Kenyatta’s own tribe, the Kikuyu, the land 
policies of the colonial government delivered Kenyatta the political activating issue 
that he needed to mobilise against the colonial authorities. The popular discontent 
among the African majority gave Kenyatta’s rhetoric of liberation significant resonance 
which further boosted his popularity and ascendency within African politics. In the lead 
up to the Mau Mau, however, the psychological predispositions of elements within the 
followership became too intense and radical for Kenyatta to have meaningful 
interactions, let alone leadership – and therefore disabled his ability to lead. Once the 
Mau Mau Emergency had calmed, and the British government had made clear 
assurances to the African population of majority government – the psychological 
predispositions of the followership were more malleable, and thus Kenyatta was able 
to lead again. The readiness of significant portions of the followership to accept 
Kenyatta’s authoritarian paternalism was also critical to the success of his leadership in 
the independence era. The stability and prosperity that Kenyatta offered the 
followership (including the settler population) attracted significant loyalty from the 
followership which in turn generated a psychological predisposition toward supporting 
him – even when genuine cracks began to appear in his administration toward the end 
of his life.  
3. What were the other forces that made up the ‘situational array’ in Kenya, and 
how stable or unstable were they? (Greenstein) 
The ‘situational array’ fluctuated widely in terms of stability throughout Kenyatta’s life. 
When Kenyatta was born, the colonial authorities governed with relative ease – 
generating a period of reasonable stability. It was at this time that the African 
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liberation cause was in its infancy, and many of its leaders untested. In the interwar 
period however, between 1918 and 1939, the forces of African nationalism had begun 
to ferment which significantly increased the potential for a major environmental 
restructure, and therefore an unstable political/situational array. The outbreak of the 
Second World War briefly arrested to process of change but in 1945 the agents had 
begun to mobilise. This coincided with a series of native policy blunders by the colonial 
authorities in Kenya, and some poor choices of appointments to the role of Governor. 
This contributed to the significant instability within the situational array; instability 
that manifested itself in what Kenyatta foresaw as a ‘dangerous explosion’ or more 
commonly referred to as the Mau Mau Emergency. Following the incredible situational 
instability of the Mau Mau was a period of stability compared to the previous crisis, 
though still unstable enough for Kenyatta’s leadership to affect genuine change. This 
was a period characterised by the British retreat from Africa. The orderly nature of 
British decolonisation in the 1960s meant that while the situational environment 
around Kenyatta was restructuring itself, it was doing so in an orderly way (in contrast 
to the neighbouring Belgian Congo for example).286  This created an ideally suited 
environment for Kenyatta’s particular style of leadership; leadership that emphasised 
the value of gradualism and consistency.   
4. Did Jomo Kenyatta possess the peculiar strengths required to engage the 
‘followership’ and direct them toward a meaningful goal and thus manipulate 
the situational array – or was the situational array too oppressive for even the 
most skilful political actor to manipulate? (Greenstein, Burns, Maslow) 
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Kenyatta’s leadership experience was evolutionary. At the time of the Mau Mau, for 
example, Kenyatta did not possess the peculiar strengths required to manipulate the 
highly unstable situational array or guide the followership – and was left alienated and 
vulnerable. In the post Mau Mau era, Kenyatta’s peculiar strengths were tailored to 
the political context. He held the skills to capture the respect and adoration of the bulk 
of the African community, and his time in London had equipped him with all of the 
skills necessary to negotiate the eventual handover of power from Britain. Kenyatta 
had the capacity for overlaying his political messages to the citizenry with traditional 
folk lore and sayings, something which buttressed the perception of him as both in-
tune with the culture of his followers, yet was also completely capable of their 
effective representation on the international stage. The success of this strategy was 
demonstrated by the trust he was accorded by his people, and their allowing him to 
centralise political control and power on his office and making Kenya a one party state.  
5. To what extent was the British method of colonial development and 
management responsible for the answers to the above questions?  
The British method of colonial development and management framed Kenyatta’s 
presidency. Kenyatta’s Scottish missionary education, for example, set so much of the 
trajectory of his life that in his final years it was the lessons he had learned from his 
dour instructors that he would recount to any visitors. As noted above, the dualism in 
Kenyatta’s leadership practice between authoritarian paternalism and strong strands 
of liberal thought with regard to self-advancement can be traced to the culture of the 
Scottish missionaries. This was a consistent and central element of British colonialism 
across the world.  
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The British development of Kenya’s agricultural economy as the primary source of 
revenue for the colony impacted Kenyatta’s leadership in a range of ways. The 
highland clearances and development of large productive settler-run ranches 
infuriated the Kikuyu and were one of the leading causes of popular discontent against 
the British that climaxed with the Mau Mau. In the less radical pre and post Mau Mau 
context, Kenyatta was successful in using this discontent to frame his messages and 
thus catapult himself to the forefront of African politics in Kenya. In Burns’ language, 
Kenyatta was able to connect with the discontent among the followership around 
issues of land, thus building a relationship and establishing a dynamic leadership 
interaction. Influencing Kenyatta’s leadership from a different angle, in the post-
independence era, the agricultural economy that the British had built up was one of 
the critical sources of prosperity that enabled Kenyatta’s government take credit for 
the economic success of the chosen strategies.  
The political system the British developed in Kenya, and the revised version of that 
they bequeathed Kenyatta had enough internal contradictions that he could easily 
manipulate it and centralise great power upon himself. As mentioned earlier the 
British attempted to give Kenya a fractious and complicated constitution so as to 
disperse power. Kenyatta’s comprehensive sweep of the polls and initial absorption of 
alternative political parties made these efforts redundant and enabled him to develop 
the one-party state as he so pleased. The British had envisaged a long apprenticeship 
for the self-government of their colonies, however, by the end of the 1950’s it was 
clear to London policy makers that it was expedient to make it a short apprenticeship 
instead. This was to avoid another Mau Mau. The nature of the British governing 
apparatus prior to independence also played a significant part in influencing Kenyatta’s 
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leadership. Power in the colonial government was primarily vested in one office – that 
of the governor. Beneath the governor was a network of district commissioners and 
officials. Kenyatta never significantly changed this system; rather it appears he sought 
to emulate it. He exercised much the same level of power and autonomy as the former 
governors, and appointed a network of loyal district officials to carry out his 
administrations’ bidding in much the same way as the old system had. In some ways it 
can argued that Kenyatta’s brand of gradualism was more a form of colonial inertia.  
This experience in gradualism or inertia was not shared across Kenya’s southern 
border, beyond Mt Kilimanjaro in Tanzania.    
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Chapter Three - Julius Nyerere 
In December 1961 representatives of the British Government, flew into Dar es Salaam, 
the capital of then British Tanganyika Territory, 287  to formalise that country’s 
independence. Weeks earlier, when speaking in support of the Tanganyikan 
Independence Bill as it passed through the British House of Lords, the Minister of State 
for Colonial Affairs, the Earl of Perth, asserted;  
‘This is, as I say, most satisfactory; and the main credit for it goes to the Prime 
Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Julius Nyerere. No doubt many of your Lordships 
know him. He is a man of great wisdom and charm, very skilful in negotiation 
and, perhaps I should say, moderate in his presentation of his demands. The 
result of all that, and the peaceful way in which the country has been led to its 
present state, has been a natural one—namely, that one is predisposed to try to 
help him forward on the road that he has set. I think it is just because of the 
moderation and wisdom with which he has handled these affairs that we find 
that Tanganyika is the first of the East African territories to reach 
independence. Perhaps there is some moral in this, and, if there is, it may be 
that it will not be lost on others in the territories in that area.’288 
Thirty-Eight years later Tanzania saw what British newspaper ‘The Independent’ called 
‘the biggest outpouring of collective grief [the country] had ever seen.’289 The reporter 
described what he saw as Tanzania throwing itself ‘into a 48-hour non-stop orgy of 
tears for Baba wa Taifa – the father of the nation – Julius Nyerere’.290 Nyerere had died 
from leukaemia a week earlier. Between these two events, Tanganyika or Tanzania as 
it has been known since 1964, experienced one of the most significant examples of 
transformational leadership Africa has ever known. Nyerere took a patently non-
ideological, non-politicised and non-radical citizenry on an experimental path that was 
at times solely determined by his intellectual analysis of the political context. Meredith 
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asserted ‘Nyerere took on the drive for socialism virtually single-handedly. There was 
no inner group around him committed to socialism; no body of thinking within the 
ruling party; no working-class agitation; no militant peasantry; no popular expectation 
of radical change. It was Nyerere’s own aspirations, his own ideology that determined 
government policy.’291 At times this held catastrophic consequences for the citizenry. 
When Nyerere passed in 1999, however, the affection that the population displayed 
for Nyerere substantially outmatched the memory and political legacies of failed 
Maoist-collectivised agriculture, a heinously swollen and inefficient bureaucracy, 
economic collapse or political repression.  To have elicited a ’48-hour non-stop orgy of 
tears’, or to have seen the normally crowded streets of Dar es Salaam emptied while 
even the hawkers and pickpockets paid tribute to their former president,292 one can 
discern the extent of Nyerere’s dynamic leadership impact upon the hearts and minds 
of the followership.  
Julius Kambarage Nyerere was born in March 1922, in Butiama, in the north of the 
then British Tanganyika Territory. Butiama was in many ways a backwater within a 
backwater; Tanganyika was considered by the British as a poor possession in East 
Africa when compared with the wealth of Kenya and Uganda.293 Nyerere was born 
under British colonial governance. The British administration in Tanganyika, however, 
was also in its infancy. British rule had only been in place since the end of World War I, 
arising from the acquisition of the territory from the vanquished German Empire. 
Nyerere was born into a chiefly family, his father the leader of the small Zanaki ethnic 
group. His father was a staunch polygamist and upholder of tradition and custom. 
Nyerere spent his childhood herding cattle in his father’s remote fiefdom. At the age of 
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twelve he was enrolled in Catholic missionary education, provided by the Musoma 
Native Authority School.294 The instruction Nyerere received at Musoma induced 
Nyerere’s lifelong commitment and interest in Roman Catholicism. Following his initial 
instruction at Musoma, Nyerere, having demonstrated a measure of intellectual 
capacity, was enrolled in elementary education at Tabora in the Western Province of 
Tanganyika. This training was also provided by the Catholic missionaries, further 
buttressing Nyerere’s commitment to the Roman Catholic Church; he was baptised 
pending his father’s death in 1942. 295  Contemporaries of Nyerere at Tabora 
remembered his intense commitment to his studies, and his uniquely high ambition as 
well as levels of competitiveness.296  In 1943, courtesy of a relatively generous 
scholarship, Nyerere was able to further his education at Makerere College in Kampala, 
Uganda.297  
Nyerere’s awakening and the British strategy for Tanganyika 
At the time that Nyerere headed north for his academic awakening in Uganda, the 
British approach to the colonial governance of Tanganyika was being hotly contested 
between London colonial policy makers, and the colonial establishment in East Africa. 
In The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945 – 1968, author Cranford Pratt asserts; ‘before 
the [British] government began vigorously to pursue multiracialism in 1949, there was 
in fact little that could be called a political strategy in Tanganyika.’298 There was a 
political consensus among the colonial administrators on the ground in Tanganyika 
that they knew what was best for the country and that they enjoyed the cooperation 
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of the Tanganyikan population through the network of local native authorities. Pratt 
notes that there was little speculation in East Africa about an eventually independent 
Tanganyika. In London however, there was significant speculation on the future of 
British administration in Africa. This culminated a report by Lord Hailey entitled Native 
Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa.  Pratt notes that the 
report was ‘perceptive and liberal’ for its time and outlined the inevitably of the 
emergence of African nationalism as a powerful force throughout the British 
possessions. The report called for a new and comprehensive political strategy from the 
colonial office.299 Lord Hailey articulated the expediency of a new strategy in the 
following terms; 
‘There are forces both at home and in the dependencies which will exert 
increasing pressure for the extension of political institutions making for self-
government, and the fuller association of Africans in them. The strength of this 
pressure is likely to be largely enhanced as a result of the war [WWII]. Unless 
we have a clear view of the constitutional form in which self-government is to 
be expressed, the answer to this pressure will be ill-coordinated, and may lead 
to the adoption of measures which we may afterwards wish to recall.’300 
Cranford Pratt includes a quote from the British Secretary of State Arthur Creech-
Jones, buttressing Lord Hailey’s point; 
‘The rate of political progress cannot be regulated according to a prearranged 
plan; the pace over the next generation will be rapid, under the stimulus of our 
own development programs, of internal pressure from the people themselves, 
and a world opinion expressed through the growing international interest in the 
progress of colonial peoples.’301 
The strategy that members of Hailey’s school were arguing for had two central 
propositions; they believed in the rapid advancement of Africans within the civil 
service and more importantly the ‘elite corps’, and they argued for a significant 
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increase in the elected representation of Africans on the Legislative and Executive 
Councils that governed the dependencies.302 The intention of these propositions was 
to attract the support and cooperation of the growing numbers of educated and 
politically conscious Africans ‘for a final and extended period of preparation for 
internal self-government and independence.’ 303  This strategy would see the 
replacement of local native authorities with democratic local government; this form of 
local democracy would be the training ground for African leaders prior to being 
granted further representation and political power.304 It was hoped the proposed new 
local government systems would inculcate the ‘appropriate political values and 
[provide] the voter and the politician with valuable experience in the operation of 
democratic institutions.’305 The proponents of this strategy believed that after the 
eventual independence, this constitutional system would lead to a system whereby 
these local institutions would form an electoral college– linking the future national 
assembly with the masses in such a way as to avoid any tendencies toward 
authoritarian rule.306 
The enlightened virtues of the proposed strategy were lost on the East African 
Governors. This highlights the disjunction between the liberal philosophies of the 
London policy makers and the conservatism of the colonial administrators. Pratt notes 
that the strategy of gradual enfranchisement and the participation of Africans in 
colonial management were rejected by the colonial establishment in Africa, as were 
the principles and assumptions that underlined the approach.307 The most emphatic 
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rejection came from the Governor of Kenya, Sir Phillip Mitchell. Pratt asserts that his 
response to the strategy was ‘verbose, racist and unrepentantly imperialistic.’308 
Mitchell believed that the foreseeable future of African political leadership lay with 
men like himself, who had taken on the ‘white man’s burden’ to develop and civilise 
the tribes of Africa until they were unmistakably western European in orientation – at 
which point they would be fit for participation in their own affairs of government.309 
Whilst the Acting Governor of Tanganyika, Sir William Battershill was not as outspoken 
as his northern counterpart, he indicated in similar dispatches back to the colonial 
office that he was in agreement with Mitchell with regard to any new strategy 
involving the advancement of Africans within the colonial administration. Pratt notes 
that Battershill’s dispatch projected a level of ‘lethargic prejudice.’310   
The government of Tanganyika was strategic in that it claimed there was no colour bar 
to entry to the administrative service, however it made careful arrangements to 
ensure African’s were never appointed. This meant that the colonial authorities could 
both claim they were progressive and supportive of the Colonial Office, yet could also 
maintain the status quo. Sir Edward Twining, who was appointed Governor of 
Tanganyika in 1950, justified the approach in the following statement;  
‘Progress is being made but before the indigenous people as a whole can 
assume any responsibilities in the sphere of central government, the local 
government system now being built up on the foundations of the native 
administrations must be fully and firmly established. Only thus can the great 
mass of the people be assured of true representation in the counsels of 
government. Critics may suggest that this envisages too slow a rate of progress 
but those responsible for carrying out the policy in Tanganyika have no doubt 
that the future will bear witness to its soundness. The truth is that there is no 
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safe shortcut to the establishment of full democratic government among Bantu 
peoples.’311 
This meant that the local government reform strategy, which was intended to speed 
up the inclusion of Africans in the political process, was turned into a rationale for 
delaying the political advancement of indigenous peoples.312 Pratt notes that the 
Tanganyikan government were anticipating an extensive period of colonial rule, and 
thus prepared their institutions accordingly. They saw no need for any ‘Africanisation’ 
of the civil service, nor did they have any confidence in the small but growing numbers 
of educated Africans. 313  The strategy of including Africans in the business of 
government was intended to limit the potential for authoritarianism in the event of 
African self-government. This strategy was deferred by the colonial administrators, to 
the point that it was redundant. It would be an interesting counterfactual study to 
analyse any potential post-independence leadership outcomes that may have occurred 
had the strategy been implemented in its original form. Nevertheless, it was not 
implemented as a result of the institutional inertia that permeated throughout the 
East African colonial service. This inertia was hardened by the reality that the rank and 
file colonial staff believed that African participation in the management of their own 
affairs ran counter to their various offices’ raison d’etre. Thus African political progress 
in the post-war era was slow, and the emerging educated and politically conscious 
class of Tanganyikans became frustrated.  
At Makerere University, Julius Nyerere gained a reputation as a star debater and a 
gifted student. He is remembered to have introduced international affairs into his 
discussions at the university, demonstrating a rare level of political consciousness 
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among Tanganyikans. 314  While at Makerere, Nyerere established the TAWA 
(Tanganyikan African Welfare Association) though he soon amalgamated it with TAA 
(Tanganyika African Association) which had been established in the 1920s to take a 
stand against any concept for Tanganyika becoming a region for full-scale white 
settlement. Nyerere completed his Diploma in Education in 1945 and returned to 
teach in a Catholic school, St Mary’s Mission School in Tabora. For three years he 
taught history and biology to young and aspirational Africans, before taking another 
step in his own academic career by moving to Edinburgh to complete a Bachelor of 
Arts and subsequent Master of Arts. Graduating with an M.A. in 1952, Nyerere was the 
first Tanganyikan to reach such lofty heights in the European academic world. Historian 
Laura Kurtz notes that it was in Edinburgh that the foundations of Nyerere’s political 
philosophy were laid.315 Returning to Tanganyika, Nyerere found a new teaching 
position at St Francis College in Pugu. Pugu was a relatively short distance from Dar es 
Salaam, Tanganyika’s largest city and capital. Shortly after his arrival he married his 
long time fiancée Maria Gabriel, opting for monogamous Catholic matrimony in 
contrast to his father’s polygamy. Shortly after settling into married life, Nyerere began 
active political participation in the TAA.316 By 1953 Nyerere had achieved the position 
of president of the association and so began practicing his political philosophy. One of 
his first decisions was to reorganise the association as a vehicle for political activity – 
re-writing its constitution and re-orienting its official objectives.317  This perhaps 
demonstrates the development of Nyerere’s growing aptitude for transformation. In 
May 1954, Nyerere was appointed as a temporary member to Tanganyika’s Legislative 
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Council and a couple of months later was made the first president of the reformed TAA 
under the new name Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).318 
Cranford Pratt notes that the establishment of TANU marked the emergence of ‘a new 
type of nationalist’ in Tanganyika. Typified by Nyerere, these individuals were young 
and highly educated. They also had ‘not had an earlier chequered career, but who had 
come to nationalist conclusions and to an anti-colonial commitment by more direct 
routes.’319 These men contrasted with the earlier breed of nationalists ‘whose pursuit 
of self-improvement had brought them to a sense of common cause with their fellow 
Africans in opposition to colonial rule… most can fairly be called members of the 
emerging bourgeoisie.’320 Nyerere was successful in uniting these two schools of 
nationalists and directed TANU toward a national focus, bringing together a variety of 
rural discontents which had previously only led to regional level agitation.321 This 
helped to create a national consciousness among the agitators; which was one of 
Nyerere’s main aims.  
In African One Party States Margaret Bates notes that the timing of the emergence of 
nationally conscious African activism coincided with the colonial government 
beginning to feel increasing international pressure. A United Nations Visiting Mission 
suggested that the government ‘ought to establish a timetable for political 
development, with Tanganyika to achieve independence in twenty years’ time.’322 
Bates notes that both Governor Twining and the Secretary of State for Colonies back in 
London took significant issue with such a suggestion – stating that the British 
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government had a pathological dislike for timetables.323 Under growing internal and 
external anti-colonial pressure, the governing bodies of Tanganyika allowed the UN’s 
Trusteeship Council to hear an oral petition from TANU. Nyerere was the obvious 
choice of speaker. He told the ‘Trusteeship Council’ that African political development 
was not occurring fast enough and that unless Africans were assured more substantial 
progress in the form of political power, then his activist core would pursue a more 
extreme attitude.324 Considering that this petition was heard at the height of the Mau 
Mau Emergency just across the northern border, a ‘more extreme attitude’ was an 
ominous and realistic threat. ‘His appearance and his statement made manifest a 
growing African political sophistication and also unrest.’325 Nyerere also informed the 
council that the period of political transition was taking far too long and that African 
membership on the Legislative Council, limited to three chiefs, no longer constituted 
sufficient representation of the advancing African opinion.326 Nyerere was heralding 
the emergence of a small yet highly activated African followership - which was 
increasingly at his disposal.  
Mwalimu – Nyerere the moral teacher 
Unlike Kenyatta who traded heavily on his personal prestige in his relationship with his 
disciples, Nyerere was a teacher – by nature and profession. Later in his leadership 
career, he was affectionately known throughout Tanzania as Mwalimu, a KiSwahili 
word for teacher.327 Nyerere’s vision for TANU, and Tanganyika, was laid out in the 
organisations 1955 constitution. The TANU constitution took the form of six major 
objectives; 
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1. ‘To prepare the people of Tanganyika for self-government and 
independence, and to fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing 
and independent. 
2. To fight against tribalism and all isolationist tendencies amongst the 
Africans, and to build up a united nationalism.  
3. To fight relentlessly for the establishment of a democratic form of 
government, and as a first step toward democracy, to fight for the 
introduction of the election principle on all bodies of local and central 
government.  
4. To achieve African majorities on all bodies of local and central government, 
and committees, boards or corporations of public service. 
5. To fight for the removal of every form of racialism and racial discrimination.  
6. To encourage and organise Trade Unionism and the Cooperative 
Movement, and to work with Trade Unions and Cooperative Societies and 
other organisations whose objectives are in harmony with the aims and 
objects of the Association.’328  
Nyerere set about teaching this vision throughout the wider TANU organisation – and 
to the Tanganyikan people. In We Must Run While They Walk – A Portrait of Africa’s 
Julius Nyerere, William Edgett Smith notes that ‘he toured upcountry Tanganyika 
almost continuously. TANU’s Land Rover, with licence plates DSK 750, became a 
familiar sight throughout the territory.329 Meredith notes that Nyerere pursued his 
goals with ‘missionary zeal’ – and carried and presented his message of liberation with 
much the same evangelistic style and vigour as the European missionaries had done 
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with their message. Edgett Smith notes that Nyerere’s efforts bore considerable fruit 
and TANU grew at a remarkable rate; ‘from one hundred thousand members in 1955 
to half a million by 1957.’330 Political historians Robert Jackson and Carl Rosenberg, as 
well as Cranford Pratt331 agree that Nyerere was becoming more than party organiser. 
‘Nyerere [was] above all, a teacher, a mwalimu. He [was] a teacher of a special sort. He 
[was] a teacher of morality.332 By the late 1950’s, Julius Nyerere had evolved into the 
archetypal Burns’ style transformational leader. He was engaging with a burgeoning 
group of followers in such a powerful way that their morality was being affected. As 
mentioned earlier, he was taking a series of disparate rural discontents against British 
rule, welding them into a national struggle, whilst teaching the population his vision 
for self-government. Nyerere was raising the moral deportment of the followership 
through a process of ‘mutual stimulation and elevation.’333  
The rapid emergence of TANU was unintentionally assisted by the colonial 
government’s inertia when it came to African political progress. Governor Twining 
always asserted that his government’s intention was to fulfil the League of 
Nations/United Nations mandate which was to bring Tanganyika to self-government 
and independence. Twining, however, also insisted that his policy ‘was based on the 
accepted policy of the British government: non-racialism, with a gradual program of 
turnover to African control; a plan of carefully graded objectives.’334 Twining refused to 
have a timetable and this agitated politically conscious Africans in Tanganyika. This saw 
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opposition ‘organised outside of the whole system,’335 which was precisely what the 
London policy makers at the Colonial Office were trying to avoid. The inertia sustained 
by Twining and his government served to swell TANU’s ranks – giving Nyerere an 
increasing mandate with which he could both press the authorities and claim 
legitimacy as a leader in Tanganyika. 
The British administrative officers in Tanganyika mostly viewed themselves as acting 
out of ‘selfless paternalism’ on behalf of Africans.336 This made the rise of TANU 
difficult to understand for the British agents. Pratt notes that the senior colonial 
administrators were hostile to any nationalist agitation as they believed their policies 
were in the best interests of the colony, and that the agitation of nationalists could 
undo the laborious work that they had put in.337  These officials also believed that they 
enjoyed the support of the majority of Africans, unless they were ‘got at’ by 
agitators.338 Governor Twining asserted that the nationalist movement was driven by 
‘self-seeking individuals’ who he believed had appointed themselves as political 
leaders and were bent on exploiting local grievances in order to advance their position 
against central government.339  
The government employed a variety of means to curtail the advances of TANU. Initially 
they attempted to win the civic debate; ‘In June 1958, for example, a Provincial 
Commissioner urged his District Commissioners to hold open political meetings 
throughout their Districts… he was sure they could re-establish the confidence of the 
people.’340 Pending the ineffectiveness of that approach, the government sought to 
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legislate to limit and control TANU through the ‘Societies Ordinance.’341 Cranford Pratt 
notes that ‘this gave the government a much tighter surveillance of all organisations 
and placed in its hands the power to refuse or to withdraw the registration of societies 
for failure to meet the rather demanding formal requirements of registration.’342 It was 
no surprise that by 1955 the only societies having their registration withheld were 
branches of TANU. The government’s response was comprehensive. Twining’s officials 
were also set the task of rehabilitating tribal chiefs to positions of authority to provide 
an indigenous counterweight to TANU. This was done in preparation for elections that 
were soon to be held. The final stroke in Twining’s plan was the establishment of the 
multi-racial United Tanganyika Party (UTP). The rationale was to establish a political 
organisation loyal to the government that could match TANU’s grassroots popularity. 
The government established an electoral system that favoured the UTP in the 
anticipated 1957 election, and the now semi-underground TANU rigorously attacked 
this as an electoral system ‘tailor-made for [the] UTP.’343 
The existence of the UTP and the proposed 1957 election split the leadership of TANU, 
with most of the leadership preferring the idea of boycotting the elections. Nyerere 
argued for participation. Historian William Edgett Smith asserts that this was a pivotal 
moment in the pre-independence period. Nyerere had to convince the overwhelming 
majority of the TANU leadership that rather than boycotting, as was their preference, 
it was in their best interests to participate.344 His rationale was that should the UTP win 
uncontested and subsequently establish themselves as the dominant political force – 
then TANU’s major objectives would be set back ten years or more. Nyerere asserted 
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‘if we don’t participate this year, the UTP is going to win. All members will be returned 
unopposed and TANU will be fighting from the outside. The only thing we could do is 
send a petition to the Colonial Office explaining our position; the Colonial Office would 
send a commission of inquiry; and the next election would be three or four years later; 
and by that time the UTP would be firmly established. We might get our independence 
by 1970 or 1975.’345 Nyerere was demonstrating a visionary capability to lead TANU. 
He was strategically astute enough to discern that the best long term profitable 
political choice was electoral participation. In Greenstein’s metaphorical terms; 
Nyerere played a skilled billiards shot within oppressive circumstances. Nyerere’s 
capacity as a Burns style transformational leader was also apparent. He dynamically 
engaged with the motivations of the actors involved to the extent that their moral 
orientation on the issue was amalgamated with his own.  With TANU opting to 
participate in the elections Twining’s seemingly grand and comprehensive strategy 
crumbled. The last option available to the administration was the detainment of 
Nyerere himself, as a final effort to arrest the growth of TANU.  
In July 1958 charges were laid against Nyerere for ‘criminal libel’ arising from his 
comments in the TANU newsletter ‘Sauti ya TANU.’346 Edgett Smith notes that Nyerere 
viewed the situation lightly; ‘resting at Lady Chesham’s farm, he would say lightly, 
almost jokingly, “shall I go to jail? Every other Prime Minister has gone to jail. But I 
can’t go to jail – it’s an election year.’347 Nyerere was referring to what became known 
as ‘the prison apprenticeship’ for African independence leaders. Many of them had 
been imprisoned by colonial powers on questionable charges before they took office. 
Nyerere’s trial coincided with Governor Twining’s retirement from Tanganyika and his 
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replacement with the tall and erudite Sir Richard Turnbill.348 Turnbill had previously 
been employed as the chief secretary in Evelyn Baring’s government in Kenya, at the 
height of the Mau Mau crisis. To the surprise of all observers, and even Nyerere, 
Turnbill invited Nyerere to Government House for high level talks, two weeks before 
the conclusion of the trial. Edgett Smith includes a quote of his, justifying his decision; 
‘tremendous feeling had been aroused. I had been through four years of the 
emergency in Kenya, and didn’t want to go through that again.’349  
Turnbill intervened in the trial and saw that Nyerere did not receive the somewhat 
coveted title of ‘prison graduate’ which was ‘so often exploited by nationalist leaders 
elsewhere in Africa.’350 Turnbill was a different breed of administrator to the likes of 
Governors Mitchell, Baring and Twining. Turnbill had first-hand experience of what 
could happen when colonial government ran head on into nationalist agitation. Under 
his watch there would be no Tanganyikan Mau Mau. Nyerere is quoted in Edgett 
Smith, reflecting; ‘Turnbill could have fallen into Twinning’s footsteps and gotten into 
real trouble, because the political movement was now very militant.’351 This is solid 
evidence to support the claim that the operation of the British Empire depended 
significantly on the personalities working on the ground, and that a different 
personality in a key position could significantly alter the course of the Empire’s history 
in a specific context. Greenstein’s conceptions of actor location are certainly vindicated 
through analysis of the British Empire.  
In the election of September 1958, TANU or TANU-backed candidates won all fifteen 
seats on the legislative council. In October Governor Turnbill chaired the new 
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Legislative Council, and in his opening address he announced basic policy changes that 
essentially recognised the experiment in multiracialism was to be aborted. ‘Tanganyika 
was finally recognised by the British for what it transparently had always been, a 
predominantly African country.’352In a second round of elections in February, TANU 
was only opposed in three seats, which the party won easily, and thus the UTP faded 
from existence. Throughout 1959 the elected members worked with their remarkably 
progressive Governor toward a series of proposals focused around the widening of the 
franchise and the removal of most racial distinctions from the electoral roll. On 
December 15th Governor Turnbill announced the implementation of these proposals – 
paving the way for self-government and eventual independence.  Turnbill called for 
new elections in September 1960, to establish a Legislative Council with an ‘unofficial 
majority’.353 Despite elements of TANU being disappointed the Governor had not gone 
further, there was jubilation among the politicised African population, and there was 
dancing in the streets of Dar es Salaam.354 
In the 1960 elections TANU continued to cement its dominance in Tanganyikan politics. 
In 58 of the 71 seats available, TANU stood unopposed. Bates notes that the only real 
electoral contests came from ‘intraparty disputes, on the basis of personality and local 
issues rather than on lines of party policy.’355 The ascendency of TANU in the 1960 
elections gave perceived sanctioning to the belief, circulated by TANU, in the virtues of 
‘a single independence movement and a strong party that backed the apparatus of the 
state.’356 Nyerere was a strong proponent of this centralism, and spoke of one-party 
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democracy and its important role in new states.357  After the September elections he 
was virtually assured a one-party state.  
Nyerere was one of independence Africa’s most eloquent advocates for the one-party 
system, so it was no surprise that after TANU’s dominance in the September elections 
that he sought to normalise TANU as the natural governing organisation in Tanganyika. 
Meredith notes, ‘he maintained that the two-party system had evolved in the West as 
a result of the competition between socio-economic classes’.358  His belief was that 
African society was essentially classless, and there was therefore no basis for party 
competition based on such distinctions; ‘parliamentary systems of the kind 
bequeathed to Africa by Europe’s departing colonial powers were misplaced.’359 
Nyerere elaborated; 
‘The British and American tradition of a two-party system is a reflection of the 
society from which it evolved. The existence of distinct classes and the struggle 
between them resulted in the growth of this system. In Africa, the Nationalist 
movements were fighting a battle for freedom from foreign domination, not 
from domination by any ruling class of our own. Once the foreign power – the 
other party – has been expelled, there is no ready-made division among the 
people. The nationalist movements must inevitably form the first Governments 
of the new states. Once a free Government is formed, its supreme task lies 
ahead – the building up of the county’s economy. This, no less than the struggle 
against colonialism, calls for the maximum united effort by the whole country if 
it is to succeed. There can be no room for difference or division.’360   
Nyerere used this analysis to justify his affiliation to the one-party system. Such 
analysis failed to take into account some the political luxuries he enjoyed in 
Tanganyika, compared with elsewhere in the continent. His statement ‘there is no 
readymade division among the people’ of Africa was disastrously proven wrong in 
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other contexts – such as Nigeria or Rwanda.361 The readymade divisions were not 
often based on class, but in many instances they were based on ethnicity. ‘In 
Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere was helped, as he himself acknowledged, by the fact that 
the population was divided among 120 tribal groupings, none of which was large 
enough or central enough to acquire a dominant position.’362 Armed with the rhetoric 
of ‘uhuru’ (freedom/independence), Nyerere enjoyed a near monopoly on galvanising 
political ideas. He did not have to provide political and material payoffs to dominant 
ethnic groups to avoid any shattering ethnic conflicts after independence. This meant 
that with TANU under his control he could prepare to take his position at the apex of 
the Tanganyikan political structure. Greenstein’s theory applied here would indicate 
that the ethnic diffuse ethnic composition of Tanzania made the political environment 
more manipulable; thus enhancing the potential for Nyerere’s historical impact.   
In March 1961 a constitutional conference was held at Dar es Salaam and in May 1961 
Tanganyika achieved full self-government. Tanganyika initially was to be a 
constitutional monarchy, with Turnbill becoming the Queen’s representative and 
Governor-General of Tanganyika. According to Bates, the last steps to independence 
were taken smoothly. Full impendence was scheduled for the 9th of December 1961.363 
On this day, climbers ascended Mt Kilimanjaro to place a torch at the summit, ‘to cast 
symbolic rays of hope beyond the country’s borders.’364 The transition of power was 
one of the most peaceful that the continent had seen during the era of decolonisation. 
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Across all of Tanganyika there were no acts of violence reported and, Bates notes, ‘the 
police force spent its time directing traffic.’365 
Before Nyerere attained the position of Prime Minister, his political message was 
simple; he stood for winning independence from the British. His message enjoyed 
resonance in almost all quarters of African life in Tanganyika. Crudely speaking, at the 
time of independence, Tanganyika consisted of around ten million Africans, roughly 
100,000 Asians and about 22,000 Europeans.366 This meant that his overwhelming 
majority of Tanganyikans were fertile political ground for his message. Nyerere’s 
political leadership was propelled by his ability to not only personify his message, but 
also to teach it in such a way the masses of the African population, as well as some 
Asians and Europeans, were elevated by his rhetoric.367 When he became Prime 
Minister, it was expected that he would have no other choice than to accommodate 
and work within the pre-existing political structures. Beyond the political capital 
Nyerere had accumulated from his message of anti-colonialism, Tanganyika seemed to 
offer a leader little to work with in terms of further political transformation. After 
independence there were few nascent issues or unifying ideals for a leader to interact 
with. Colonial Tanganyika lacked the class of upwardly mobile and politically articulate 
Africans who were driving progress in West Africa.368 Economically, Tanganyika was 
resource deprived with very small amounts of arable land and no other significant 
resources that could generate the state enough resources to empower the leader to 
forge any new paths. There was also an infrastructural deficit. During the colonial era 
the British had chosen to focus their development efforts in the more prosperous 
                                                          
365
 Bates, p. 431 
366
 Cartwright, p. 159 
367
 Cartwright, p. 163 
368
 Ibid, p. 156 
117 
 
northern dependencies of Kenya and Uganda, and their settler dominated southern 
possessions.369 ‘There was little to suggest that [Tanganyika] would choose a path 
markedly different from that of the other states.’370 Based on this evidence, it could be 
assumed that Nyerere was obliged to maintain whatever status quo was possible in 
Tanganyika. Instead, what eventuated in the independence era was one of the most 
resilient examples of transformational leadership to occur in decolonised Africa. 
During the independence struggle, Nyerere had given some hints of his affiliation to 
the principles of equality. In the 1950’s Nyerere had asserted that the high incomes of 
civil servants and ‘other functionaries’ were drawn from the labour and toil of the 
peasantry.371  Despite these hints, few suspected his motives when weeks after 
independence he temporarily resigned as Prime Minister. He had decided to devote 
himself to developing a coherent TANU governing philosophy that was intended to 
frame the post-independence period government agenda. Cartwright asserts that his 
goals were; ‘the creation of a non-exploitative, egalitarian society, and a party whose 
leaders would remain open to criticism and control by the people.’372 These goals were 
driven by Nyerere’s belief, demonstrated in one of his more well-known assertions; 
‘we in Africa have no need of being converted to socialism than we have of being 
taught democracy. Both are rooted in our past, in the tradition of the society that 
produced us.’373 Nyerere was drafting the blueprint for an African adaptation of 
socialism. Nyerere dedicated his vast intellectual energy to the development of this 
philosophy.  
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Nyerere’s ‘sabbatical’ of sorts significantly assisted his strategic location within the 
rapidly changing political environment. This was because it prevented his being tainted 
as a leader by the relatively small but still significant anticolonial backlash that so much 
of his core followership demanded. Cartwright asserts; ‘there was further advantage to 
being out of government office in this first flush of Tanganyikan independence.’374 The 
British methods of colonial management had built up sufficient political pressures 
within the Tanganyikan context that needed an outlet once independence took place. 
‘The government sought to demonstrate African political control by deportations, by 
advancing Africans over Europeans, and Asians in the civil-service, by bringing in a 
Preventative Detention Act, and by other actions which seemed both high-handed and 
racist. These were actions which Nyerere would have had qualms about taking.’375 
Such excess included an incident where ‘the British manager of the Palm Beach Hotel 
in Dar es Salaam asked four Africans – one of whom, he later learned was the mayor of 
Dar es Salaam – to leave the hotel bar. He was immediately served with a deportation 
order.’376 TANU needed to satisfy its activist core who were levelling the demands for 
the above actions, and Nyerere needed to distance himself from this ‘excess.’377In 
December 1962, when Tanganyika formalised a new republican constitution and the 
worst of these excesses were out of the way, Nyerere was elected as President by an 
overwhelming majority of Tanzanians. He was untainted by the process of the new 
government asserting its control. Nyerere returned full of inspiration and energy to 
fulfil his transformative plans.  
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Nyerere’s presidency and ujamaa 
 Nyerere’s efforts to rebuild TANU as a vehicle for mass mobilisation in Tanganyika 
were almost undermined by an army mutiny in January 1964. Nyerere hoped to 
suppress the mutiny with the internal strength of his new TANU organisation however 
the rank-and-file membership of the party were slow to come to the aid of their 
leaders. The mutiny had to eventually be suppressed with the assistance of British 
marines. The mutiny demonstrated the possible frailty of Nyerere’s transformational 
programme in its embryonic stages. Nyerere’s response to the mutiny was an 
endeavour to reorganise the Tanganyikan military loyal to him and his party. 
Cartwright notes that this was only partially successful and the military remained a 
‘vaguely menacing background shadow.’378  
At the same time as the mutiny, there was an African uprising on the offshore 
sultanate of Zanzibar – that was too close to Tanganyika for Nyerere to ignore. The 
crisis demonstrated Nyerere’s preference to lead independently and often without 
consultation. The new leaders of Zanzibar were a group of African nationalists and 
radical Marxists. This drew significant interest from both axes of the cold war and 
Nyerere discerned that he did not want any proxy-war fought ‘on his doorstep.’379 He 
therefore unilaterally decided that Tanganyika would try and persuade the Zanzibari 
leaders to amalgamate the island state with Tanganyika. His strategy proved successful 
and in April 1964, Tanganyika became the United Republic of Tanzania – the name 
change recognising the amalgamation. This move had much expedience for Nyerere’s 
leadership, though it also demonstrated a significant moral trend in his governing 
style. Whereas other African independence leaders saw interest from Western or 
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Eastern powers as a potential resource to be manipulated; ‘the more idealistic leaders, 
such as Julius Nyerere, preferred that Africa should stand aloof from the sterile 
quarrels of the Cold War.’380 This could well have been one of the several motivations 
that led Nyerere to see Tanzania absorb Zanzibar.  
With these relatively short-term concerns set aside; Nyerere became pre-occupied 
again with his long term vision for the independent political development of Tanzania. 
Whilst extolling the virtues of the one-party state style of government, Nyerere sought 
to make the system more responsive to the grassroots needs of the citizenry – and 
therefore democratic. In 1965 he set up a commission to investigate how a de facto 
one-party state might be made more democratic. The proposals arising from the 
commission saw Tanzania opt for a system where more than one TANU candidate 
could contest a seat. These amendments did not significantly democratise the system, 
though they empowered voters to remove a candidate who was particularly 
unpopular.381 To apply both Greenstein and Burns’ leadership theories; by seeking 
these changes Nyerere was both enhancing his strategic location within the political 
context; his office was never threatened internally, and to the outside world these 
actions declared that he was not another post-independence tyrant or  dictator. 
Nyerere was also appeasing the followership in such a way that built trust and loyalty 
in his leadership.  
Nyerere buttressed his international standing by demonstrating a distinctive lack of 
interest in the spoils of leadership. ‘His personal integrity and modest lifestyle was in 
sharp contrast to the extravagance and corruption for which other African presidents 
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had generally become renowned.’382 Nyerere also possessed genuine and intense 
concern for the advancement of egalitarianism in Tanzania – whilst also displaying 
considerable disdain for any elitism he saw emerging in his new country. He therefore 
devoted his ‘formidable intellectual energy’, 383  to the development of a 
comprehensive strategy for Tanzania that would both significantly advance 
egalitarianism whilst purging his country of any elitism similar to that which emerged 
in other decolonising contexts in Africa. Professor Goran Hyden of the University of Dar 
es Salaam wrote that Nyerere was making Tanzania ‘a political mecca for liberal and 
socialist progressives from all over the world, anxious to see a challenge to neo-
capitalism.’384 Nyerere’s good intentions and ability to attract international acclaim 
also attracted Tanzania material benefits; ‘by the 1970s Tanzania benefited from more 
foreign aid per capita than any other African country.’385 Essentially Nyerere’s high 
level of integrity, matched with his worthy intentions for his people meant that 
international observers wanted and were willing to support the success of his projects. 
To employ the theorists; upon inheriting office, Nyerere’s strategic location within an 
oppressive context seemed to suggest he had few choices in terms of the political 
direction he could chose for Tanzania. His personal qualities as a leader, however, 
were a significant enabling force in in both attracting foreign support and assistance 
for his projects; as well as developing and enhancing the trust and faith his 
followership placed in his ability to lead. ‘Nyerere offers the student of African rulers 
and regimes an example of a leader whose personal ideals will have made a significant 
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difference not only to personal relations of power in the state, but also to social 
relations in the wider society.’386 
In the years following independence an economic gap began to emerge between rural 
and urban Tanzanians. Urban-dwellers incomes increased in real terms by 65% 
between 1960 and 1968. In the same period farmers’ incomes remained virtually 
static.387 Nyerere had been propounding the merits of redistributive socialism for 
years, though he had never taken any significant action to implement these ideals. He 
had been teaching the virtues of socialist morality and a socialism strongly influenced 
by his Christian faith across Tanzania since before independence. In 1967, disturbed by 
the possibility of Tanzania becoming a ‘less successful version of free-enterprise 
Kenya,’388 Nyerere took action. Meredith writes Nyerere was ‘alarmed that a new 
acquisitive African elite was beginning to emerge in Tanzania and that traditional 
communal values were being eroded.’389 He therefore staged an ‘intellectual coup.’390 
On the 7th of February 1967 Nyerere issued a statement of party principles known as 
the Arusha Declaration.391 It is believed that Nyerere wrote the declaration by hand 
during the Arusha Conference.392 The declaration was a call for national self-reliance 
and placed considerable emphasis on the need for development to begin at the lowest 
rural level. It also asserted the state’s right to control all of the major means of 
production and trade within the Tanzanian economy.393  The Arusha Declaration 
heralded the practical manifestation of Nyerere’s teaching on African socialism. It 
provided for the comprehensive reorganisation of Tanzanian life around the socialist 
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principles of ‘ujamaa’ (family-hood).  Following the declaration the government began 
a program to nationalise the ‘commanding heights’ of the Tanzanian economy.394 
Commentators Jackson and Rosenberg assert the ‘major financial, commercial, and 
manufacturing enterprises, many of them foreign owned or the property of Tanzania’s 
Asian minority, were taken over by the state.’395 
Nyerere also emphasised the need for Tanzania to be less dependent on foreign aid. 
He believed that ‘self-reliance’ was critical to the success of the project. For it to be 
realised Tanzania needed to become economically sovereign and independent. He 
asserted; ‘There is in Tanzania a fantastic amount of talk about getting money from the 
outside. Our governments and different groups of our leaders never stop thinking 
about methods of getting finance from abroad.’396 Nyerere was critical of his ministers 
and civil servants who he asserted were incapable of conceiving a developmental path 
that did not depend on the attraction of foreign aid. Nyerere believed that self-reliance 
and independence were synonymous. As long as Tanzania required foreign aid to 
prosper, his country was still in the clutches of colonialism. He proclaimed 
‘independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a national depends 
upon gifts and loans from another for its development. How can we depend on foreign 
governments and companies for the major part of our development without giving to 
those governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The 
truth is we cannot.’397 Cartwright notes that the policy paradigm was driven by the 
belief that ‘Tanzania had neither any reason nor the right to expect help from other 
countries in her attempts to achieve economic development, and thus must rely 
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entirely upon her own resources.’398 As Tanzania did not enjoy any significant resource 
endowment, Nyerere recognised that the country’s best chance for economic 
independence was through rural development.399 Though this development would be 
slower than that observed elsewhere on the continent, Nyerere believed the 
development of a sustainable peasant-led agricultural economy would deliver more 
long term benefits.  
The Arusha Declaration was accompanied by a ‘leadership code’ designed to curb any 
growth of a privileged African elite as was seen in Kenya and further afield. Nyerere 
justified the code asserting;  
‘Many leaders of the independence struggle… were not against capitalism; they 
simply wanted its fruits, and saw independence as the means to that end. 
Indeed many of the most active fighters in the independence movement were 
motivated – consciously or unconsciously – by the belief that only with 
independence could they attain that ideal of individual wealth which their 
education or their experience in the modern sector had established as a 
worthwhile goal.’400   
Nyerere established the code to curb these aspirations. To the consternation of 
many,401 the code stipulated that all senior government or party officials had to also be 
peasants or workers. These officials were to be in no way associated with the interests 
of capital. No person employed by the state or TANU would be able to buy shares in 
private companies or even own rental accommodation.402 Cartwright notes that at the 
TANU conference where the code was ratified there was widespread unhappiness; 
however Nyerere was successful in persuading the delegates to support it. This was all 
in stark contrast to the Kenyan experience when Kenyatta actively encouraged the 
business practices that Nyerere sought to eradicate. The institutionalising of the 
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leadership code typifies Nyerere as a transformational leader in contrast to one of 
transaction. Kenyatta managed a loyal body of government officials and operatives 
through allowing them to enjoy the material pay-offs of his capitalist strategy. This was 
a political leadership transaction. Nyerere instead saw Kenyatta’s strategy as 
corrupting and sought to revolutionise the morality of his government agents. This was 
done through teaching the virtues of establishing a ‘nation of equals’ whilst denying 
any incentives for government officials to use their offices for material gain. Nyerere 
also oversaw the placing of restrictions on luxury foreign imports, and significant 
education reforms designed eliminate any advantages that children of civil servants 
might enjoy. Nyerere was bent on curbing the growth of any privileged elite.  
Nyerere’s drive for equality was best exhibited in his proposals for self-sufficient 
socialist villages to be developed across Tanzania. These villages were to be the 
fundamental units of rural development. They were to be called ‘ujamaa villages,’ 
drawing on the idea of family-hood referenced above.  The ujamaa villages were 
intended to attract the previously scattered rural population into more concentrated 
living. It was hoped agricultural productivity would be boosted by the increased labour 
force available and the state’s ability to provide the villages with modern agricultural 
techniques and equipment. ‘Strip farms or shambas were to be replaced by large 
communal units.’403 Nyerere also held that centralising the rural population in the 
ujamaa villages would make it easier for the state to provide essential services such as 
roads, clean water, healthcare and schools. This was Nyerere’s ‘silver bullet’ to address 
inequality in Tanzania.  
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Nyerere endeavoured to encourage the rural population to move into the villages as 
he asserted the population had to be willing for the entire project to work. Initially he 
believed that coercing the population to adopt the ujamaa system would be 
counterproductive to his overall aims. He asserted; ‘an ujamaa village is a voluntary 
association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work 
together for their common good.’404 Nyerere travelled around rural Tanzania trying to 
build grassroots support for the ujamaa villages. He would often join with peasants 
digging their fields as well as attend their local meetings in order to build support for 
the Arusha Declaration. Cartwright asserts these actions were part of his drive to 
‘encourage people to decide for themselves what should be done, rather than simply 
following the governments orders.’405 This was an archetypal example of Burns’ 
transformational leadership style; ‘transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual 
stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders 
into moral agents.’406 The Ujamaa program, however, only saw limited and slow 
progress. 
By the end of 1968 there were only around 180 villages that legitimately conformed to 
the ujamaa model.407 Nyerere tried to speed up the process by offering incentives for 
the population to move into the model villages and was met with limited success. ‘By 
mid-1973 the number of ujamaa villages had increased to 5,000, involving some 2 
million people, or about 15% of the population.’408 Meredith goes on to note that 
many of these were formed only for the prospect of attaining government support in 
the form of a new water supply or school.  
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Few villages were genuinely managed in the communal or cooperative fashion that 
Nyerere had envisaged. One cooperative that was successful was the Ruvuma 
Development Association (RDA). Beginning in 1963 near the Mozambique border, the 
RDA had successfully and cooperatively built up infrastructure including a flourmill, 
sawmill and even a road-transport company.409 The management of RDA was required 
to still participate in a full-share of manual labour and the villagers would share 
communal meals. The RDA was, however, not under the central control of the 
government as it had been created four years before Arusha. In October 1969, Nyerere 
abolished the RDA, one of the most successful examples the ujamaa model – because 
it was not under the central control of Dar es Salaam. Ironically Nyerere used the 
Societies Ordinance mechanism to end the RDA; the same mechanism that was 
introduced by Governor Twinning in the 1950’s to control TANU.410 This perhaps 
demonstrates an aptitude, also exhibited by Kenyatta, for Nyerere to employ colonial 
era mechanisms created for political control, to enhance his strategic position within 
the political environment. Despite Nyerere’s rhetoric about transforming Tanzania to 
exist in genuine ‘uhuru’, free from any colonial hangovers – he was willing to govern, in 
some respects, in a similar way to the former British governors; autocratically. This was 
perhaps best demonstrated in the next phase of the ujamaa program.  
Frustrated with the slow progress of the program, and the reluctance of many 
Tanzanians to embrace his vision, Nyerere became impatient to see the fruits of his 
transformative program. Cartwright recalls, ‘in 1973 Nyerere openly abandoned the 
reliance on persuasion for rural transformation, announcing… it was time to force 
                                                          
409
 Cartwright, p. 172 
410
 Ibid, p. 173 
128 
 
people to move in order to save them from continuing “life of death”.’411 In a radio 
broadcast he lauded the benefits his government had brought to the rural population 
such as clean water, healthcare and education, and asked what the peasants had done 
in return – inferring that they had done nothing. The broadcast concluded with 
Nyerere admitting he could not turn people into socialists by force, but he could 
ensure that everyone lived in a village.412 He therefore set his government the target 
of having all rural Tanzanian’s moved into the villages by 1976. In order to meet the 
deadline party officials and district administrators began planning ‘operations’ that 
were to involve truckloads of rural people being ‘dumped’ onto new sites. 413 
Unfortunately for the displaced persons, minimal preparation was done to get the sites 
of their new villages up to standard; as the government officials doing the planning did 
not have to live with the outcomes. This was deeply reminiscent of the colonial era. 
The government officials were also responsible for burning the homes and crops of the 
transported villages, so as to prevent them from returning once moved.414  
Between 1973 and 1977 around 11 million people were moved into new villages. 
Meredith asserts that was one of the greatest mass movements in African history. 
Nyerere strategically employed this figure, telling his people and the world that such a 
movement could not have been accomplished by force and that the move was 
overwhelmingly voluntary. ‘Eleven million people could not have been moved by force 
in Tanzania; we do not have the physical capacity for such forced movement, any more 
than we have the desire for it.’415 
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Whether this mass migration was a consequence of transformative leadership and 
Nyerere’s conversion of enough of the population into moral agents, or whether it was 
an example of naked power wielding remains contentious. It was likely a combination. 
Nyerere was correct in asserting the Tanzanian state, and all the resources of TANU 
were not capable of orchestrating such a move against the will of the people, however, 
stories of brutality and coercion were too common to allow Nyerere to claim he had 
the complete cooperation of the Tanzanian people. Even writers sympathetic to the 
experiment such as French writer Sylvain Urfer, articulated some of the harsh realities 
of the villagisation; ‘it was as if a tidal wave had washed over the country, with millions 
of people being moved in a dictatorial manner, sometimes overnight, on to waste land 
that they were expected turn into villages and fields.’416  
 Meredith writes that the disruption caused by the villagisation almost caused 
catastrophe with food production falling drastically and the incidence of famine 
spreading across the country.417 Nyerere’s government attempted to mitigate the food 
supply crisis with food imports, though this almost completely depleted Tanzania’s 
foreign exchange reserves. Eventually Nyerere was obliged to turn to the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund for the fiscal assistance he needed to among other 
things, feed his people. A project in self-reliance spun-out into large scale dependence 
on international aid and assistance.  By 1979 90% of Tanzania’s population had been 
moved into ujamaa villages, yet the collectivised system of agriculture was only 
producing 5% of Tanzania’s agricultural output.418 
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The program of state control of the commanding heights of the economy was no more 
successful. The nationalisations spawned a number of state controlled enterprises that 
were systemically inefficient. They were ‘incompetently managed, over staffed and 
mired in debt.’419 Myriad state commercial organisations were established to provide 
banking and insurance services, as well as manage state farms, state marketing boards 
and even state shops. Meredith notes that these organisations were run by managers 
who behaved more like bureaucrats than businessmen. They ran their organisations as 
though they were part of the civil service, which created unfortunate levels of 
patronage within the economy.420  Members of the workforce came to believe their 
jobs were permanently assured by the socialist state – significantly limiting workers 
motivation and efficiency. Nyerere made a speech in 1977 entitled ‘The Arusha 
Declaration Ten Years After,’ in which he ‘bitterly complained’ about the chronic 
inefficiency within the bloated state sector – arising from the ‘indifference and laziness 
of managers and workers.’421 Nyerere asserted; ‘It is essential that we should tighten 
up on industrial discipline. Slackness at work, and failure to give a hard day’s effort in 
return for wages, is a form of exploitation; it is an exploitation of other members of 
society. And slackness has undoubtedly increased since the Arusha Declaration was 
passed.’422 A Burns and Greenstein explanation of this dilemma could hold that the 
moral orientation of significant numbers of the citizenry had remained untransformed 
by Nyerere’s fervent teachings on socialism, and therefore formed an oppressive block 
within the situational context that had considerable potential to derail Nyerere’s goals.  
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Cartwright explores this idea, relating it back to the colonial era. ‘Actions under 
colonial rule, and the fact that colonial authorities had so much more power than 
previous rulers to enforce their edicts, left a legacy of deep suspicion and distrust of 
“the government”.’423 During the colonial era it was prudent for the African to lay low 
when any government officials appeared; because ‘even an innocent census question 
about one’s children or cattle or crops might be the prelude to a new tax.’424 Colonial 
officials further contributed to the distrust by taking the line that such evasiveness was 
best treated with force rather than persuasion. These perceptions of government were 
not alleviated by attempts to enfranchise Africans during the decolonisation; 
Cartwright muses, ‘the reality of government for most Africans was authoritarian 
power wielded in an unpredictable and capricious manner.’425 The colonial era also 
saw Government viewed primarily as an external entity which existed for the 
extraction of profits for the benefit of others elsewhere. Common perception was that 
government was ‘alien and arbitrary’ – and this did not inspire loyalty. Cartwright 
asserts that even with African’s of the calibre of Nyerere in control, this perception 
was slow to change. ‘The suspicion of government… made it very difficult for any 
leader to mobilise popular enthusiasm for a government-led development effort.’426 
Therefore, despite Nyerere’s considerable transformative leadership skill, the 
situational context had framed the orientation of the followership toward the 
government. This meant that Nyerere could not inspire key quarters to involve 
themselves in his development project. Furthermore, acknowledging the government 
was historically ‘alien and arbitrary,’ members of the citizenry had no traditional 
loyalty to it –meaning some individuals did not suffer any moral problems when 
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extracting unintended benefits from it. This fits within Burns’ framework as elements 
of the followership in this case fit within his follower classification as ‘apathetics.’ Their 
apathy toward the leader-follower relationship was frustrating Nyerere’s leadership 
endeavours.   
Despite Nyerere’s best efforts to encourage Tanzanians to come behind the project 
and work towards it, the state enterprises continued to operate in the same fashion. 
The Tanzanian economy became beleaguered by the inefficiency and the huge and 
recurring losses the state enterprises incurred. Towards the end of the 1970s the 
situation did see some improvement with the food supply recovering, though Tanzania 
was still running ‘a serious balance-of-payments deficit.’ 427  In 1978 Tanzania’s 
economic problems were compounded again with drought, the rising cost of oil and a 
war to end Idi Amin’s brutal dictatorship in Uganda. Nyerere’s decision to commit the 
Tanzanian military to ending Amin’s tyrannous regime demonstrated his high level of 
moral purpose, however also highlighted his inability to fully comprehend the 
economic ramifications. Cartwright argued, ‘the war… was clearly one of the most 
justifiable wars in history, but it dealt Tanzania’s economy a costly blow.’428 More than 
half of Tanzania’s limited export earnings were dedicated to the war effort between in 
1978 and 1981, the other half was consumed by oil imports. Nyerere’s economic woes 
were compounded by a drought during the same period which dramatically reduced 
Tanzania’s grain production. This combination of problems forced Nyerere to go to the 
international community ‘cap in hand’ for food aid and long term loans.429 The 
international community responded, and by 1982 the annual level of foreign aid 
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reached $600 million.430 Without these funds ‘Tanzania would have plunged into 
penury.’431 As Tanzania entered the 1980’s, the country was more reliant on foreign 
assistance than before Arusha. In a state broadcast to mark twenty years of 
independence, Nyerere admitted to his people ‘we are poorer now than we were in 
1971.’432 Nyerere’s navigation of his highly oppressive situational context had crippled 
his leadership agenda. Meredith writes that Nyerere’s achievement was related not to 
the success of the strategic path he had chosen, ‘but to his ability to persuade foreign 
sponsors that his objectives were sincere.’433 
Despite Nyerere’s woeful economic record, analysis must take into account some of 
the significant successes of his leadership. As a result of Nyerere’s leadership efforts, 
Tanzania had diverted substantially from the course of many of its decolonised 
counterparts. For example in the field of education, health and social services Nyerere 
oversaw near unprecedented improvements. In 1976 Nyerere’s government had 
achieved a 66% literate population, one of the highest levels in Africa.434 Primary 
school enrolment increased from one quarter of the school aged population to 95%.435 
40% of villages in Tanzania were given access to clean tap water and 30% had health 
clinics.436 Nyerere also oversaw life-expectancy increasing by ten years from forty-one 
to fifty-one years.437 According to Cartwright, Tanzania had done more than almost 
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any African state to distribute the benefits of healthcare and education ‘down to the 
ordinary farmer in the bush.’438 This element of ujamaa was successful.  
In 1985 Nyerere announced he would retire after the elections held later that year. He 
was to leave Tanzania one of the world’s poorest countries. What resources were 
available in Tanzania were relatively evenly distributed among the populous, 
something truly distinctive in the context of decolonised Africa.439 Also distinctive in 
the context was that Nyerere was one of six African heads of state out of the 150 who 
had ‘trodden the African stage,’ to voluntarily relinquish power.440 He remained the 
Chairman of the Chama cha Mapinduzi (reformed TANU) until the 1990s, in a role akin 
to being an elder statesman. Perhaps one of the more accurate appraisals of Nyerere’s 
presidency came from a Dar es Salaam market trader, Winnie Naali, who upon 
Nyerere’s death in 1999 wore a black cloth with Nyerere’s image imbedded as a mark 
of respect for Mwalimu. Winnie told a reporter, ‘He was not very clever at economics 
and this was not good for the wealth of the country, but when he realised this, he said 
sorry and resigned. He wanted Tanzania to be one big village, a family for us all, and 
for all of us to take part.’441 
Theoretical Questions of the Leadership of Julius Nyerere 
1. How strategically well placed was Julius Nyerere to affect meaningful political 
change in the selected environments? (Greenstein) 
Nyerere completely altered the course of history in Tanzania. He was located within 
some areas of political life to affect change in an intense and lasting way. The 
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environment itself, however, was in other ways highly resistant to change. Some of 
this resistance was overcome by Nyerere’s leadership, and some of the environmental 
resistance overcame Nyerere. Nyerere’s formidable intellectual energy and personal 
integrity saw him acquire considerable respect within Tanzania’s first governing 
organisation TANU. This empowered his leadership as he was never encumbered by 
any significant internal challenges to his office. Nyerere also had at his disposal a 
popular and willing party organisation. His cementing of the one-party system in 
Tanzania further enhanced his strategic position as electoral competition was never a 
tax upon his political energy. Nyerere’s ability to pre-emptively discern his evolving 
political context also gave him the ability to better locate himself within the leadership 
environment. Nyerere’s limited resources, however, significantly oppressed his 
leadership and endeavours toward his goals. His noble and experimental goals and 
aspirations in national ‘family-hood’ were consistently undermined by the economic 
unviability of the ujamaa project. Nevertheless, Nyerere’s transformation and 
therefore historical impact upon Tanzania was immense. Whilst the lack of economic 
resources undermined the project, the fact that Nyerere made it last so long – and that 
it saw so many Tanzanian lives irrevocably changed, was remarkable. The lack of 
economic resources in Tanzania may well have also empowered the project in that 
there were not any established or major vested economic interests motivated enough 
to challenge Nyerere’s leadership. Thus his strategic location was further enhanced.  
2. How and to what extent did the psychological predispositions of the 
‘followership’ in Tanzania (at different times and phases) enable or disable the 
Nyerere’s ability to lead, and therefore affect historical outcomes? (Burns, 
Maslow)   
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The psychological predispositions of the ‘followership’ were one of the major 
challenges to Nyerere’s leadership. Nyerere was a classic case of Burns’ transformative 
leader. This meant that his leadership was concerned with dynamically interacting with 
the followership in such a way that their motivations and aspirations were 
amalgamated with his own. At times Nyerere delivered such prophetic political 
teaching that the ‘followership’ was genuinely on-board with his project. This was 
often driven, however, by a pre-existing and underlying desire for independence 
among the citizenry. Nyerere could not tap into such nascent issues to support his 
leadership toward African socialism; they simply were not there. Employing Maslow; 
the followership did not necessarily see how their ‘esteem’ or ‘self-actualisation’ needs 
were to be fulfilled living in ujamaa villages. In fact their more basic needs of food and 
security were actually threatened by the programme. This created significant apathy 
within the followership toward Nyerere’s transformative agenda. This, to an extent, 
disabled Nyerere’s leadership. 
3. What were the other forces that made up the ‘situational array’ in Tanzania, 
and how stable or unstable were they? (Greenstein) 
The ‘situational array’ that framed Nyerere’s leadership contained both stable and 
unstable elements. In contrast to Kenya, nationalist feeling had not built up to the 
same radical and violent levels as were demonstrated by the Mau Mau. Tanzania did 
not see a brutal and violent anti-colonial uprising. In this way the situational 
environment was more stable and more suitable for Nyerere’s leadership to affect 
meaningful historical change. This contrasts with Greenstein’s theory that the higher 
the level of environmental restructuring, the greater the potential for a leader to make 
a historical impact. Once Nyerere had taken office the British Government was 
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supportive of Nyerere which had a stabilising impact upon his leadership. Also 
significantly influencing the situational array of historical forces around Nyerere were 
events in Kenya. The horror and brutality of that anti-colonial struggle meant that 
British actors, such as Turnbill were anxious to avoid any reappearance of a Mau Mau 
equivalent emergency in Tanzania. This increased the rate of environmental 
restructuring in Nyerere’s milieu, as after Governor Twining’s administration the 
British were quite accepting of change as a political fact. This also had a stabilising 
effect as it meant Nyerere and his followers carried out their independence struggle 
within a pre-existing governing framework, rather than working from the outside.  
The distinctive lack of a numerous, landowning and vociferous European settler 
population was another feature of Nyerere’s situational array. Elsewhere in Africa the 
presence of such a group formed a considerable part the political environment that 
independence leaders had to navigate. With only around 22,000 Europeans, Nyerere 
was largely spared from this complication within the strategic environment. This was a 
stabilising feature of the environment as it limited the potential for problems around 
ethnic conflict and resource distribution. It may have also had a limited destabilising 
impact after independence. Kenyatta, for example, was quick to capitalise on the 
European population’s experience and ability to support his government while Nyerere 
could not enjoy this benefit to the same extent. This meant that with low levels of 
indigenous education at the time of independence, Nyerere had to recruit a potentially 
less able civil service to support his leadership goals.  
The diffuse nature of African population in Tanzania also had a stabilising and enabling 
impact upon Nyerere’s leadership. In Nigeria for example, one of the major hurdles 
any leadership has to overcome is the strength and assertiveness of the major 
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ethnicities within that country. In Tanzania there were 120 ethnic groupings among the 
African population, none of which large enough to attain a dominant position. This 
stabilised the political environment, further avoiding any potential ethnic conflict a 
leader could be exposed to. This assisted Nyerere’s leadership as his situational array 
or ‘billiard table’ was also spared this complication.  
4. Did Julius Nyerere possess the peculiar strengths required to engage the 
‘followership’ and direct them toward a meaningful goal and thus manipulate 
the situational array – or was the situational array too oppressive for even the 
most skilful political actor to manipulate? (Greenstein, Burns, Maslow) 
Nyerere possessed remarkable skill in the delivery of his message and vision for 
Tanzania. He was often likened to more of a preacher than a politician and was 
affectionately known as mwalimu –a great teacher. When he died in 1999, Tanzania 
stopped.  This was excellent evidence of the extent to which he had dynamically 
engaged with the followership, through his use of his peculiar strength as a moral 
teacher. The direction of the followership toward a meaningful goal was more 
complex. Whilst Nyerere enjoyed nationwide adoration, his ability to guide the 
citizenry in a direction determined by his leadership was undermined. His agents did 
not share his vision, and thus corrupted the noble goals of the ujamaa project. This 
coupled with Tanzania’s meagre economic resources made the situational 
environment too oppressive to complete the transformation Nyerere was seeking. 
According to Maslow’s hierarchy, actors are motivated by ‘needs’. Despite Nyerere’s 
gift for the visionary and moral teaching of his ujamaa goals, the agents he needed to 
action the programme did not share the vision. It was hard to see how their ‘esteem’ 
or ‘self-actualisation’ needs could be fulfilled under ‘ujamaa’, as the programme 
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sought to make them equal with the lowliest of peasants.  This framed the situational 
array to the extent that despite Nyerere’s unique abilities, he was unable to 
manipulate the environment for the full achievement of his goals.  
5. To what extent was the British method of colonial development and 
management responsible for the answers to the above questions?  
In the Tanzanian experience, the British method of colonial development and 
management was different to its normative approach in other parts of Eastern and 
Central Africa. This was driven by several forces. The acquisition of Tanganyika as a 
League of Nations Mandate and subsequently a United Nations Trusteeship meant that 
the paradigm for its colonial management was significantly different to that which 
framed the British approach during earlier times as part of the ‘Scramble for Africa’. At 
the time of its amalgamation into the British Empire, London’s lust for international 
expansion and dominance was, along with its financial resources, largely spent. Whilst 
the acquisition of the Tanganyika Territory completed Cecil Rhodes’ vision of an 
empire stretching from Cape Town to Cairo, the attainment of this dream had lost 
substantial support by the end of the First World War. The Tanganyika Territory was 
never therefore a colonial project of significance the way neighbouring Rhodesia and 
Kenya were. Another force that differentiated the British approach to the Tanganyika 
Territory from their other African possessions was the perceived lack of value they 
placed on the territory. East Africa was already considered a backwater within the 
expansive empire. This was demonstrated by how Britain chose to place the quality of 
their colonial administrators. Murray-Brown noted, ‘East Africa did not attract the 
highest grade of colonial official – India and the Sudan took the cream of the university 
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graduates.’442 In the context of East Africa, the Tanganyika Territory was a considered 
backwater, and a poor one at that. This meant that it received limited policy initiatives 
and development from the Colonial Office, other than the generic ‘long 
apprenticeship’ for self-government. The ‘long apprenticeship’ was to be achieved 
through a policy of ‘multi-racialism’ that was in keeping with the British approach to 
the region. The policy of multi-racialism was a façade for assuring the continued 
dominance of the Governor and the political restraint of the overwhelming African 
majority. This was frustrating enough for members of the African population to drive 
the emergence of an underlying anti-colonial feeling. It was this feeling that Nyerere’s 
leadership was able to build upon.  
The British perception of Tanganyika as a low-value possession meant that, when the 
nationalist movement gained traction, the resistance arising from the colonial 
establishment was less significant than elsewhere. This coupled with the unique 
personalities of Governor Turnbill and Nyerere, meant that the eventual transition of 
power was completed peacefully and from within the pre-existing institutions. The 
degree of stability that this in turn generated had a positive impact upon Nyerere’s 
leadership, and the country as a whole. The goodwill arising from the peaceful 
transition that existed between Whitehall and Nyerere was also an enabling force in 
his leadership.  
The British Government had attempted to pursue pre-independence policies that may 
have limited Nyerere and TANU’s ability to establish an impregnable political position, 
a position that scuttled any chances of electoral competition in the independence era. 
These policies were, however, undermined by an institutional inertia displayed by the 
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Governors of Tanganyika before Turnbill. In this way Nyerere’s strategic position post-
independence was unintentionally enhanced by the earlier intransigence of Governor 
Twining to enfranchise and include more Africans earlier, in the political process.  
The British treatment of the Tanganyika Territory as a backwater significantly 
hampered post-independence economic development, which in turn impacted upon 
Nyerere’s leadership. The infrastructural deficit, as well as the lack of education and 
healthcare available in Tanganyika contributed to the economic challenges that 
eventually proved to be his undoing. In this way his strategic location was weakened 
by a lack of investment by the British (and Germans) throughout the colonial era in the 
territory. Nyerere was not successful in converting enough of the followership to 
sharing his vision for the solution to these problems. Therefore they hurt his leadership 
endeavours significantly. This was, to an extent, off-set by the support the British, and 
other international aid donors provided Nyerere when his economy was in ruins.  
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Conclusion  
‘The very fact of most African state’s newness, and the consequent fluidity of 
their political systems, has given great scope for leaders to take them in a wide 
variety of directions. Their fragile institutions and weak civic culture have 
paradoxically both limited what a leader can do and at the same time enhanced 
his power.’443 
In the 1960s and 1970s Africans reasserted themselves as fundamental actors in the 
process of determining the future of their continent. At the head of this reassertion 
were the political leaders. They optimistically assumed the mantle; many with the 
intent of seeing their inherited colonial states take their ‘place in the sun.’444 This gave 
rise to a new political leadership phenomenon; decolonised African leadership. This 
thesis has explored two examples of this phenomenon, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius 
Nyerere. It has articulated the unique forces that have interplayed with their 
leadership experiences, as directed by the theorists James McGregor Burns and 
Frederick Greenstein. Abraham Maslow was also employed to buttress the Burns’ 
approach to the analysis of leadership. Their theories guided the researcher to look to 
the dynamic interplay between the leader and their political environment as the 
fundamental place to analyse their experiences. This direction was well suited to the 
selected cases. The unique environmental forces that framed these leaders’ 
experiences were one of the major distinctions of this new leadership phenomenon. 
This thesis sought to place extra focus on one of the environmental forces; the British 
method of colonial development and management. In highlighting the extent to which 
the methods of British colonial administration interacted with the leadership 
experiences of Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere, this thesis intends to assist further 
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scholarship in the conceptualisation of the dynamic leadership environment faced by 
the early generations of decolonised African political actors.   
This choice of approach led the researcher to articulate the nature of the British 
Empire, through the analysis of its philosophical foundations, through to its modus 
operandi,  and subsequently how this differed across contexts. With this analysis 
established, focus was applied to how the Empire manifested itself within the selected 
contexts. In the twentieth century, considerable cleavage was observable, between 
the enlightened philosophical approach to Empire that was advanced by the Colonial 
Office in London, and the practices of Britain’s colonial agents on the ground. This 
understanding formed a critical dynamic of this thesis. The extent to which British 
colonial activity framed post-colonial leadership was based on a dichotomy. A theme 
recurrent in this thesis was the Colonial Office attempting to implement policies for 
the enfranchisement of Africans and increases in their participation in civic affairs. 
These attempts were often then corrupted by a considerable institutional inertia that 
existed within the colonial service. This in turn meant that the personalities of the 
British operatives in the selected environments were just as important a unit of 
analysis as the colonial policies emanating from Westminster. These realities 
supported the necessity of articulating the narrative of the unique British operations in 
each of the selected environments; as generalisations prove problematic.  
In Kenya, it was discovered that British operations were often dictated by the powerful 
and vociferous European settler minority and at other times by the sole discretion of 
the autocratic office of the Governor. This side-lined the Colonial Office, along with its 
preference for African inclusion. This proved to be a significant environmental 
influence during the independence struggle, and upon the leadership of Jomo 
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Kenyatta. Britain’s war-time colonial policies also proved to be a substantial 
contribution to the post-colonial leadership environment. British methods of African 
recruitment had seen their village societies reorganised to the extent that for a brief 
period tribal animosity was broken down, and Britain had become the ‘common 
oppressor.’  
The environmental dynamics of Kenya in the mid-twentieth century were framed by an 
apparent cooperation between key settler stakeholders and the Governor, to retard 
African political progress. This was a major environmental contribution by the British 
to Kenyatta’s leadership equation. The resistance to change saw political pressures 
build up to an extent that not even Kenyatta could control their outburst. This outburst 
was the Mau Mau Emergency; a near decade long struggle that grew into one of the 
British Empire’s most significant twentieth century African legacies.  
In Tanzania (or Tanganyika as referred to at the time), the British Empire’s appearance 
and operations was significantly different. They framed the leadership environment in 
a distinctive way to that was observed in Kenya. Tanganyika was not the valued 
possession that Kenya was, and was never chosen as a location for organised 
settlement. Tanganyika did not offer the British any noteworthy resource 
endowments, or any large and utilisable labour force. This saw the territory governed 
as an almost after-thought – with only loose regional policies applied, if any. Whilst the 
same institutional inertia was observable through governors such as Twinning, the 
Empire’s manifestation in Tanganyika had a different impact on the post-colonial 
leadership milieu of Julius Nyerere.   
Frederick Greenstein’s prism was effective in encompassing how the above imperial 
operations fed into the leadership equation. Greenstein’s billiard table metaphor for 
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conceptualising the location of the actor within an evolving milieu proved especially 
useful. Greenstein’s prism efficiently led the researcher to uncovering how British 
operations framed post-colonial leadership. This was through the establishment of 
leadership context; and how such operations created an oppressive or manipulable 
political environment that tested the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of the actors. 
Greenstein’s contribution in regard to ‘environmental restructuring’ was also helpful. It 
directed the researcher to look to the extent to which the environment around the 
leader was evolving as a means of discerning how meaningful their historical impact 
was likely to be. In both cases there were high levels of environmental restructuring 
present, as this was the nature of decolonisation. These high levels of restructuring, 
however, cannot be assumed to have gifted the leaders the ability to affect history by 
taking their countries in any direction they chose. It perhaps was best demonstrated in 
the Nyerere case, while restructuring did occur, there were also underlying elements 
of the situational context that were fixed, and non-navigable for even the most skilful 
political actor.    
Theorist James McGregor Burns (supported by Abraham Maslow) advised the 
researcher to analyse the relationship between the leader and context through the 
following prism. Burns’ directs the researcher to scrutinise the relationship between 
the leadership and followership as the primary means of understanding and classifying 
the type of leadership they are observing. Burns’ transformational typology was 
observable in both the Kenyatta and Nyerere cases, though significantly more in the 
latter than the former. Burns held that transformational leadership occurs when a 
leader is able to mobilise their understanding of nascent issues within the followership 
to the extent that they can manipulate that group of followers’ moral orientation 
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toward the leaders’ goals. Critical here is the acknowledgement of when nascent issues 
did and did not exist, with special interest in how the British colonial methods 
influenced this. For example, both subject leaders were successful in engaging with 
underlying colonial resentment, and guiding it within their own leadership goals to 
great effect. In the post-colonial era, however, this process became more complex. 
Kenyatta took a ‘transactional path’ post-independence, in that rather than trying to 
transform the morality of the citizenry, he sought to achieve leadership through a 
series of transactions with the various groups of followership. Kenyatta offered 
stability and prosperity – which saw the increasing satisfaction of Maslow’s needs 
within key aspirational groups, and in exchange, those key groups allowed Kenyatta to 
pursue the one-party state, and to make himself politically impregnable.  
Nyerere’s approach was different. In the post-colonial era, he pressed on with a 
transformative agenda. He sought to further teach his philosophy to the followership 
in such a way that he hoped their morality would be elevated to a similar level as his 
own. Whilst noble, this approach failed to recognise a critical element of successful 
transformational leadership as held by Burns.  Despite Nyerere’s ‘Ghandian’ efforts to 
preach the virtues of his ujamaa philosophy to the followership – the necessary 
underlying feeling within the followership was not available for Nyerere to manipulate 
or guide. Nyerere needed at least a core-group of committed agents who had been 
converted to his vision to complete the transformations he was seeking. Unfortunately 
for the lofty goals of ujamaa, such a group did not exist. In this way Nyerere’s desire to 
see his country transformed along the lines of his African socialist philosophies was 
continually frustrated by a lack of affiliation to his goals displayed by the very people 
he most needed to implement them.  
147 
 
In both cases it appeared that without Britain ‘the common oppressor’, post-colonial 
transformational agendas seemed elusive. The nascent and uniting political issues 
were sparsely available to leaders for the mobilising and manipulation of the 
followership toward their goals. This resulted in leaders either settling for a 
transactional approach as occurred in Kenya, or alternatively suffering ultimately 
abortive transformational efforts, as occurred in Tanzania. The synthesis of this idea 
with Maslow and Greenstein’s theoretical contribution is perhaps best visualised in the 
following diagram.  
 
Figure 4.1 – The imagined spectrum of political choices vs. the actual spectrum of 
choices available to leaders at independence 
 
Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere had honourable goals that motivated their 
leadership endeavours. At independence the relationship between these leaders and 
their followers was framed by high levels of confidence and optimism. Both leaders 
saw some of their optimistic goals achieved and succeeded in improving the lives of 
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many of their followers. Their leadership environment was, however, undeniably 
oppressive and limiting. Upon inheriting ‘uhuru’ the leaders believed they had a wide 
spectrum of political paths upon which they could embark. The reality was different. 
There were structural limitations within the milieu which could not be overcome; 
many of which were bequeathed upon Nyerere and Kenyatta by their British 
predecessors.  
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